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考虑质量检查的SaaS服务供应链契约协调
引用本文:杨斌,戴涛,陈煜婧.考虑质量检查的SaaS服务供应链契约协调[J].上海海事大学学报,2020,41(1):87-92.
作者姓名:杨斌  戴涛  陈煜婧
作者单位:上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306;上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306;上海海事大学物流科学与工程研究院,上海201306
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71471110);上海市科学技术委员会科研计划(17DZ2280200)
摘    要:以独立软件开发商(independent software vendor,ISV)为主导的、由ISV与软件即服务(Software-as-a-Service,SaaS)平台运营商组成的两级服务供应链,面临产品缺陷率和努力水平不确定引发的市场需求波动问题。针对该问题,对比分散无协调决策和集中决策下的供应链收益,分析契约协调的必要性;考虑SaaS平台运营商质量检查行为,根据质量检查结果,建立风险共担的补偿契约与惩罚契约相结合的契约模型;考虑ISV无法监控SaaS平台运营商的努力水平和产品缺陷率的不确定性,分析质量检查行为对供应链收益的影响,讨论基于质量检查结果的契约协调。研究表明,根据质量检查结果所提出的契约模型能够有效增加供应链成员的收益,实现供应链协调。通过对模型进行算例分析,指明契约模型的有效性和现实意义。

关 键 词:质量检查  缺陷率  努力水平  补偿契约  惩罚契约
收稿时间:2019/2/21 0:00:00
修稿时间:2019/5/6 0:00:00

SaaS service supply chain contract coordination considering quality inspection
YANG Bin,DAI Tao,CHEN Yujing.SaaS service supply chain contract coordination considering quality inspection[J].Journal of Shanghai Maritime University,2020,41(1):87-92.
Authors:YANG Bin  DAI Tao  CHEN Yujing
Institution:(Institute of Logistics Science&Engineering,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)
Abstract:The two level service supply chain, which is dominated by an independent software vendor (ISV) and composed of ISV and SaaS (Software as a Service) platform operators, is faced with the problem of market demand fluctuation caused by fuzzy product defect rate and uncertain level of effort.Aimed at the problem, the profits under decentralized uncoordinated decision making and centralized decision making are compared, and the necessity of contract coordination is analyzed. Considering the quality inspection behavior of SaaS platform operators, the contract model combining risk sharing compensation contract and punishment contract is established according to the quality inspection results. Considering that ISV cannot monitor the effort level of SaaS platform operators and the uncertainty of product defect rate, the influence of quality inspection behavior on supply chain profit is analyzed, and the contract coordination based on quality inspection results is discussed. The research shows that, the contract model according to the quality inspection results can effectively increase the profits of all parties in the supply chain and realize the coordination of the supply chain. The validity and practical significance of the contract model are pointed out by an example analysis of the model.
Keywords:quality inspection  defect rate  effort level  compensation contract  punishment contract
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