校企合作创新的协调失灵、再匹配与发展机制——基于省际校企合作创新的面板数据分析

论文在借鉴匹配理论和博弈论的基础上,构建了一个两阶段的高校与企业的合作创新模型。模型显示,成功的合作创新有赖于校企双方各自进行较高水平的技术研发努力和设备投资。但是在两阶段合作过程中,协调失灵可能导致双方的投入激励较低,致使合作失败,再加上较高的合作再匹配成本,会进一步抑制合作创新发展。论文利用省际的中国工业企业与高校的合作创新数据检验了本文的主要推论。计量结果显示,当一个地区从事新技术开发或投资的校企比重越低时,该地区的合作创新"市场厚度"越薄,合作分离后的再匹配成本越高,该地区的合作创新将朝着恶性循环方向发展。不过,政府对合作创新的支持会降低分离风险,提高合作协调性。

Coordination failure,re-matching and development mechanism of cooperative innovation between enterprises and universities-An analysis of cooperative innovation between enterprises and universities based on the panel data of provinces

On the basis of matching theory and game theory, this paper established a two-stage model of cooperative innovation between enterprises and universities. The model shows that the successful cooperative innovation depends on universities' high R&D efforts and enterprises' high level of equipment investment. However, in a two-stage process of cooperation, coordination failure and high re-matching cost may inhibit investment efforts of both sides, and leading to cooperation failure. Using the panel data of China's inter-provincial cooperative innovation between universities and industrial enterprises, the paper further explore the impact factors which influence the re-matching of collaborative innovation. Econometric analysis showed that the higher proportion of new technology development and investment in a region, the thicker of the university-enterprise cooperation "market". The match cost is low, and the cooperative innovation goes towards a virtuous circle. Meanwhile, the government's funding may reduce the possibility of separation and coordination failure of cooperative innovation between enterprises and universities.