Objections to Ostritsch’s argument in “The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation”

This paper raises three objections to the argument presented by Ostritsch in The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation, in which the amoralist’s mantra “it’s just a game” is viewed as an illegitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to (typically violent) video games. The first objection focuses on Ostritsch’s ‘strong sense’ of player enjoyment, which I argue is too crude, given the moral work it is meant to be doing. Next, I question the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim that certain video games are immoral. I examine what is involved in making this claim and what would be required for a normative position to be established: none of which is addressed by Ostritsch. Finally, I challenge the legitimacy of his claim that players are obliged not to play certain video games in certain ways (i.e., games endorsing immorality as ‘fun games’). I distinguish between immoral and suberogatory actions, arguing that the latter is in fact more applicable to cases Ostritsch has in mind, and that one is not obliged not to engage in these actions.     

Locating the wrongness in ultra-violent video games

The extremely high level of simulated violence in certain recent video games has made some people uneasy. There is a concern that something is wrong with these violent games, but, since the violence is virtual rather than real, it is difficult to specify the nature of the wrongness. Since there is no proven causal connection between video-game violence and real violence, philosophical analysis can be particularly helpful in locating potential sources of wrongness in ultra-violent video games. To this end, this paper analyzes video game violence through the lens of utilitarian, Kantian, and post-modern perspectives. Through these analyses, several explanations of the wrongness in violent video games emerge.     

Violent computer games,empathy, and cosmopolitanism

Many philosophical and public discussions of the ethical aspects of violent computer games typically centre on the relation between playing violent videogames and its supposed direct consequences on violent behaviour. But such an approach rests on a controversial empirical claim, is often one-sided in the range of moral theories used, and remains on a general level with its focus on content alone. In response to these problems, I pick up Matt McCormick’s thesis that potential harm from playing computer games is best construed as harm to one’s character, and propose to redirect our attention to the question how violent computer games influence the moral character of players. Inspired by the work of Martha Nussbaum, I sketch a positive account of how computer games can stimulate an empathetic and cosmopolitan moral development. Moreover, rather than making a general argument applicable to a wide spectrum of media, my concern is with specific features of violent computer games that make them especially morally problematic in terms of empathy and cosmopolitanism, features that have to do with the connections between content and medium, and between virtuality and reality. I also discuss some remaining problems. In this way I hope contribute to a less polarised discussion about computer games that does justice to the complexity of their moral dimension, and to offer an account that is helpful to designers, parents, and other stakeholders. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACLA 2006 conference in Princeton, 25 March 2006.     

Is it wrong to play violent video games?

Many people have a strong intuition that there is something morallyobjectionable about playing violent video games, particularly withincreases in the number of people who are playing them and the games'alleged contribution to some highly publicized crimes. In this paper,I use the framework of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethicaltheories to analyze the possibility that there might be some philosophicalfoundation for these intuitions. I raise the broader question of whetheror not participating in authentic simulations of immoral acts in generalis wrong. I argue that neither the utilitarian, nor the Kantian hassubstantial objections to violent game playing, although they offersome important insights into playing games in general and what it ismorally to be a ``good sport.' The Aristotelian, however, has a plausibleand intuitive way to protest participation in authentic simulations ofviolent acts in terms of character: engaging in simulated immoral actserodes one's character and makes it more difficult for one to live afulfilled eudaimonic life.     

How online gamers’ participation fosters their team commitment: Perspective of social identity theory

Online games are highly popular applications. While online gamers actively participate in gaming teams, no study has yet explored whether gamers have sufficient teamwork knowledge and have accumulated sufficient team participation experience. These likely strengthen team commitment, but we do not know, indicating a research gap. Research filling this gap could shed light on useful means for enhancing gamers’ team commitment. Grounded in social identity theory, we theorize the mechanism that links gamers’ overall gaming team participation experience and overall gaming teamwork knowledge to their team commitment. We collect two-wave data from 344 online gamers that have played massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) and use structural equation modelling for data analysis. We find that overall team participation experience is positively related to gaming team identification, while overall teamwork knowledge is positively related to compliance with gaming team norms. Both team identification and norm compliance are positively related to gaming team commitment. This study is the first to clarify the mechanism underlying the impacts of overall gaming team participation experience and overall gaming teamwork knowledge on gamers’ team commitment. Our findings provide the practical insight that game designers should incorporate game features that require or reward gamers’ participation in gaming teams or enhance gaming teamwork knowledge, thus strengthening gamers’ team commitment.     

The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation

According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for the so-called “endorsement view” according to which there is nevertheless a sense in which games themselves can be morally problematic, viz. when they do not only represent immoral actions but endorse a morally problematic worldview. Based on the endorsement view, I argue against full blown amoralism by claiming that gamers do have a moral obligation when playing certain games even if their moral obligation is not categorically different from that of readers and moviegoers.     

For it is in giving that we receive: Investigating gamers’ gifting behaviour in online games

Social interactions in online games have led gamers to form lasting social relationships. This has caused a tremendous increase in gift-giving on online gaming platforms. This study aims to identify factors that impact gamers’ gifting behaviour in online games. A conceptual framework is developed by incorporating the Social Identity Theory, Social Exchange Theory, and Theory of Planned Behaviour. This study adopts a quantitative research methodology that collects data from 404 Clash of Clans gamers. The findings show that gaming team identification and compliance with gaming team norms are positively associated with gaming team commitment. Gifting reciprocity, pleasure, relationship support, and convenience were positively associated with the perceived worth of gift-giving while perceived cost was negatively associated. Gaming team commitment, attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, and perceived worth were positively associated with online game gifting intention. It was also found that gifting behaviour is an immediate consequence of gifting intention in online games. This paper contributes to the under-researched literature on gifting behaviour in online games. It provides novel insights into gamers’ gifting behaviour that can allow game developers to enhance revenue by increasing the sale of virtual in-game items.     

Pornography, ethics, and video games

In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows: there is no principled distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on establishing the following three theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornography, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined. Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indirect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not.     

A Humean approach to assessing the moral significance of ultra-violent video games

Although the word empathy only recently came into existence, eighteenth century philosopher, David Hume, significantly contributed to our current understanding of the term. Hume was among the first to suggest that an empathic mechanism is the central means by which we make ethical judgments and glean moral knowledge. In this paper, I explore Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and I argue that his conception of empathy provides a surprisingly apposite framework for interpreting and addressing a current issue in practical ethics: the moral significance of ultra-violent video games. Ultimately, I attempt to show that a Humean account of morality uniquely explains the dangers of ultra-violent video gaming by elucidating a direct connection between playing such games and moral harm.     

The incorrigible social meaning of video game imagery

In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like “it’s only a game” lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery.     

Getting ‘virtual’ wrongs right

Whilst some philosophical progress has been made on the ethical evaluation of playing video games, the exact subject matter of this enquiry remains surprisingly opaque. ‘Virtual murder’, simulation, representation and more are found in a literature yet to settle into a tested and cohesive terminology. Querying the language of the virtual in particular, I suggest that it is at once inexplicit and laden with presuppositions potentially liable to hinder anyone aiming to construct general philosophical claims about an ethics of gameplay, for whom assumptions about the existence of ‘virtual’ counterparts to morally salient phenomena may prove untrustworthy. Ambiguously straddling the pictorial and the performative aspects of video gaming, the virtual leaves obscure the ways in which we become involved in gameplay, and particularly the natures of our intentions and attitudes whilst grappling with a game; furthermore, it remains unclear how we are to generalise across encounters with the virtual. I conclude by briefly noting one potential avenue of further enquiry into our modes of participation in games: into the differences which a moral examination of playfulness might make to ethical evaluation.     

Game mechanics and technological mediation: an ethical perspective on the effects of MMORPG’s

In the past decades, video games have grown from a niche market to one of the major entertainment media, enticing millions of players worldwide. When ethical aspects of video games are being debated, the discussion oftentimes revolves around effects of their content, such as violence. This paper argues that effects of game mechanics, such as reward mechanisms, should be considered as well, as these are at the core of the appeal of games. We analyze the ethical dimension of behavioral game design present in Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG’s). Using the framework of technological mediation, we show how opaque and seductive game mechanics can invite problematic usage patterns, such as excessive use with negative effects on well-being, and how designers can take responsibility for morally acceptable impact of their games. Having a practical focus, the paper concludes with several proposals for better design.     

Violent video games and morality: a meta-ethical approach

This paper considers what it is about violent video games that leads one reasonably minded person to declare “That is immoral” while another denies it. Three interpretations of video game content are discussed: reductionist, narrow, and broad. It is argued that a broad interpretation is required for a moral objection to be justified. It is further argued that understanding the meaning of moral utterances—like “x is immoral”—is important to an understanding of why there is a lack of moral consensus when it comes to the content of violent video games. Constructive ecumenical expressivism is presented as a means of explaining what it is that we are doing when we make moral pronouncements and why, when it comes to video game content, differing moral attitudes abound. Constructive ecumenical expressivism is also presented as a means of illuminating what would be required for moral consensus to be achieved.     

The gamer’s dilemma: An analysis of the arguments for the moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia

Most people agree that murder is wrong. Yet, within computer games virtual murder scarcely raises an eyebrow. In one respect this is hardly surprising, as no one is actually murdered within a computer game. A virtual murder, some might argue, is no more unethical than taking a pawn in a game of chess. However, if no actual children are abused in acts of virtual paedophilia (life-like simulations of the actual practice), does that mean we should disregard these acts with the same abandon we do virtual murder? In this paper I shall outline several arguments which attempt to permit virtual murder, whilst prohibiting virtual paedophilia.     

“全民偷菜”的教育社会学思考

针对目前网络流行的＂开心农场＂等偷菜游戏,本论文从游戏本身的特征和游戏者本身两因素着手,以目前高校大学生群体为例,结合教育社会学和心理学理论知识进行了深入的分析探讨。网络游戏是把双刃剑,在带来娱乐性的同时,其潜在危害也应积极防御,从而避免对网络游戏的过分沉溺。     

Defending the morality of violent video games

The effect of violent video games is among the most widely discussed topics in media studies, and for good reason. These games are immensely popular, but many seem morally objectionable. Critics attack them for a number of reasons ranging from their capacity to teach players weapons skills to their ability to directly cause violent actions. This essay shows that many of these criticisms are misguided. Theoretical and empirical arguments against violent video games often suffer from a number of significant shortcomings that make them ineffective. This essay argues that video games are defensible from the perspective of Kantian, Aristotelian, and utilitarian moral theories.     

Enacting taboos as a means to an end; but what end? On the morality of motivations for child murder and paedophilia within gamespace

Video games are currently available which permit the virtual murder of children. No such games are presently available which permit virtual paedophilia. Does this disparity reflect a morally justifiable position? Focusing solely on different player motivations, I contrast two version of a fictitious game—one permitting the virtual murder of children, the other virtual paedophilia—in order to establish whether the selective prohibition of one activity over the other can be morally justified based on player motivation alone. I conclude that it cannot, for reasons discussed.     

幼儿园户外建构游戏的实施现状及开展建议

户外游戏是幼儿健康成长的重要保障,户外建构游戏在幼儿园课程中具有十分重要的作用。《幼儿园工作规程》中规定了我国幼儿园每天开展户外游戏活动的时间要达到两小时及以上,寄宿类的幼儿园每天开展的户外游戏活动的时间需要达到三小时及以上。我国幼儿园开展的户外建构游戏以幼儿自主活动为主,当前幼儿园在户外开展的建构类游戏中有着较为丰富的主题,户外建构游戏的主题和主题之间存在着较多的自然互动。户外建构游戏活动对幼儿来说十分重要,户外建构游戏可以促进幼儿的认知能力、审美能力、身体技能以及非智力因素的发展。     

青春期学生群体行为的探讨与干预

美国的WWE摔跤表演赛一向以它的暴力场面著称,而当这一切发生在一群青春期的学生对同学的欺负上,就变得让人匪夷所思,是什么让青春期的学生这一群体变得如此暴力值得我们关注,同时也引起我们对青春期学生群体行为的探讨,以及如何对青春期学生群体行为进行有效的干预。     

Resolving the gamer’s dilemma

Morgan Luck raises a potentially troubling problem for gamers who enjoy video games that allow the player to commit acts of virtual murder. The problem simply is that the arguments typically advanced to defend virtual murder in video games would appear to also support video games that allowed gamers to commit acts of virtual paedophilia. Luck’s arguments are persuasive, however, there is one line of argument that he does not consider, which may provide the relevant distinction: as virtual paedophilia involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, it is therefore an instance of child pornography. I argue that virtual paedophilia involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, which amounts to child pornography. I then draw on arguments to show that child pornography is morally objectionable. Finally, depictions of virtual murder are not instances of pornography, and so are not morally objectionable for this reason. So, there is a relevant moral distinction to draw between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia that is able to justify the former but not the latter.