政府奖惩下不同权力结构闭环供应链的决策研究

针对由单个制造商和零售商所组成的闭环供应链,考虑政府奖惩零售商回收废旧品活动的情况,基于博弈论方法,分别构建了集中式、制造商和零售商存在Nash均衡博弈、制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈等模式下的闭环供应链决策模型,进而探讨了政府设置的奖惩力度和废旧品最低回收率分别对四种模式闭环供应链的决策、系统各成员及总利润的影响问题。研究表明:产品的单位批发价格和废旧品的回收率均会随着政府奖惩力度的增加而增加;产品的单位销售价格会随着政府奖惩力度的增加而减少;制造商的利润会随着政府奖惩力度的增加而增加;零售商的利润和集中式决策闭环供应链的总利润同时受到政府奖惩力度和废旧品最低回收率的影响。因此,政府通过设置合理的奖惩力度和废旧品最低回收率,可使得闭环供应链和系统各成员在获得满意经济效益的同时实现生态效益。

Research onthe decision of closed-loop supply chain under the government premium and penalty based on different power structure

Aimed at a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a single manufacture and a single retailer under the government premium and penalty mechanism, this paper constructs a centralized CLSC game model and three decentralized CLSC game models with game theory, which are manufacture and retailer Nash balance, manufacture-stackelberg, and retailer-stackelberg. Then, we discuss the impact of the premium and penalty range as well as lowest return rate on the decision and profits of the four CLSC models. The research shows that as the premium and penalty range increases, wholesale price, collection rate and manufacture's profit increase while retail price reduces. The retailer's profit and CLSC total profit are affected by both government premium and penalty range and the lowest return rate. Therefore, only if the government set up reasonable penalty range and the lowest return rate can CLSC and members in the system obtain economic and ecological benefit.