首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于演化博弈的再制造策略选择动态分析
引用本文:游达明,朱邵玲.基于演化博弈的再制造策略选择动态分析[J].科技管理研究,2018(17).
作者姓名:游达明  朱邵玲
作者单位:中南大学商学院
基金项目:国家自然科学“环境规制与企业生态技术创新激励:基于央地分权视角的理论与实证研究”(批准号:71573283)
摘    要:基于演化博弈理论建立制造商和经销商的动态博弈模型,分别研究未引入质保机制和引入质保机制下制造商和经销商的决策选择和影响因素。根据制造商和经销商博弈呈现出的长期性和动态性,运用复制动态方程得到两者行为的演化规律。研究结果表明,没有引入质保机制时,再制造主体进行再制造博弈时,制造商和经销商有可能会陷入决策的囚徒困境,从而无法实现生产的最优决策,当引入质保这样一个机制,经销商和制造商可以根据质保的调整进行决策的优化,最终实现生产决策的双重帕累托最优。

关 键 词:再制造  经销商  制造商  质保  演化博弈  囚徒困境
收稿时间:2017/12/8 0:00:00
修稿时间:2018/1/8 0:00:00

Dynamic Analysis of Remanufacturing Strategy SelectionBased on Evolutionary Game
Abstract:Based on the evolutionary game theory, the dynamic game model of the manufacturer and the dealer is established, and the decision choice and influencing factors of the manufacturer and the dealer under the introduction of the warranty mechanism and the introduction of the warranty mechanism are studied respectively. According to the long-term and dynamic of the game between the manufacturer and the dealer, the evolution law of the two is obtained by using the dynamic equation of replication. The results show that when the two remanufactured entities are remodeled without the introduction of the warranty mechanism, the manufacturer and the dealer may fall into the prisoner"s dilemma of decision making and thus can not achieve the optimal decision of production. When a mechanism such as a warranty is introduced, the dealer and the manufacturer can optimize the decision based on the adjustment of the warranty, and ultimately the two parties achieve their respective production
Keywords:remanufacturing  dealer  manufacturer  warranty  evolutionary game  prisoner
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《科技管理研究》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《科技管理研究》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号