技术不确定的研发项目投资时机期权博弈分析

抢先还是等待？研发项目投资时机的期权博弈分析表明,单头垄断时,企业只要考虑延迟投资带来的价值;而双头垄断可以有两种均衡：合作投资价值VC始终大于先动投资价值VL时,合作投资是均衡,但会晚于单头垄断时;VC与VL存在交点时则形成先动者-跟随者均衡,竞争将投资临界点提前。

Option-game analysis for the entrance time of R&D projects investment under technologic uncertainty

To be preemptive or waiting? The analysis on the entrance time of R&D project investment using option-game theory shows that the monopoly considers only the value of deferred investment. But there are two types of equilibriums for the duopoly, namely, the cooperative investment equilibrium which is invested later than that for the monopoly when the value of cooperation is always larger than that of preemption investment; and the leader-follower equilibrium when the two types of investment values have an intersection. Moreover, the critical point of investment is advanced because of the competition.