| 基于委托代理理论的企业研发活动研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王宁,陈思.基于委托代理理论的企业研发活动研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006,27(1):27-30. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王宁 陈思 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京工业大学,经管学院,北京,100022 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业研发过程中由于出资方和项目组双方目标利益的不一致和信息不对称，常常出现委托代理的问题。通过把委托代理理论引入企业研发活动．建立模型求解．发现研发人员的工作热情和该项工作自身的风险性，以厦企业激励制度的实施紧密相关，给出实践对策并建立动态绩效激励合约。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理理论 研发 激励因子 绩效契约 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-0241（2006）01-0027-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-08-13 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年8月13日 |
Analysis of Enterprises' R&D Based on Principal-Agent Theory |
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| WANG Ning,CHEN Si.Analysis of Enterprises'''' R&D Based on Principal-Agent Theory[J].Science of Science and Management of S.& T.,2006,27(1):27-30. |
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| Authors: | WANG Ning CHEN Si |
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| Abstract: | In the R&D process of enterprise agency-principal problems often emerge which is a result of target benefits inconformity and information asymmetry between investors and item executors. This article established a dynamic performance-incentive contract by introducing the principal agent theory into enterprise development activity building up models to recognize the work enthusiasm of R&D staff and the risk of R&D activities. |
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| Keywords: | principal agent theory research and development motivation gene performance agreement |
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