试论新农保实施过程中的逆向选择和道德风险及解决对策

"新农保"制度内生式的缺陷使其难以有效地规避机会主义行为1]表现下的逆向选择和道德风险的悖论,并且仅依靠政府强大的政策"攻势"并不能达到新农保人人参与、人人受益的效果。新农保的运营过程是典型的信息不对称条件下的经济主体的交易行为,虽然新农保有别于商业保险,但信息不对称条件下的新农保运营过程也就必然存在着逆向选择和道德风险。当事人事前的机会主义被称为逆向选择,事后的机会主义称为道德风险。本文以经济学机会主义为基本视角,通过对新农保运营过程中参与主体的行为分析,旨在提出能够合理规避参与主体"非完全理性"的行为,以促进新农保制度的健康运营。

Try to talking of the adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of the implementation of the new rural insurance and solutions

Endogenous defects in the new rural insurance system so that it is difficult avoid opportunistic behavior performance under ad verse selection and moral hazard paradox, and only rely on strong government policy ＂offensive＂ and can＇t reach the new rural insurance for everyone involved, the effect of benefit everyone. Operational process of the new rural insurance transaction behavior of economic entities under the typical condition of asymmetric information, the new rural insurance is different from commercial insurance, but the process of the new farmer ＇s insurance operations under asymmetric information conditions will inevitably exist adverse selection and moral hazard. The parties beforehand opportunism is called adverse selection, ex post opportunism known as moral hazard. The basic economics opportunism perspective, through the analysis of the behavior of the new farmer＇s insurance operations process involved in the main, to reasonably avoid proposals which would participate in the body ＂completely rational＂ behavior, in order to promote the health of operators of the new rural insurance system.