Piaget,Moral Development and the Curriculum

Abstract

In The Moral Development of the Child Piaget proposes a sketch of a developmental account of moral judgments, and the sequence of stages which he there proposes have been widely taken to provide a basis for any adequate developmental account. However, if Piaget's work on cognitive development is taken as providing a standard by which to judge such theories it is doubtful that moral development can be accounted for through the use of the equilibrium concept. The very notion of ‘a moral judgment’ with which Piaget works imposes severe restrictions on the adequacy of the theory, leading him necessarily to ignore important issues. Furthermore, there seems to be no underpinning available to secure the necessary order of the stages, and as a matter of fact some children seem to show evidence of a capacity to make advanced moral judgments at an early age. It is argued, therefore, that the search for developmental structures of this kind should be abandoned.     

Moral and Religious Education

Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.     

The Existentialists and Problems of Moral and Religious Education: 2. Tillich and Jaspers

Abstract

This assessment of L. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a dialectical critique focusing on his claim that the sixth stage of moral development is morally adequate, specifically, that it is both comprehensive and fully equilibrated. The dialectical method employed follows the generalized empirical method advanced by B. Lonergan. The paper includes a brief account of this method and of the sixth stage of moral reasoning as outlined by Kohlberg. Employing the dialectical notions of intellectual conversion and moral conversion, it uncovers certain unresolved conflicts of this stage and points to the need for a further moral stage of development, which would be both more highly differentiated and more fundamentally based.     

A Comparative Study of Moral Development of Korean and British Children

The present study explored Kohlberg's theory of moral development in relation to Korean and British children. A total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7-16 years were interviewed individually using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, Form A. It was thought that the children in both cultural groups would develop moral stages at a similar rate. However, they showed cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In addition, it was not possible to match some of the responses from the Korean children to Kohlberg's manual, implying that there are some Korean traditional concepts which affect Korean children's moral reasoning that Kohlberg was not aware of. Thus, Kohlberg's system could be used to examine children's general moral stage but was insufficient to understand fully Korean children's moral reasoning. The present study suggests that the interpretation of children's moral reasoning should be made based on consideration of cultural influence.     

Moral Reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim Adolescents

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to test the universality of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages of the development of moral judgment in Nigerian and Pakistani cultures. For the first study, 120 Nigerian Muslim Hausa secondary school adolescents (60 boys and 60 girls), whose ages ranged between 14 and 16, were questioned individually about two of Piaget's moral judgment situations, representing two different moral attributes, clumsiness and equality. In the second study, 90 subjects (30 Nigerian Muslim Hausa, 30 Nigerian Muslim Yoruba, and 30 Pakistani Muslim Punjabi adolescents), whose ages ranged between 12 and 13, were questioned about one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. The nature of the subjects’ responses suggested that moral reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim adolescents are greatly affected by their cultural values.     

Moral Authority and Moral Education

Abstract:

Elsewhere, the author has argued that the liberal theory of moral education is both morally dangerous and philosophically mistaken. The moral educator cannot be morally neutral, but must be morally committed, even if he is to attempt to teach children how to think for themselves about moral questions, or develop their autonomy, rather than indoctrinate them. This position implies that the moral educator must be a moral authority. The author defends this claim against subjectivists who deny the existence of moral authority by arguing that the possibility of moral judgment creates the possibility of moral authority.     

Kohl berg's Cognitive‐Developmental Theory in Educational Settings: Some Possible Abuses

Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.     

Kohlberg and Piaget: Aspects of their Relationship in the Field of Moral Development

Abstract:

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment, though Piaget's work is not the only influence on Kohlberg's ideas. Piaget's system of moral growth is briefly examined, and the extent to which subsequent research has validated it, is noted, thus placing Kohlberg in a historical context. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. The concept of stages and the nature and processes of stage development are discussed, and in this context the relationship between Kohlberg's moral development and Piaget's cognitive development is examined. It is concluded on the basis both of logic and evidence that the relationship, although complex rather than isomorphic, is likely to hold considerable potential for future research.     

A Moral Education in an Ethical System

This article raises a number of interrelated issues. It first considers the need for a disability-aware education for everyone, including post-school leavers. This has both structural and curricular implications. At the structural level, it is argued that if we are to move towards a more ethical educational system, institutional discrimination must be dismantled. At the curricular level, the notion of a "culture of resistance", with distinctive moral characteristics, is explored. The article next considers the moral education of disabled people, covering such issues as recognition of alternative perspectives, building on life-experience and the development of self-confidence and self-esteem. In conclusion, it is suggested that a moral education in an ethical system would integrate universalising understandings of the principle of justice, and its application, with the development of contextual thought which can take account of the value and uniqueness of individuals and the particularity of their educational needs.     

Hypothetical Moral Situations

Abstract:

Hypothetical moral situations are often used by teachers and researchers in order to simulate real‐life moral problems. This article draws some logical distinctions between different types of moral conflict and the different types of question that can be asked about them. It is suggested that this approach must have serious limitations if it is assumed that there is a direct and straightforward connection between hypothetical and real‐life moral judgments, as the former necessarily lack the situational features of the latter.     

Moral Judgement Development Within the Family

Abstract

This paper examines research and theory regarding the process of moral judgement development within the family environment. Four major issues in research on the family's influence on moral judgement development are outlined and the existing data relevant to these issues are briefly presented. The author's approach to studying these issues is described. The implications of research on moral development within the family for moral education are also addressed.     

R.S. Peters and Moral Education, 1: The Justification of Procedural Principles

Abstract

In this article, which is the first of two to examine the ideas of R. S. Peters on moral education, consideration is given to his justificatory arguments found in Ethics and Education. Here he employs presupposition arguments to show to what anyone engaging in moral discourse is committed. The result is a group of procedural principles which are recommended to be employed in moral education. This article is an attempt to examine the presupposition arguments Peters employs, to comment on the procedural principles he believes are presupposed, and to consider the strength of the presupposition argument. My conclusion is that Peters's arguments fail to establish the conclusion he arrives at, and that any gains from the form of argument he uses are hollow.     

Moral Education and the Training of Teachers

Abstract

In this study of the relationship between moral behaviour, level of moral development, and motivation, moral behaviour was assessed in an experimental situation in which it was necessary to violate the experimenter's authority to help someone; level of moral development was assessed by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, and motivation by a post‐experimental interview.

Although 72 per cent of the subjects stated afterwards that they felt that they should help, only 43 per cent did, and only 6 per cent volunteered their own service. As the level of moral development rose, an increasing percentage of subjects helped. Subjects interpreted the same situation differently and were motivated to make the same response for different reasons, which varied with their level of moral development.     

Responsibility,Moral Judgment and Moral Obligation

Abstract

This paper describes the evolution of the just community approach from Lawrence Kohlberg's earliest educational theorizing to the most recent experimental applications. The just community approach represents Kohlberg's most mature theory of moral education and has been the subject of intense research since 1975. Although Kohlberg initially recommended the discussion of moral dilemmas as a means of promoting moral development, he envisaged a far more radical and comprehensive approach. Inspired by a kibbutz school that successfully combined democratic and collectivist values, Kohlberg and his colleagues initiated a series of experimental programmes in public high schools. Evaluation of these programmes indicates that they establish cultures conducive to the development of socio‐moral reasoning and action.     

Moral Education in the Netherlands

Abstract

Although moral education is or ought to be a standing concern, both in the family and in society, this article mainly deals with moral education in basic schools in the Netherlands. As such it is a counterpart of religion in the denominational schools. It is organized by the Dutch Humanistisch Verbond (Humanist League) which is also responsible for the teacher's training and the methods of teaching. That defines the humanist context of this form of education. Thus humanist moral education makes a major contribution ‐‐ albeit only in a minority of schools ‐‐ to a humanist development of children.     

Theorising Drama as Moral Education

Although it is commonly assumed within schools that drama has a place within moral education, there is very little theory or analysis to support the assumption. This article sketches a theoretical framework to show how and in what ways drama can make a distinctive contribution to the field. Drawing upon Stenhouse (1975) it proposes a broad distinction between moral instruction and moral induction and analyses drama's potential contribution to both areas. In so doing, it draws links between the cultural practices of the theatre and those of the drama classroom, analysing the moral potential of the dramatic experience through five theoretical lenses. These include the enacted nature of dramatic narrative; the association between drama and the learning of rules; the communal function of drama as a public artform; dialogue and dialogism in drama; and the relationship between emotion, reason and moral engagement in drama.     

Ethics before Equality: Moral education after Levinas

Emptiness, indeed nihilism, is a characteristic of so much contemporary discourse regarding morality and moral education. This is found in facile notions of teaching right and wrong but also in the prevalence of rights-talk, with its sacrosanct assumptions about equality. This article examines this discourse in the light of Levinas' account of the primacy of ethics - of my absolute responsibility in the face of the other, of the asymmetry of my relation to the other. It seeks an account of receptivity that releases the ethical from the limitations of moral reasoning.     

Modes of Moral Thought

Abstract

This paper reviews current theories of moral development and points out a number of common aspects which appear to lack full empirical support. An alternative theory of moral development, proposed by Norman Williams, is tested here and its main conclusions receive tentative support. These are that moral development is cumulative rather than linear in nature and that it takes place within four separate modes ‐‐ expedient, altruistic, intuitive and heteronomous ‐‐ in parallel.

It is suggested that this classification scheme provides a valuable research tool for investigating the relationship between moral thought and variables such as age, sex, intelligence and social class, but that confirmation of its basic hypotheses is essential before further research can be undertaken.     

Kant's Account of Moral Education

While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant's moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.