| 有效市场竞争对供应链中道德风险的制约 |
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| 引用本文： | 何宾,贾怀京.有效市场竞争对供应链中道德风险的制约[J].安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2004,32(3):282-285. |
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| 作者姓名： | 何宾 贾怀京 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 温州师范学院,经济管理学院,浙江,温州,325035
2. 北京邮电大学,经济管理学院,北京,100876 |
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| 摘 要： | 供应链中的委托代理问题主要包括由事前信息不对称引起的逆向选择问题和由事后信息不对称引起的道德风险问题.有效的市场竞争对供应链企业间道德风险问题具有制约作用,在长期有效的市场竞争环境下,供应链各合作企业将会更关注供应链联盟的整体竞争力,而把自己当前的利益放在次要的位置.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 有效市场竞争 道德风险 均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-2435(2004)03-0282-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年11月17日 |
Restriction of effective market competition on the moral hazard problem in supply chain |
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| HE Bin.Restriction of effective market competition on the moral hazard problem in supply chain[J].Journal of Anhui Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences),2004,32(3):282-285. |
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| Authors: | HE Bin |
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| Abstract: | In the supply chain, the problems in agency mainly involve the adverse selection caused by ex ante information asymmetry and moral hazard caused by ex post information asymmetry. Efficient market competition can restrict the moral hazard among enterprises in the supply chain. Under the circumstance of a long-term effective market competition the enterprises will pay more attention to the competition ability of the whole supply chain rather than their own interests. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain effective market competition moral hazard equilibrium |
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