高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理研究

代理理论认为公司债务期限受到债权人和股东之间委托关系的影响,但这是否包含了高管薪酬激励的信息呢?本文运用信号发送理论,提出了基于债权人预期的高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理,对我国2008-2012年实施股权激励计划公司的面板回归分析发现,高管现金薪酬对债务期限的影响呈倒U型,股权激励计划和股票增持有利于提高债务期限,但股权激励强度的影响却是消极的,验证了研究假设。最后就高管薪酬契约设计、债权人对公司信用评估以及信息披露提出了建议。

Impacting mechanism of executive compensation incentive on corporate debt maturity

From the traditional agency theory, debt maturity decision is influenced by the relationships between creditor and shareholder, but whether it includes the information of executive incentive compensation? This paper elucidates the impacting mechanism of executive compensation structure on debt maturity based on creditors' expectation. With the panel data analysis of listed companies that implemented the stock incentive plan from 2008 to 2012, results show that there is a reverse U-shape relationship between executive cash compensation and debt maturity, stock option plan and stake-raising are positive but incentive intensity is opposite, which is consistent with research hypotheses. Last, some advicesis put forward on the executive compensation design, credit rating by creditor, and how to improve information disclosure.