高技术计划项目分段投资的激励契约设计

随着政府近年来对高技术计划项目的投资力度不断加大,作为项目承担主体的科研机构的道德风险问题越来越突出。因此,亟需设计一套科学合理的激励与约束机制,来提高科研机构的研发效率。为此,本文基于委托-代理理论,构建了高技术计划项目分段投资的激励契约设计模型,并分析在此模型下科研机构的分阶段选择努力水平,研究了分段投资和激励契约在减轻科研机构道德风险中的作用,最后对政府的高技术计划项目的投资管理提出了对策建议。

Incentive contract design for staged investment in hi -tech projects

Recently,along with the increasing of the government investment for hi-tech plan projects,the moral hazard originated from these science research institutes becomes more and more severe.Designing a set of appropriate mechanisms for the incentive and restraint to improve the research efficiency of these institutes is desiderated.Based on the principle-agent theory,an incentive contract model for staged investment in hi-tech plan projects is established,and the staged strive levels of these science institutes are analyzed.Then,the role of staged investment and incentive contract for mitigating moral hazard of the sciense research institutes is reseached.Finally,some suggestions for the investment management of hi-tech plan projects are put forward.