供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型

以两条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,讨论了两供应链采用不同决策结构时链间Stackelberg博弈问题,并对链间博弈四种决策结构(分散—分散、分散—集中、集中—分散、集中—集中)进行比较分析。研究结果表明,1)对于领导者供应链来说,集中决策是其占优策略;2)对于追随者供应链来说,采用集中决策还是分散决策,则取决于产品可替代性的高低和领导者供应链的选择;3)当产品替代度较低时,集中—集中结构是链间单次和多次重复博弈的均衡解;当产品替代度较高时,集中—分散结构是链间单次博弈均衡解,而分散—分散结构则是多次重复博弈均衡策略。

The decision model of vertical structure under Stackelberg game among supply chains

By taking two supply chains as a research object, each of them containing one manufacturer and one retailer, the problem involving Stackelberg game is discussed, when two supply chains adopt different decision structures, respectively. In particular, four decision structures between these two supply chains are analyzed, including the structures of decentralized-decentralized, decentralized-centralized, centralized- decentralized, centralized-centralized. It is found that (1) centralized decision is the dominate strategy for the leader supply chain;(2) as for the follower supply chain, whether adopting centralized decision or decentralized decision, it is depended on the substitutability degree of products and the selection of the leader supply chain; (3) when the substitutability degree of product is low, the structure of centralized-centralized is the equilibrium solution of single and repeat games; and when the substitutability degree of product is high, the structure of centralized-decentralized is the equilibrium solution of single game; while the structure of decentralized -decentralized is the equilibrium solution of repeat games.