Education for autonomy: a rejoinder to Aviram and Assor

Aviram and Assor try two strategies for rebutting my recent critique of autonomy as an educational aim. First, they argue that my objection to dispositional autonomy fails. Second, they identify and defend a technical sense of autonomy quite different from any that I consider. I show here that there are serious problems with both lines of argument.     

The Song of the Earth: A pragmatic rejoinder

In The Song of the Earth, Jonathan Bate promotes ‘ecopoesis’, contrasting it with ‘ecopolitical’ poetry (and by implication, other forms of writing and expression). Like others recently, including Simon James and Michael Bonnett, he appropriates the notion of ‘dwelling’ from Heidegger to add force to this distinction. Bate's argument is effectively that we have more chance of protecting the environment if we engage in ecopoetic activity, involving a sense of immediate response to nature, than if we do not. This has obvious educational implications. If Bate, James and Bonnett are correct, then the educational pursuit of (eco)poetic sensibility will, of itself, contribute to education for a sustainable future by grounding human experience in nature; if their assertions are insupportable, and (eco)poetic sensibility does not afford privileged access to a state of nature, then the assumption cannot be made that the development of such sensibility will contribute to education for sustainability. I shall critique Bate's argument from a pragmatic perspective.