| 风险投资中委托代理问题与制度安排 |
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| 引用本文： | 乔桂明,卜亚.风险投资中委托代理问题与制度安排[J].科研管理,2004,25(1):118-122. |
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| 作者姓名： | 乔桂明 卜亚 |
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| 作者单位： | 苏州大学商学院,苏州,215021 |
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| 摘 要： | 风险投资运作过程中，存在着由于信息不对称而导致的委托代理问题。在我国，由于风险投资业起步较晚、不规范运作普遍，委托代理问题更为严重。本文从风险投资组织形式的安排、中介机构的设立和监管体制的完善等制度安排视角，对这一问题进行了较为全面的探讨，以期规范我国的风险投资运作，促进我国高科技产业的快速发展。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 委托代理 制度安排 信息不对称 中介机构 中国 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-2995(2004)01-005-0118 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年3月4日 |
The principal-agent problem on venture capital market and institution arrangement |
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| Qiao Gui-ming,Bo Ya.The principal-agent problem on venture capital market and institution arrangement[J].Science Research Management,2004,25(1):118-122. |
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| Authors: | Qiao Gui-ming Bo Ya |
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| Abstract: | There is asymmetry of information on venture capital market.Especially in China,because venture capital was introduced into China only in 1980s,its principal-agent problem is very prevalent.The author explains this problem fully from three aspects.First of all,adopting the venture capital partnership for China;secondly,establishing Chinese intermediary for venture capital industry;thirdly,perfect supervision system.Only by these,can venture capital operate efficiently and prompt high-tech industry's development. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital the principal-agent problem institution arrangement |
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