| 创业基金合伙关系的动态激励研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 劳剑东,李湛.创业基金合伙关系的动态激励研究[J].预测,2000,19(6):65-66,51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 劳剑东 李湛 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文讨论了有限合伙制创业基金中有限合伙人与创投家的委托－代理关系，研究了合伙关系的动态激励问题。通过构建多阶段代理模型分析了最优激励契约，并讨论了最优契约的各种决定因素。
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| 关 键 词： | 创业基金 委托－代理关系 最优契约 动态激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2000)06-0065-02 |
The Dynamics of Incentive in Venture Capital Partnerships |
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| LAO Jian-dong,LI Zhan.The Dynamics of Incentive in Venture Capital Partnerships[J].Forecasting,2000,19(6):65-66,51. |
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| Authors: | LAO Jian-dong LI Zhan |
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| Abstract: | The paper discusses the principal-agent problem between limited partner and venture capitalists in venture capital fund. We study the incentive problem in partnerships from a dynamic perspective. We propose muliti-period model under which the optimal contracts were designed. Besides,we discuss some factors affecting contracts. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital venture fund principal-agent optimal contrac| |
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