互补性专利联盟是否必要——一个基于讨价还价许可模式的新见解

由互补性专利形成的专利联盟能够克服“专利丛林”问题，提高纵向产业链的经济效率是对专利联盟的一般共识。这一论断是建立在古诺标价模型基础之上的。本文建立了更加符合现实的关于专利许可的两阶段讨价还价博弈模型，得出的结论是无论下游市场是完全竞争市场还是寡头垄断市场，都存在一个弱占优战略均衡。均衡时，产业链联合利润达到最大，且产出等于专利联盟进行联合许可的产出，而总许可价格比专利联盟时的许可价格更低。 这意味着由传统的古诺互补品问题而引发的“古诺效应”并不成立，互补性专利的交易并不需要通过专利联盟许可来克服专利许可交易中出现的所谓诸如“专利丛林”、“费用叠加”、“专利挟持”、“反公地悲剧”等问题。

Is a patent pool inevitable for complementary patents:A new insight of licensing model based on bargaining

It is a general consensus that patent pools made up of complementary patents can overcome patent thicket problem and improve economic efficiency in vertical industrial chain. This argument is based on the Cournot posted prices model. In this paper, we build a more realistic two stage bargaining game model about patent licensing and draw a conclusion that there is a weak dominant strategy equilibrium whatever the downstream market is complete competitive or oligopolic.The joint profit is maximized in the chain and output is equal with the bundled output of patent pool, the total licensing price is less than that of patent pool. This implies that the Cournot effect resulting from Cournot complements problem is no longer valid, a patent pool is not necessary to overcome so-called problems such as patent thicket, royalty stacking, patent holdup, anticommons tragedy in the licensing deals about complementary patents.