Reasoning in Young Children: Fantasy and Information Retrieval

The present article examines 2 predictions concerning conditional reasoning in children derived from Markovits's model of conditional reasoning. The first claims that children under 12 years of age should be able to respond correctly to uncertain logical forms if the premises and context enable them to access pertinent counterexamples from memory. The second concerns the effect of reasoning in a fantasy context. Previous studies have established that young children can correctly respond to certain reasoning problems with empirically false premises when these are presented in a fantasy context. However, this model of reasoning predicts that presenting empirically true premises in a fantasy context should decrease performance on the 2 uncertain logical forms. In Study 1, a total of 48 8-year-olds, 78 10-year-olds, and 74 12-year-olds were given 4 reasoning problems involving familiar premises. These problems were embedded in either a fantasy or a realistic context and presented via video tape. Results were consistent with the predictions made. Study 2 attempted to determine whether these results could be due to context or problem formulation. A total of 40 7-year-olds and 46 8-year-olds were given reasoning problems with either no context or with a visual image preceding the problems. Results showed that children did equally well in these conditions, and that providing an image did not improve performance.     

Children and adults' intuitions of what people can believe

Two preregistered studies tested how 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and adults judged the possibility of holding alternative beliefs (N = 240, 110 females, U.S. sample, mixed ethnicities, data collected from September 2020 through October 2021). In Study 1, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were supported by evidence (but judged they could without this evidential constraint). In Study 2, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were moral beliefs (but judged they could without this moral constraint). Young children viewed moral beliefs as more constrained than adults. These results suggest that young children already have sophisticated intuitions of the possibility of holding various beliefs and how certain beliefs are constrained.     

Young Children's Understanding of "Remember" and "Forget"

3 studies examined young children's understanding that if one "remembers" or "forgot," one must have known at a prior time. In Study 1,4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood the prior knowledge component of "forgot"; both groups understood that a character with prior knowledge was "gonna remember." Study 2 controlled for the possibility that good performance on "remember" might be due to a simple association of remembering with knowledge. A significant number of 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that when 2 characters currently knew, the one with prior knowledge remembered, and that when neither character currently knew, the one with prior knowledge forgot. Study 3 made prior knowledge more salient by making the remembered or forgotten item visible to the subjects throughout. 4-year-olds performed near ceiling on both verbs, whereas 3-year-olds' performance did not differ from chance. The results are discussed in relation to children's developing understanding of the mind.     

Mapping novel nouns and verbs onto dynamic action events: are verb meanings easier to learn than noun meanings for Japanese children?

The present research examined how 3- and 5-year-old Japanese children map novel nouns and verbs onto dynamic action events and generalize them to new instances. Studies 1 to 3 demonstrated that although both 3- and 5-year-olds were able to map novel nouns onto novel objects, only 5-year-olds could generalize verbs solely on the basis of the sameness of the action. Study 4 showed that the difficulty young children experience in learning verbs lies mainly in mapping the appropriate element to a verb rather than in encoding and remembering an action itself. The results of this research are related to a long-debated issue of whether noun learning is privileged over verb learning.     

There's More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye: Young Children's Difficulty Understanding Biased Interpretation

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.     

The development of children's ability to fill the gaps in their knowledge by consulting experts

This research investigated children's ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge and seek missing information from appropriate informants. In Experiment 1, forty-five 4- and 5-year-olds were adept in assigning questions from 3 domains (medicine, firefighting, and farming) to corresponding experts (doctor, firefighter, or farmer). However, when given the options of answering the same questions themselves or assigning them to an expert (Experiment 2), only 6-year-olds were consistently able to recognize when they did not know answers and then assign test questions correctly. Four- and 5-year-olds tended to overestimate their own knowledge or assign questions to the wrong expert. This result was replicated in Experiment 3, in which 5-year-olds were given incentives for correct answers.     

Components of young children's trait understanding: behavior-to-trait inferences and trait-to-behavior predictions

Trait attribution is central to people's na?ve theories of people and their actions. Previous developmental research indicates that young children are poor at predicting behaviors from past trait-relevant behaviors. We propose that the cognitive process of behavior-to-behavior predictions consists of two component processes: (1) behavior-to-trait inferences and (2) trait-to-behavior predictions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds can infer trait labels from behaviors. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds can predict behaviors from trait labels but not from past behaviors. Experiment 3 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds understand traits as predictive and stable over time. Taken together, these three studies show that young children, in possessing component trait-reasoning processes, have a nascent understanding of traits.     

Preschool children's difficulty understanding the types of information obtained through the five senses

Two studies explored 3- and 4-year-olds' (N = 60) understanding that the five senses can each lead to different types of knowledge. In Study 1, 40 children engaged in five scenarios in which they could only perform one sensory action to identify the property of an object (e.g., color, scent). After performing the action, children were asked how they found out the property and to show the experimenter how they had found it out. Using a Mr. Potato Head doll, children were also asked to indicate the sensory organ the doll would need to use to identify the property. In Study 2, 20 children presented with five Mr. Potato Head dolls, each sporting only one sensory organ (e.g., a nose), were asked which Mr. Potato Head could find out the property in question. The 3-year-olds performed significantly poorer than the 4-year-olds on all tasks, suggesting a marked transition in children's ability to recognize the origin of their modality-specific knowledge during the time period between 3 and 4 years of age.     

Phantoms and fabrications:young children's detection of implausible lies

The present study investigated whether young children are gullible and readily deceived by another's lies. Specifically, this study examined whether young children believe a lie teller's statement when the statement violates their developing knowledge of a distinction between reality and fantasy. In the first three experiments 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 293) were presented with either a story or a live staged event in which an individual made an implausible statement about a misdeed (claiming that a ghost jumped out of a book and broke a glass). A significant age effect was obtained: 5- and 6-year-olds tended to report that the individual who made the implausible statement had actually committed the misdeed, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds tended to accept the claim of the protagonist. Experiment 4 revealed that 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 43) not only disbelieved an individual's implausible statement but also inferred that the individual was lying and had a deceptive intent. In contrast, Experiment 5 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 41) had difficulty disbelieving an individual's implausible claim about an inanimate object (i.e., the claim that a chair came alive and broke the glass). The findings suggest that 5- and 6-year-olds are not so gullible as previously thought, and that they use their well-developed real-world knowledge to detect scapegoating lies. In contrast, many younger children tend to believe another's implausible lies, perhaps due to the fact that the knowledge needed to detect such lies has not yet been consolidated.     

Using Scaffolding Strategies to Promote Young Children’s Scientific Understandings of Floating and Sinking

The purposes of this study are to examine young children’s explanations of floating and sinking and to investigate how scaffolding strategies provided by a tutor could promote their scientific understandings. Fifteen 4-year-olds and fifteen 5-year-olds from a public kindergarten in northern Taiwan participated in this study. The children were interviewed before and after an instructional intervention to examine their understandings about how the weight, volume, and material of an object are related to sinking and floating. During the intervention, children manipulated objects made of different materials and were assigned to one of the three groups: scaffolding-material (provided with teaching scaffolding and allowed to see the materials of the objects), scaffolding (teaching scaffolding only), and material groups (seeing the materials only). In the first two groups, 16 teaching strategies based on six scaffolding principles were employed. Analyses of interviews showed that before the intervention, the 4-year-olds seemed to have a variety of explanations for sinking and floating and a majority of the 5-year-olds used weight as an explanation for floatation. After the intervention, both 4- and 5-year-olds in the scaffolding-material and scaffolding groups improved their understandings of floating and sinking. Particularly, three out of five 5-years-olds in the scaffolding-material group related the material of an object to its buoyancy and generalized their explanations to the objects made of the same material. The findings suggest that manipulative experiences alone might not be enough for children to further their understandings about floatation and that combining teaching scaffolding with children’s perceiving of the materials of objects is more effective. This study provides insight into how to support young children to learn science through effective teaching strategies.     

Using Representations: Comprehension and Production of Actions with Imagined Objects

Previous research suggests that young children have difficulty producing actions with imagined objects (pantomimes): They frequently substitute a body part to represent the object involved in the action. This response has also been observed in neurologically impaired adults. Study 1 examined the comprehension and production of pantomimes in 3- and 5-year-old children and normal adults to explore further this aspect of representational ability. Results indicate that young children not only have difficulty producing imaginary object representations in contrast to normal adults, they also have difficulty comprehending imaginary object representations and are better at comprehending pantomimes with a body part representation. The results from the pantomime comprehension task were replicated in Study 2 with 3- and 4-year-olds. These findings are discussed in the context of the development of representational ability as children demonstrate increasing independence from concrete environmental support in their knowledge about actions.     

Causal Learning Across Culture and Socioeconomic Status

Extensive research has explored the ability of young children to learn about the causal structure of the world from patterns of evidence. These studies, however, have been conducted with middle-class samples from North America and Europe. In the present study, low-income Peruvian 4- and 5-year-olds and adults, low-income U.S. 4- and 5-year-olds in Head Start programs, and middle-class children from the United States participated in a causal learning task (N = 435). Consistent with previous studies, children learned both specific causal relations and more abstract causal principles across culture and socioeconomic status (SES). The Peruvian children and adults generally performed like middle-class U.S. children and adults, but the low-SES U.S. children showed some differences.     

Preschoolers' Understanding of the Link between Thinking and Feeling: Congnitive Cuing and Emotional Change

In 3 studies we investigated 3- through 6-year-olds' knowledge of thinking and feeling by examining their understanding of how emotions can change when memories of past sad events are cued by objects in the current environment. In Study 1, 48 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were presented with 4 illustrated stories in which tocal characters experience minor sad events. Later, each story character encounters a visual cue that is related to one of his or her previous sad experiences. Children were told that the character felt sad and they were asked ot explain why. Study 1 suggested considerable competence as well as substantial development in the years between 4 and 6 in the understandings of the influence of mental activity on emotions. Studies 2 and 3 more systematically explored preschoolers' understanding of cognitive cuing and emotional change with difterent types of situations and cues. Across these 2 studies, 108 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds listened to illustrated stories that featured story characters who each experienced a sad event and swho were later exposed to a related cue. Children were not only asked to explain why the characters suddenly felt sad, but in some stories, they were also asked to predict and explain how another character, who was never at the past sad event, would feel. Results of studies 2 and 3 showed an initial understanding of cognitive cuing and emotion in some children as young as 3, replicated and extended the evidence for significant developmental changes in that understanding during the preschool years, and revealed that the strenght and consistency of preschoolers' knowledge of cognitive cuing and emotion was affected by whether cues were the sme, or only similar to, parts of the earlier events.     

One Cow Does Not an Animal Make: Young Children Can Extend Novel Words at the Superordinate Level

Six match-to-sample picture/object selection experiments were designed to explore children's knowledge about superordinate words (e.g., "food") and how they acquire this knowledge. Three factors were found to influence the learning and extension of superordinate words in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 230): The number of standards (one versus two), the type of standards presented (from different basic-level categories versus from the same basic-level category), and the nature of the object representations used (pictures versus objects). A different pattern of superordinate word acquisition was found between 3-year-olds and 4- and 5-year-olds. Although 4- and 5-year-olds could learn and extend novel words to superordinate categories in the presence of two picture exemplars from different categories or a single three-dimensional (3-D) exemplar, 3-year-olds could do so only in the presence of two 3-D exemplars. These findings indicate that young children's acquisition of superordinate words is influenced by multiple factors and that there is a developmental progression from multiple exemplars to single exemplars in superordinate word learning.     

The Use of Trait Labels in Making Psychological Inferences

Three studies investigated children's capacity to use trait labels as tools for making inferences about mental states. For example, knowledge that a story character is "nice" as opposed to "mean" could lead to predictions that the character would respond with greater negative affect upon discovering that his or her action had made someone upset. Study 1 (N = 48) examined whether participants (kindergartners, second graders, fifth graders, and adults) would make different psychological inferences based on whether a character was labeled as "nice" versus "mean." Study 2 (N = 30) examined the same issue with 4-year-olds using a simpler methodology. Study 3 (N = 30) extended the results of Study 2, by examining whether describing characters as "shy" versus "not shy" would lead 4-year-olds to make different mental state inferences. Taken together, these findings suggest that even for young children, trait labels can serve as a basis for making nonobvious inferences. Developmental differences are discussed.     

Young Children's Understanding of Forgetting over Time

2 studies investigated young children's understanding that as the retention interval increases, so do the chances that one will forget. In Study 1 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 characters who simultaneously saw an object, the character who waited longer before attempting to find it would not remember where it was. In study 2 (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds), 4-year-olds but not 3-year-olds understood that of 2 objects seen by a character, the object that was seen a "long long time ago" would be forgotten and the object seen "a little while ago" would be remembered. The findings are discussed in relation to research on young children's understanding of the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of knowledge over time.     

Young Children''s Understanding of the Role That Sensory Experiences Play in Knowledge Acquisition

3 studies investigated whether young children understand that the acquisition of certain types of knowledge depends on the modality of the sensory experience involved. 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children were exposed to pairs of objects that either looked the same but felt different, or that felt the same but looked different. In Study 1, 36 children were asked to state, when one of these objects was hidden inside a toy tunnel, whether they would need to see the object or feel it in order to determine its identity. In Study 2, 48 children were asked to state which of 2 puppets knew that an object hidden inside a tunnel possessed a given visual or tactile property, when one puppet was looking at the object and the other was feeling it. In Study 3, 72 children were asked, in a scenario similar to Study 2, to state for each puppet whether he could tell, just by looking or by feeling, that the hidden object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Children were also asked what was the best way to find out whether a given object possessed a certain visual or tactile property. Results of all 3 studies suggest that an appreciation of the different types of knowledge our senses can provide (i.e., modality-specific knowledge) develops between the ages of 3 and 5. The results are discussed in relation to young children's developing understanding of the role that informational access plays in knowledge acquisition.     

Preschoolers' Ability to Distinguish Living Kinds as a Function of Regrowth

In order to acquire a theory of biology, children must acquire knowledge about living kinds. Although many studies have shown that preschool children do not accurately classify living kinds and do not use appropriate properties when asked to decide whether something is a living kind, recent work has shown that 3- and 4-year-olds do know something about biological growth. The ability of kinds to heal through regrowth was used in this paper as a measure of children's implicit understanding that plants and animals can be grouped together. In 3 experiments, children were told that animals, plants, and artifacts had been damaged and were asked whether the objects could heal through regorwth and whether a person could mend them. In all studies, children were sensitive to ontological kind, 4-year-olds realized that both plants and animals can regrow but that artifacts must be fixed by human intervention. 3-year-olds were less knowledgeable but did realize that artifacts cannot regrow. Overall, children showed some biological knowledge, implicity grouping plants and animals together and differentiating them from artifacts.     

The Development of Children's Knowledge about Inner Speech

Two studies demonstrated that preschool children have little knowledge and awareness of inner speech. Study 1 showed that, in contrast to 6-to7-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds usually did not infer that a person silently engaged in such intrinsically verbal mental activities as reading, counting, or recalling items from a shopping list was saying things to herself. They also tended to deny that covert speech is a possible human activity. Study 2 demonstrated that 4-and 5 year-olds are much poorer than adults at detecting their own inner speech. Children seem to acquire this sort of knowledge and awareness during the early school years, perhaps through experiencing their own inner speech while reading, writing, adding, and subtracting.