股权激励机制与经理的机会集合

现代企业所有权与经营权的分离，使得股东与经理之间形成了委托代理关系，在信息不对称的情况下，委托人有必要对代理人的行为建立一套激励与约束机制。本文就股权激励机制的可行性与合理性加以探讨，通过引入经理的机会集合，构造一股东与经理之间的两阶段博弈，从而确定一适当的股权激励比例。

Stock-based Incentive Mechanism and Managers' Opportunity Set

The separation of ownership and operation of modern firms builds up a principal-agent relation between stock-holders and managers. Under asymmetric information it is necessary for the principal to set up a mechanism of incentive and constraint for the agent. The paper explores the feasibility and reasonability of stock-based incentive mechanism, through the introduction of the opportunity set of managers, makes up a two-perild game between stock-holders and managers, and works out a proper stock-based incentive ratio.