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基于EPR制度的政府与制造商博弈
引用本文:程永伟.基于EPR制度的政府与制造商博弈[J].软科学,2011,25(11):78-81.
作者姓名:程永伟
作者单位:北京物资学院,北京,101149
摘    要:以检查频率和废旧品回收率作为政府和制造商的博弈策略,引入环境损失系数和激励系数改进得益函数。根据决策的先后顺序,建立同步决策的博弈机制、政府决策在先的博弈机制、制造商决策在先的博弈机制,研究了不同环境损失系数和激励系数下,三种博弈机制的稳定性以及可能引发的社会问题。研究表明:政府公信力和企业诚信是博弈机制正常运行的前提条件;在决策自由度得到保证的前提下,政府应当依据环境损失系数,调整激励系数,实现"双赢"。

关 键 词:逆向物流  政府  制造商  博弈论

Game between the Government and Manufacturer Based on EPR
CHENG Yong-wei.Game between the Government and Manufacturer Based on EPR[J].Soft Science,2011,25(11):78-81.
Authors:CHENG Yong-wei
Institution:CHENG Yong-wei (Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149)
Abstract:This paper adopts the inspecting frequency and recovery rate as the game strategy of the government and manufacturer.It introduces environment loss coefficient and incentive coefficient to improve benefit functions.According to different decision-making order,it builds synchronized decision-making game mechanism,government-first game mechanism and manufacturer-first game mechanism.The stability of three mechanisms and possible social problems are analyzed with different environment loss coefficient and ince...
Keywords:reverse logistics  government  manufacturer  game theory  
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