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清代山西票号的激励机制及其对当代银行监管的启示
引用本文:杨兰.清代山西票号的激励机制及其对当代银行监管的启示[J].韩山师范学院学报,2003,24(1):27-32.
作者姓名:杨兰
作者单位:上海财经大学金融学院,上海,200433
摘    要:票号是19世纪中国历史上一个重要的金融组织,其中,最负盛名的是山西票号,它在没有政府监管的情况下,繁荣昌盛近一个世纪,后因战乱不断才逐渐倒闭并消失。山西票号的经营制度深谙委托代理之道,也就是今天在经济学界大行其道的激励理论,并形成了一套行之有效的激励机制。尽管时代和环境都发生了变化,激励问题是永恒的。山西票号的激励制度的启示对当代中国银行业监管效率的改进是有益的。

关 键 词:委托代理  激励机制  动机监管
文章编号:1007-6883(2003)01-0027-06

An analysis of the incentive mechanism of Qin Dynasty's Shanxi Piaohao and how it works in current banking supervision
YANG,Lan.An analysis of the incentive mechanism of Qin Dynasty''''s Shanxi Piaohao and how it works in current banking supervision[J].Journal of Hanshan Teachers College,2003,24(1):27-32.
Authors:YANG  Lan
Abstract:Piaohao is a kind of very important financial institu tion in Chinese banking history. It was prosperous in the 19 century and had fad ed away during that turbulent times. However its unique and efficient management structure, especially the use of the incentive mechanism and the disposal of th e relation of agent-principal, are still worth learning for the current banking supervision.
Keywords:the relation of agents and principals  incentive me chanism  motive supervision  
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