| 工程监理制度下的委托代理博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 秦旋.工程监理制度下的委托代理博弈分析[J].中国软科学,2004(4):142-146. |
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| 作者姓名： | 秦旋 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,建工学院,天津,300072;华侨大学,土木工程系,福建,泉州,362011 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论中的"委托-代理理论"对工程监理制度下的业主与工程师之间的委托代理关系进行了分析。根据不同的假设条件构造了两类业主与工程师之间的委托-代理博弈模型,在此基础上分析了两博弈方(业主和工程师)的选择和行为。通过设计合理的监理合同(激励合同),利用内外部约束机制和市场声誉能有效抑制在不对称信息环境下的道德风险,为我国监理制度的健康发展提供了有益的启示。
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| 关 键 词： | 工程监理 委托代理 道德风险 博弈 最优合同 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-9753(2004)04-0142-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年8月8日 |
Game Analysis of Principal- agent Relationship under the Engineering Supervision Institution |
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| QIN Xuan.Game Analysis of Principal- agent Relationship under the Engineering Supervision Institution[J].China Soft Science,2004(4):142-146. |
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| Authors: | QIN Xuan |
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| Abstract: | The principal-agent relationship between employer and engineer is analyzed by applying "principal-agent theory" in the game theory. Two types of principal-agent model are established according to different hypothesis, and the players' action and choices are analyzed. The incentive contract between employer and engineer, interior and exterior constraint mechanism as well as reputation effects play sufficient roles in reducing the moral hazard, which provide implications for healthy development of Chinese engineering supervision institution. |
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| Keywords: | engineering supervision principal-agent moral hazard game theory best contract |
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