| 税收检查的监督博弈模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 郑莉,汪洋. 税收检查的监督博弈模型分析[J]. 顺德职业技术学院学报, 2010, 8(1): 22-24. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1672-6138.2010.01.008 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郑莉 汪洋 |
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| 作者单位： | 顺德职业技术学院,经济管理学院,广东,佛山,528333 |
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| 摘 要： | 以博弈论中的混合战略纳什均衡为分析工具,针对支付函数的不确定性,引入企业规模以及企业年营业收入、社会效用影响因子、税务机关稽查能力因子．通过建立税收机关与纳税企业间的监督博弈模型,从三个方面对监督博弈模型进行了拓展。
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| 关 键 词： | 监督博弈 支付函数 逃税 |
Supervisory Game Model Improvement and Analysis Based on Tax Inspection |
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| ZHENG Li,WANG Yang. Supervisory Game Model Improvement and Analysis Based on Tax Inspection[J]. , 2010, 8(1): 22-24. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1672-6138.2010.01.008 |
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| Authors: | ZHENG Li WANG Yang |
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| Affiliation: | ZHENG Li,WANG Yang (School of Business Administration,Shunde Polytechnic,Foshan Guangdong 528333,China) |
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| Abstract: | Taking mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in game theory as an analysis tool,this paper establishes the supervisory game model between tax authority and rate-paying corporation.According to the inaccuracy of its payoff function,enterprise scale,social effectiveness factor and inspecting ability are introduced into this paper to expand and improve the model from three aspects.The conclusion has the immensely guiding role for improving tax efficiency and preventing tax evasion. |
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| Keywords: | supervisory game payoff function tax evasion |
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