首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择
引用本文:杨慧军,杨建君.股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择[J].科研管理,2015,36(4):48-55.
作者姓名:杨慧军  杨建君
作者单位: 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西 西安 710049
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71272138),2013-2016;教育博士点基金(20110201110016),2012-2014。
摘    要:基于委托代理理论及技术创新理论,探讨股权集中度对企业技术创新选择的影响。以182家制造企业及高新技术企业数据为样本,利用因子分析及结构方程模型对相关假设进行检验。结果表明:(1)经理人激励在股权集中度和技术创新之间具有中介效应;(2)股权集中度和经理人短期薪酬激励呈负相关,和经理人长期薪酬激励呈正相关;(3)短期薪酬激励不利于突变创新,长期薪酬激励有利于突变创新和渐进创新。

关 键 词:股权集中度  突变创新  渐进创新  经理人激励
收稿时间:2013-03-13

Ownership concentration,managerial compensation and technology innovation choices
Yang Huijun,Yang Jianjun.Ownership concentration,managerial compensation and technology innovation choices[J].Science Research Management,2015,36(4):48-55.
Authors:Yang Huijun  Yang Jianjun
Institution:School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
Abstract:We analyze the impacts of ownership concentration on technological innovation based on the agency theory and innovation theories. By introducing managerial compensation as mediate variable, we construct the logical relationship of "ownership concentration-managerial compensation-technological innovation" . After testing our hypotheses utilizing data of 182 companies from Chinese manufacture and high-technology industries with EFA,CFA an SEM analyses,we find that managerial compensation mediate the relationship between ownership concentration and technological innovation;and ownership concentration is negativity related to managerial short-term compensation, but is positively related to managerial long-term compensation. Moreover, short-term compensation goes against radical innovation, but long-term compensation promotes both radical and incremental innovation.
Keywords:ownership concentration  radical innovation  incremental innovation  managerial compensation
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《科研管理》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《科研管理》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号