| 风险投资中最优融资合约的多阶段博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 万良勇,周欢.风险投资中最优融资合约的多阶段博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2012,32(6):236-239. |
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| 作者姓名： | 万良勇 周欢 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州,510640
2. 中山大学岭南学院,广东广州,510275 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学规划青年项目(09YJC630083);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20090172120037);华工社科基金项目(x2gsN7090050) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于风险投资家和风险企业家之间存在的双重道德风险,构建多阶段动态博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法分析该模型,讨论股权收益、清算收益对两方的激励作用以及风险投资家的资本结构对其总收益的影响。在此基础上,进一步就如何通过签订最优融资合约以达到最优激励效果进行分析,验证风险投资家采取股权—债权相结合的投资工具的合理性。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 双重道德风险 融资合约 多阶段投资 |
Analysis on Multi - stage Game of the Optimal Financial Contract in Venture Capital Investment |
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| WAN Liangyong
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ZHOU Huan.Analysis on Multi - stage Game of the Optimal Financial Contract in Venture Capital Investment[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2012,32(6):236-239. |
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| Authors: | WAN Liangyong ZHOU Huan |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China; 2.School of Lingnan,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the double moral hazard between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs,we construct a multi-stage dynamic game model.We discuss the incentive effect of liquidation proceeds and stock returns on venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs and the influence of capital structure of venture capitalists on their total income.Based on the multi-stage game model,we discuss how to use the best suitable financial contract to get the best incentive effect and we testify the rationality of the investment instrument comprised by equity and debt instrument. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital double moral hazard financing contract multi-stage investment |
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