基于消费者补贴的多产品供应链碳减排和价格决策

为研究政府补贴消费者情况下的多产品供应链碳减排优化,考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的多产品两级供应链(制造商处于主导地位),运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别构建制造商和零售商在无政府补贴和政府补贴消费者时的分散决策博弈模型,求解得到最优碳减排率、批发价和零售价。通过比较和分析发现:当政府补贴因子超过一定值时,供应链利润、低碳产品零售价和减排率均优于无政府补贴情形;政府补贴因子和减排难度的变化对制造商、零售商和供应链利润有不同的影响,政府补贴因子的增加和减排难度的降低会促进供应链利润的增加和碳减排率的提高。通过算例分析验证模型的有效性。

Carbon emission reduction and price decision of multi-product supply chains based on consumer subsidy

To study carbon emission reduction optimization of multi product supply chains with government subsidy to consumers, a two stage supply chain with multi products consisting of a dominant manufacturer and a retailer is considered. By the Stackelberg game theory, the decentralized decision making game models of manufacturers and retailers are constructed respectively without government subsidy and with government subsidy to consumers. By solving the models, the optimal carbon emission reduction rate, wholesale price and retail price are obtained. The comparison and analysis show that: when the government subsidy factor is above a certain value, the supply chain profit, the retail prices of low carbon products and the emission reduction rate are higher than those without government subsidy; the changes of the government subsidy factor and the difficulty of emission reduction have different effects on the profits of the manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, where the increase of the government subsidy factor and the decrease of the difficulty of emission reduction help improve the supply chain profit and the carbon emission reduction rate. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.