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基于碳税的供应链合作减排补贴策略研究
引用本文:孟卫军,姚雨,申成然.基于碳税的供应链合作减排补贴策略研究[J].科技管理研究,2018(9).
作者姓名:孟卫军  姚雨  申成然
作者单位:重庆交通大学经济与管理学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目“低碳环境下制造企业再制造决策与优化策略研究”( 71303272,71302196)
摘    要:在低碳可持续发展背景下,供应链企业会利用各自研发优势合作减排。为研究此类合作减排的补贴策略问题,在基于政府向终端产品收取碳税的政策下,构建三阶段政企博弈模型,对无政府补贴、投入补贴、减排量补贴3种情形进行比较分析。研究表明,在碳税政策下,无论政府是否给予补贴,企业都会进行合作减排;两种方式的补贴均可以提高减排量、企业利润和政府效益,但较投入补贴方式,政府按减排量补贴的效果更为显著。

关 键 词:低碳供应链  合作减排    Stackelberg博弈  投入补贴  减排量补贴
收稿时间:2017/7/22 0:00:00
修稿时间:2017/9/7 0:00:00

A Research of Subsidies for Cooperative Emission Reduction in Supply Chain based on Carbon Tax
Abstract:To achieve low carbon sustainable development, the supply chain enterprises cooperate in R Dto fully take advantage of respective capacity. How to make subsidy policy on supply chain enterprises who cooperate in emission abatement. To solve this problem, based on the emission tax on end products,the three-stage government-enterprise game model is established, in which three situations are analyzed and compared: no subsidy, subsidy for input of R D, subsidy for amount of emission. The conclusion is:fiestly, whether theSgovernmentSprovides subsidy or not,SenterprisesSwillScooperate inSemission abatementSunerSthe carbonStax; seccondly, the both subsidy policies can promote the emission reduction, corporate profits and social we-lfare. But The effect of subsidy on amount of emission is more significant than that of the input subsidy.
Keywords:low-carbon supply chain  cooperation in emission abatement  Stackelberg game model  subsidy for input of R D  subsidy for amount of emission
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