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企业群体间信息安全知识共享的演化博弈分析
引用本文:熊 强,仲伟俊,李治文,等.企业群体间信息安全知识共享的演化博弈分析[J].软科学,2014(3):45-50.
作者姓名:熊 强  仲伟俊  李治文  
作者单位:;1.东南大学经济管理学院;2.江苏大学管理学院
摘    要:针对信息安全知识共享平台缺乏效率的问题,运用演化博弈模型对企业群体参与信息安全知识共享平台过程建模并求解分析,得出:共享群体中企业所采用的策略与安全知识共享的成本是密切相关的,当共享成本不断增长,出现多种演化稳定均衡;企业之间的关系将对演化稳定均衡产生影响,在企业相互依赖时其更易采用知识共享策略,而当企业之间为竞争或独立关系时其共享的意愿也较低;如果"搭便车"行为从对方知识共享中获得的收益很大,则企业自身实施知识共享的积极性会大大降低。为了提升公共信息安全水平,政府组织可对共享行为予以补贴,以激励企业实施信息安全知识共享。

关 键 词:企业群体  信息安全  知识共享  演化博弈

Analysis of Information Security Knowledge Sharing among Enterprises Group Based on Evolutionary Game
Abstract:Concerning on the lack of efficiency for the information security knowledge sharing platform,this paper employs the evolutionary game theory to establish a security information sharing model about information security knowledge sharing between enterprises which take part in the sharing platform and concludes: the strategy that enterprises adopts is closely related to the cost of knowledge sharing,the increasing cost of sharing induces multiple evolutionary stable equilibriums; while the relationship among enterprises also affects the outcome of the equilibrium,the knowledge sharing strategy will be adopted by enterprises who are interdependent,whereas,the willingness of knowledge sharing is low for enterprises who are competing or dependent to each other. If the benefit of enterprises from"free-riding"behavior is great enough,the enthusiasm of them conducting the knowledge sharing will be dropped considerably. To improve the level of common information security, it will be helpful for the government to subsidize the sharing behavior and stimulate the incentive of security information sharing.
Keywords:enterprises group  information security  knowledge sharing  evolutionary game
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