| 风险投资机构治理机制分析:有限合伙制视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹凤鸣,颜晓燕.风险投资机构治理机制分析:有限合伙制视角[J].科技广场,2011(8):161-164. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹凤鸣 颜晓燕 |
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| 作者单位： | 江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌,330022 |
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| 基金项目： | 南昌市软科学研究科技项目(2010-RKX-009)的阶段性成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 风险投资不同利益主体之间会形成双重委托代理关系,并因此会产生相应的委托代理风险。风险投资的高效运作,必须有效解决这种委托代理风险。本文从监督和激励机制方面,探讨了有限合伙制风险投资企业的治理机制问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 双重委托代理 监督 激励 有限合伙制 |
Analysis of Venture Capital Governance:Limited Partnership Perspective |
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| Cao Fengming Yan Xiaoyan.Analysis of Venture Capital Governance:Limited Partnership Perspective[J].Science Mosaic,2011(8):161-164. |
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| Authors: | Cao Fengming Yan Xiaoyan |
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| Institution: | Cao Fengming Yan Xiaoyan(Finance College of Jiangxi,Normal University,Jiangxi Nanchang 330022) |
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| Abstract: | Venture Investment between the different interest groups will form a dual agency relationship,and would have principal-agent risks.The operation of venture capital must efficiently resolve the risk.The paper explores the problem of governance mechanism of limited partnership venture capital corporate from supervision and motivation. |
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| Keywords: | Dual Principal-agent Supervision Motivation Limited Partnership |
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