Getting to No: Pragmatic and Semantic Factors in Two‐ and Three‐Year‐Olds' Understanding of Negation

Although infants say “no” early, older children have difficulty understanding its truth‐functional meaning. Two experiments investigate whether this difficulty stems from the infelicity of negative sentences out of the blue. In Experiment 1, given supportive discourse, 3‐year‐olds (N = 16) understood both affirmative and negative sentences. However, with sentence types randomized, 2‐year‐olds (N = 28) still failed. In Experiment 2, affirmative and negative sentences were blocked. Two‐year‐olds (N = 28) now succeeded, but only when affirmatives were presented first. Thus, although discourse felicity seems the primary bottleneck for 3‐year‐olds' understanding of negation, 2‐year‐olds struggle with its semantic processing. Contrary to accounts where negatives are understood via affirmatives, both sentence types were processed equally quickly, suggesting previously reported asymmetries are due to pragmatic accommodation, not semantic processing.     

A Similarity Heuristic in Children’s Possibility Judgments

Children often judge that strange and improbable events are impossible, but the mechanisms behind their reasoning remain unclear. This article (N = 250) provides evidence that young children use a similarity heuristic that compares potential events to similar known events to determine whether events are possible. Experiment 1 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds who hear about improbable events go on to judge that similar improbable events can happen. Experiment 2 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds more often affirm that improbable events can happen if told about related improbable events than if told about unrelated ones. Finally, Experiment 3 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds affirm the possibility of improbable events related to known events, but deny that related impossible events can happen.     

Accent,Language, and Race: 4–6‐Year‐Old Children's Inferences Differ by Speaker Cue

Three experiments examined 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds' use of potential cues to geographic background. In Experiment 1 (N = 72), 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds used a speaker's foreign accent to infer that they currently live far away, but 6‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 2 (N = 72), children at all ages used accent to infer where a speaker was born. In both experiments, race played some role in children's geographic inferences. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 48), 6‐year‐olds used language to infer both where a speaker was born and where they currently live. These findings reveal critical differences across development in the ways that speaker characteristics are used as inferential cues to a speaker's geographic location and history.     

Carving Metacognition at Its Joints: Protracted Development of Component Processes

Two experiments investigated the development of metacognitive monitoring and control, and conditions under which children engage these processes. In Experiment 1, 5‐year‐olds (N = 30) and 7‐year‐olds (N = 30), unlike adults (N = 30), showed little evidence of either monitoring or control. In Experiment 2, 5‐year‐olds (N = 90) were given performance feedback (aimed at improving monitoring), instruction to follow a particular strategy (aimed at improving control), or both. Across conditions, feedback improved children's monitoring, and instruction improved both monitoring and control. Thus, children's poor metacognitive performance likely reflects a difficulty engaging the component processes spontaneously rather than a lack of metacognitive ability. These findings also suggest that the component processes are distinct, with both undergoing protracted development.     

The Development of Selective Copying: Children's Learning From an Expert Versus Their Mother

This study tested the prediction that, with age, children should rely less on familiarity and more on expertise in their selective social learning. Experiment 1 (N = 50) found that 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds copied the technique their mother used to extract a prize from a novel puzzle box, in preference to both a stranger and an established expert. This bias occurred despite children acknowledging the expert model's superior capability. Experiment 2 (N = 50) demonstrated a shift in 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds toward copying the expert. Children aged 9–10 years did not copy according to a model bias. The findings of a follow‐up study (N = 30) confirmed that, instead, they prioritized their own—partially flawed—causal understanding of the puzzle box.     

Infants' Perception of Emotion From Body Movements

Adults recognize emotions conveyed by bodies with comparable accuracy to facial emotions. However, no prior study has explored infants' perception of body emotions. In Experiment 1, 6.5‐month‐olds (n = 32) preferred happy over neutral actions of actors with covered faces in upright but not inverted silent videos. In Experiment 2, infants (n = 32) matched happy and angry videos to corresponding vocalizations when the videos were upright but not when they were inverted. Experiment 3 (n = 16) demonstrated that infants' performance in Experiment 2 was not driven by information from the covered face and head. Thus, young infants are sensitive to emotions conveyed by bodies and match them to affective vocalizations, indicating sophisticated emotion processing capabilities early in life.     

Order Matters: Children's Evaluation of Underinformative Teachers Depends on Context

The ability to evaluate “sins of omission”—true but pragmatically misleading, underinformative pedagogy—is critical for learning. This study reveals a developmental change in children's evaluation of underinformative teachers and investigates the nature of their limitations. Participants rated a fully informative teacher and an underinformative teacher in two different orders. Six‐ and 7‐year‐olds (N = 28) successfully distinguished the teachers regardless of the order (Experiment 1), whereas 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds (N = 82) succeeded only when the fully informative teacher came first (Experiments 2 and 3). After seeing both teachers, 4‐year‐olds (N = 32) successfully preferred the fully informative teacher (Experiment 4). These results are discussed in light of developmental work in pragmatic implicature, suggesting that young children might struggle with spontaneously generating relevant alternatives for evaluating underinformative pedagogy.     

Where Culture Takes Hold: “Overimitation” and Its Flexible Deployment in Western,Aboriginal, and Bushmen Children

Children often “overimitate,” comprehensively copying others' actions despite manifest perceptual cues to their causal ineffectuality. The inflexibility of this behavior renders its adaptive significance difficult to apprehend. This study explored the boundaries of overimitation in 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children of three distinct cultures: Westernized, urban Australians (N = 64 in Experiment 1; N = 19 in Experiment 2) and remote communities of South African Bushmen (N = 64) and Australian Aborigines (N = 19). Children overimitated at high frequency in all communities and generalized what they had learned about techniques and object affordances from one object to another. Overimitation thus provides a powerful means of acquiring and flexibly deploying cultural knowledge. The potency of such social learning was also documented compared to opportunities for exploration and practice.     

The Role of Speaker Knowledge in Children's Pragmatic Inferences

During communication, conversational partners should offer as much information as is required and relevant. For instance, the statement “Some Xs Y” is infelicitous if one knows that all Xs Y. Do children understand the link between speaker knowledge and utterance strength? In Experiment 1, 5‐year‐olds (N = 32) but not 4‐year‐olds (N = 32) reliably connected statements of different logical strength (e.g., “The girl colored all/some of the star”) to observers who were fully or partially informed. Four‐year‐olds’ performance improved when observer knowledge could be assessed more easily (Experiment 2a, N = 25) but remained the same in a nonlinguistic version of Experiment 1 that preserved the epistemic requirements of the original study (Experiment 2b, N = 26). These findings have implications for the development of early communicative abilities.     

The Development of Simile Comprehension: From Similarity to Scalar Implicature

Similes require two different pragmatic skills: appreciating the intended similarity and deriving a scalar implicature (e.g., “Lucy is like a parrot” normally implies that Lucy is not a parrot), but previous studies overlooked this second skill. In Experiment 1, preschoolers (N = 48; ages 3–5) understood “X is like a Y” as an expression of similarity. In Experiment 2 (N = 99; ages 3–6, 13) and Experiment 3 (N = 201; ages 3–5 and adults), participants received metaphors (“Lucy is a parrot”) or similes (“Lucy is like a parrot”) as clues to select one of three images (a parrot, a girl or a parrot-looking girl). An early developmental trend revealed that 3-year-olds started deriving the implicature “X is not a Y,” whereas 5-year-olds performed like adults.     

Seeing Iconic Gesture Promotes First- and Second-Order Verb Generalization in Preschoolers

This study investigated whether seeing iconic gestures depicting verb referents promotes two types of generalization. We taught 3- to 4-year-olds novel locomotion verbs. Children who saw iconic manner gestures during training generalized more verbs to novel events (first-order generalization) than children who saw interactive gestures (Experiment 1, N = 48; Experiment 2, N = 48) and path-tracing gestures (Experiment 3, N = 48). Furthermore, immediately (Experiments 1 and 3) and after 1 week (Experiment 2), the iconic manner gesture group outperformed the control groups in subsequent generalization trials with different novel verbs (second-order generalization), although all groups saw interactive gestures. Thus, seeing iconic gestures that depict verb referents helps children (a) generalize individual verb meanings to novel events and (b) learn more verbs from the same subcategory.     

The Audiovisual Temporal Binding Window Narrows in Early Childhood

Binding is key in multisensory perception. This study investigated the audio‐visual (A‐V) temporal binding window in 4‐, 5‐, and 6‐year‐old children (total N = 120). Children watched a person uttering a syllable whose auditory and visual components were either temporally synchronized or desynchronized by 366, 500, or 666 ms. They were asked whether the voice and face went together (Experiment 1) or whether the desynchronized videos differed from the synchronized one (Experiment 2). Four‐year‐olds detected the 666‐ms asynchrony, 5‐year‐olds detected the 666‐ and 500‐ms asynchrony, and 6‐year‐olds detected all asynchronies. These results show that the A‐V temporal binding window narrows slowly during early childhood and that it is still wider at 6 years of age than in older children and adults.     

The Influence of First‐Hand Testimony and Hearsay on Children's Belief in the Improbable

Children (3.5–8.5 years; n = 105) heard claims about the occurrence of improbable or impossible events, then were asked whether the events could really happen. Some claims were based on informants' first‐hand observations and others were hearsay. A baseline group (n = 56) reported their beliefs about these events without hearing testimony. Neither first‐hand claims nor hearsay influenced beliefs about impossible events, which remained low across the age range. Hearsay (but not first‐hand claims) did influence beliefs about improbable events. Preschoolers expressed greater belief following hearsay, compared to their beliefs following first‐hand claims and compared to the baseline group's beliefs. By contrast, older children expressed less belief following hearsay, compared to their beliefs following first‐hand claims and compared to the baseline group's beliefs.     

Preschoolers’ Understanding of How Others Learn Through Action and Instruction

It is widely believed that exploration is a mechanism for young children's learning. The present investigation examines preschoolers’ beliefs about how learning occurs. We asked 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds to articulate how characters in a set of stories learned about a new toy. Younger preschoolers were more likely to overemphasize the role of characters’ actions in learning than older children were (Experiment 1, N = 53). Overall performance improved when the stories explicitly stated that characters were originally ignorant and clarified the characters’ actions, but general developmental trends remained (Experiment 2, N = 48). These data suggest that explicit metacognitive understanding of the relation between actions and learning is developing during the preschool years, which might have implications for how children learn from exploration.     

Differential Effects of Salient Visual Events on Memory-Guided Attention in Adults and Children

Both salient visual events and scene-based memories can influence attention, but it is unclear how they interact in children and adults. In Experiment 1, children (N = 27; ages 7–12) were faster to discriminate targets when they appeared at the same versus different location as they had previously learned or as a salient visual event. In contrast, adults (N = 30; ages 18–31) responded faster only when cued by visual events. While Experiment 2 confirmed that adults (N = 27) can use memories to orient attention, Experiment 3 showed that, even in the absence of visual events, the effects of memories on attention were larger in children (N = 27) versus adults (N = 28). These findings suggest that memories may be a robust source of influence on children's attention.     

Out of Reach,Out of Mind? Infants’ Comprehension of References to Hidden Inaccessible Objects

This study investigated the nature of infants’ difficulty understanding references to hidden inaccessible objects. Twelve‐month‐old infants (N = 32) responded to the mention of objects by looking at, pointing at, or approaching them when the referents were visible or accessible, but not when they were hidden and inaccessible (Experiment I). Twelve‐month‐olds (N = 16) responded robustly when a container with the hidden referent was moved from a previously inaccessible position to an accessible position before the request, but failed to respond when the reverse occurred (Experiment II). This suggests that infants might be able to track the hidden object's dislocations and update its accessibility as it changes. Knowing the hidden object is currently inaccessible inhibits their responding. Older, 16‐month‐old (N = 17) infants’ performance was not affected by object accessibility.     

Mini managers: Children strategically divide cognitive labor among collaborators,but with a self-serving bias

Strategic collaboration according to the law of comparative advantage involves dividing tasks based on the relative capabilities of group members. Three experiments (N = 405, primarily White and Asian, 45% female, collected 2016–2019 in Canada) examined how this strategy develops in children when dividing cognitive labor. Children divided questions about numbers between two partners. By 7 years, children allocated difficult questions to the skilled partner (Experiment 1, d = 1.42; Experiment 2, d = 0.87). However, younger children demonstrated a self-serving bias, choosing the easiest questions for themselves. Only when engaging in a third-party collaborative task did 5-year-olds assign harder questions to the more skilled individual (Experiment 3, d = 0.55). These findings demonstrate early understanding of strategic collaboration subject to a self-serving bias.     

Prelinguistic Relational Concepts: Investigating Analogical Processing in Infants

This research asks whether analogical processing ability is present in human infants, using the simplest and most basic relation—the same–different relation. Experiment 1 (N = 26) tested whether 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds spontaneously detect and generalize these relations from a single example, as previous research has suggested. The attempted replication failed. Experiment 2 asked whether infants could abstract the relation via analogical processing (Experiment 2, N = 64). Indeed, with four exemplars, 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds could abstract the same–different relation and generalize it to novel pairs. Furthermore, prior experience with the objects disrupted learning. Facilitation from multiple exemplars and disruption by individual object salience are signatures of analogical learning. These results indicate that analogical ability is present by 7 months.     

Connecting the Dots Between Past and Future: Constraints in Episodic Future Thinking in Early Childhood

Preschoolers have limited capacity to use past experiences to prepare for the future. Two experiments sought to further understand these limitations. Experiment 1 (N = 42) showed that 3- to 4-year olds’ difficulty performing anticipated future actions was constrained by their memory for relevant past actions, especially those including temporal information. Experiment 2 (N = 94) sought to determine whether preschoolers fail to see that past experiences can inform future-oriented actions. When the connection between the past and future was experimentally heightened, future thinking accuracy improved, but only if preschoolers remembered past experiences. The results indicate that past recall is a prerequisite for future thinking but failure to bridge past and future further accounts for observed limitations in future thinking in early childhood.     

From Flexibility to Constraint: The Contrastive Use of Lexical Tone in Early Word Learning

Infants must develop both flexibility and constraint in their interpretation of acceptable word forms. The current experiments examined the development of infants' lexical interpretation of non‐native variations in pitch contour. Fourteen‐, 17‐, and 19‐month‐olds (Experiments 1 and 2, N = 72) heard labels for two novel objects; labels contained the same syllable produced with distinct pitch contours (Mandarin lexical tones). The youngest infants learned the label–object mappings, but the older groups did not, despite being able to discriminate pitch differences in an object‐free task (Experiment 3, N = 14). Results indicate that 14‐month‐olds remain flexible regarding what sounds make meaningful distinctions between words. By 17–19 months, experience with a nontonal native language constrains infants' interpretation of lexical tone.