产品市场竞争、债务融资与企业过度投资

债务融资会减少企业可支配的自由现金流,提高经理人败德行为的成本与风险,从而降低股东-经理人之间的代理冲突,约束企业过度投资行为。我国政府干预和预算软约束的影响,弱化了债务融资对国有企业过度投资行为的约束,使得债务融资对非国有企业的治理作用强于国有企业。而产品市场竞争作为企业重要的外部治理机制,在一定程度上加强了债务融资的硬约束作用,随着产品市场竞争程度的提高,企业负债对过度投资行为的抑制作用加强。

Product Market Competition,Debt Financing and Corporation Over-investment

The debt financing will reduce the disposable free cash flow of enterprises and will increase the cost and the risk of managers＇ moral hazard,thereby,to reduce the agency conflict between shareholders and managers,and will suppress over-investment behavior.Because the government intervention and SBC can weaken the effect of the debt financing on state-owned enterprises＇ over-investment,the debt financing＇s governance effect for non-state-owned enterprises is stronger than state-owned enterprises.The product market competition is an important external governance mechanism for enterprises;to some extent,it can strengthen the role of hard constraints of debt financing.The debt financing can suppress over-investment more effectively while product market competition becomes more severe.