Cultivating Political Morality for Deliberative Citizens — Rawls and Callan Revisited

In this article, I will argue that the implementation of deliberative democracy needs to be supplemented by a specific political morality in order to cultivate free and equal citizens in exercising public reason for achieving a cooperative and inclusive liberal society. This cultivation of personality is literally an educational project with a robust ethical ambition, and hence, it reminds us the orthodox liberal problem concerning the relation between the state and its citizenship education. Following Callan’s reformulation of the political conception of the person, I will argue that Rawls’s political liberalism can accommodate the ethical demand of deliberative citizenship education. Liberal civic education should legitimately specify its own ethical endowments for active citizenship and need not shy away from making proposals on the cultivation of liberal character that might result in influencing individual’s conception of the good. Rawls’s theory thus redefines the state neutrality problem on education and paves the way for a framework of deliberative citizenship education.     

Education and Nationality

The paper argues that nationality and national sentiment have been, until recently, neglected concepts in liberal, as distinct from conservative, political and educational philosophy, It claims that, appropriately detached from nationalistic ideas associated with the political right, the promotion of national sentiment as an educational aim is not incompatible with liberalism and, more strongly, may be desirable for reasons of personal and cultural identity as well as for redistributive reasons. The paper then explores issues to do with British nationality in particular, arguing for a remodelled conception to replace the traditional one; and finally it looks at curricular implications, especially in the British context, of aiming at the cultivation of national sentiment within a liberal framework.     

When Choice Does Not Matter: Political Liberalism,Religion and the Faith School Debate

Liberal attempts to defend faith schooling have been conditional on the ability of faith schools to serve as a context for individual choice. A recent critique of these attempts claims that religious parents would find such moderate faith schooling unacceptable. This article sets forth a new liberal defence of faith schools drawing heavily on the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism. Since political liberalism's understanding of personal autonomy does not include the ability to make choices, the political liberal defence of faith schools can accommodate denominational schools that limit the ability of students to choose or change their religion.     

DEVELOPMENTAL LIBERALISM

A bstract .  In this essay, Randall Curren identifies a type of liberalism that incorporates empirical claims about the development of agency and rationality, and responds to the criticism that liberalism rests on an incoherent conception of autonomous agency . He argues that moral agents did indeed "become ghosts" somewhere en route from Aristotle to Kant, but not for the reasons supposed, nor with the consequences for liberalism alleged by its critics. Curren concludes that an Aristotelian form of developmental liberalism, resting on a conception of rational agency as embodied, incremental, and developmentally contingent on social and circumstantial factors, can survive the familiar critiques of the "liberal self" and enable the liberal tradition to further expand the range of educational matters it can fruitfully address.     

罗蒂对自由主义理性辩护方式的批判

自由主义政治哲学从近代发端到当代修正,其理论演变都是围绕着某种理性论证方式展开的,在论证过程中借助于一种普遍人性观点和理性假设推论出自由主义的基本原则和制度规范.罗蒂的反认识论和反理性主义立场使他不再相信任何基础主义式的理论言说方式,但他对启蒙政治计划及其实践效果的认可也使他在放弃自由主义理论的同时并没有放弃该理论为之辩护的社会制度和生活方式.他认为,自由主义制度及其生活方式需要寻找一种新的辩护方式,这种方式将抛弃启蒙哲学思想的残余,以便更能够适应后启蒙时代的智识语境,因而也能产生更好的辩护效果.虽然罗蒂的辩护方式在自由主义内部也未得到认可,但对于我们站在自由主义文化之外认识自由主义及反思政治哲学方式具有积极的启发意义.     

The 'Futures' of Queer Children and the Common School Ideal

This paper focuses on an especially urgent challenge to the legitimacy of the common school ideal—a challenge that has hardly been addressed within contemporary debates within liberal philosophy of education. The challenge arises from claims to accommodation by queer people and queer communities—claims that are based on notions of queerness and queer identity that are seriously underrepresented within contemporary liberal political and educational theory. The paper articulates a liberal view of personal autonomy that is constituted by a conception of practical reasoning rooted in thick communal experiences. It is argued that common schools concerned with equal concern for the autonomy of all children must attend to the specific communal requirements needed to developing the autonomous practical reasoning of queer children—requirements for what is termed a sense of 'futurity'. Five practical recommendations for common schools are briefly outlined. The paper concludes with some reflections on the divergent and convergent interests of queer theory and liberalism, and considers some possibilities for a partial reconciliation of the two theoretical perspectives.     

Education for Liberal Democracy: Universalising a Western Construct?

An influential view of liberalism and its view of education holds that it is a western construct unsuited to non-western societies. Bikhu Parekh's critique of liberal democracy is taken here as representative of that position. In challenging that view, this article shows through an analysis of recent policy that post-apartheid education in South Africa expresses a liberal view of education, just as the political order introduced in 1994 is a liberal one. If we adopt Parekh's principle that societies should be allowed to choose their own destinies, there are transcendental grounds for promoting liberalism and a liberal view of education outside of the liberal western democracies.     

Liberalism and Communitarianism: a response to two recent attempts to reconcile individual autonomy with group identity

This article is concerned with recent attempts to balance the claims for political citizenship in a liberal democracy (liberalism) with competing claims for cultural identity within traditional non‐liberal communities (communitarianism). Claims of the first kind are usually seen as universal in that they are based on what it is to be human, while claims of the second kind are seen as particular in so far as they relate to membership of a specific culture. Singh (1997) argues for discussion method as a means of reconciling the claims of democratic citizenship with those of cultural attachment in non‐liberal communities. In an earlier and related paper, Singh (1995) also seeks an accommodation between shared and particular values in a multicultural society. Halstead (1997) is concerned about the dilemmas faced by liberal educators and by Muslims with regard to the sex education curriculum and Muslim pupils. In an earlier paper, Halstead (1995) makes proposals for a curriculum which combines a communitarian commitment to the cultural integrity of non‐liberal communities with active participation in the life of a liberal democracy. I will argue that whether we begin from a liberal commitment to individual autonomy (Singh) or from a concern for the cultural integrity and survival of non‐liberal communities (Halstead), there are very real difficulties in achieving a reconciliation between liberal and communitarian perspectives.     

Rawls' Theory of Justice and Citizenship Education

Political liberalism purports to be independent from any controversial philosophical presuppositions, and its basic principles and features are often presented as the most accommodating of difference and heterogeneity, so long as the latter is not illiberal, oppressive and fanatic. Educational theory welcomes this assumption and attempts to utilise it in citizenship curriculum debates, often in a receptive and arguably uncritical way. I shall critique the above by unveiling the contestable epistemological and anthropological theses underlying Rawls' difference principle and by discussing the conception of education that they ground. I shall draw especially on sociology of education and its questioning of the 'racism of intelligence' in order to show that political liberalism mistakes its self- and world-understanding as a reflection of general and undisputed facts. Further, I shall explain how a more critical perspective would give educational theory a more active role by challenging the so-called 'reproductive' conception of education. I shall conclude by assessing the significance of such a critique for teaching citizenship, putting forward some suggestions for a reorientation of political education.     

Further Attempts to Balance Liberal Virtues with Claims for Cultural Identity within Traditional Non-liberal Communities. A reply to Neil Burtonwood

In a recent paper, Neil Burtonwood (Educational Studies, 24(3), pp. 295–304, 1998) argued that 'recent attempts to balance the claims for political citizenship in a liberal democracy (liberalism) with the claims of cultural identity within traditional non-liberal communities...' (p. 295) are bound to fail; because 'liberalism cannot be neutral between ... cultures that value individual autonomy and those that do not', any 'attempts at reconciling' those two perspectives 'are bound to fail' (p. 303). His claim is that whatever position we begin from, there are real difficulties in achieving a reconciliation between the two perspectives, which he sees as exclusive. He refers to my papers (Singh, Educational Review, 47(1), pp. 11-24, 1995; Educational Studies, 23(2), pp. 169-184, 1997) where discussion method has been suggested as a means of reconciling the two positions. I still favour this method. This paper agrees with Burtonwood that liberalism is non-neutral in relation to liberal virtues such as equality and respect for persons, and no groups including liberal ones, should be privileged with respect to non-interference from the state. Although the paper acknowledges the value of 'Popperian critical method', it sees this method as very limited in respect of settling conflicts arising from comprehensive or world-views. Liberals and liberal societies have long realised this and have made attempts to accommodate cultural practices of traditional groups. Although the two positions exclude each other at a deep level, at a more mundane, every-day level, they share much that is common to both, which makes intercultural understandings possible. Education must capitalise on this and take us beyond a single framework. The difficulty is, of course, what do we do and how can we assess the situation, when frameworks themselves clash? The paper argues for dialogue, tolerance and accommodation within limits, set by respect for persons. This is not to ask liberalism to give up what is foundational to liberalism, as Burtonwood suggests, but to reinforce liberalism itself, as we show below.     

Family Education, State Intervention and Political Liberalism

This paper tries, from the perspective of political liberalism, to answer the question whether parents can fail in the moral upbringing of their children to the extent that the state has the right to intervene or to override their legal authority over their children. It is argued that state intervention must meet the liberal criterion of justificatory neutrality, and, on the basis of a discussion of the notion of 'reasonable citizens', that only serious parental failure to inculcate basic rules can justify judicial intervention in the family that meets this criterion. It is concluded that political liberalism burdens the state with incompatible demands.     

寻求秩序与意义的努力——从平社学人群体建构的原因论及

平社是20世纪20年代末中国的一个自由主义知识分子团体。平社学人群体的建构是中国自由主义知识分子为消解近代中国在社会政治和思想文化层面的双重危机所作出的又一次探索和努力的结果。这一结果,不仅是淑世情怀和“五四”以来民主科学精神的延续,更是现实政治、社会环境变迁与自由主义理念及群体成员的政治参与意识共同催生的产物。平社的产生透射出中国自由主义知识分子对如何重构社会秩序和意义世界的思考。然而,自由主义理论的内在矛盾和现实遭遇决定了平社学人的努力又将陷入新的轮回之中。     

社群主义对新自由主义的批评刍议

新自由主义是在洛克、亚当·斯密古典自由主义思想基础上发展起来的当代政治思想流派,其间众多学者提出了许多相关理论,罗尔斯的《正义论》把新自由主义理论推上了顶峰,在社会中引起了很大的反响,瞻仰者批判者皆有,而在批判的声音中社群主义呼声最为激烈,它们从各个角度对新自由主义理论进行了质疑,有许多可取之处,但也有许多地方值得商榷,从本质上分析可以得出一个结论,社群主义对新自由主义的批评虽然是坚实有力的,但它对自己观点的表述却是苍白软弱的,它的缺陷决定它只是一种学术思潮,而新自由主义必然且已走向政治生活并占领统治地位.     

斯徒卢威自由主义思想的核心理念

斯徒卢威是20世纪初俄国自由主义思潮和政治运动中的领军人物.他的"伟大俄罗斯"的国家理念是建立在保守自由主义基础上的国家复兴的独特纲领,是关于个人、民族、国家、历史的继承与创新的思想,他呼唤依赖国家的历史、文化传统和所有爱国主义力量的创造性的活动建立新的国家体制,吸引人民尤其是知识阶层参与国家生活,克服政权与社会文化因素、人民之间的脱离,保障各种公民权利和政治权利、宪法的实施,推动俄国实现经济上强大、政治上自由,保持民族传统和价值."伟大俄罗斯"是斯徒卢威自由主义思想的核心理念,是向同时代的俄国知识分子提出的一个重要命题,同时是20世纪俄国思想文化史的一个重要课题.     

Liberalism,Pluralism, and Political Education: Paradox or paradigm?

Inspired by concern about promoting civic participation and preserving the liberal democratic state, political theorists have recently reignited a debate about the nature of political education in a liberal society. These theorists' arguments in favor of teaching toleration are significant for the progress of education reforms currently being debated and implemented in current liberal democracies and some emerging nations. Despite the increasing attention paid to the value of liberal civic education, however, its specific content is typically left virtually blank. This article aims to redress this gap in the literature by developing a coherent and comprehensive (albeit still very general) curriculum for liberal political education. To this end, Section I analyses the nature of the ideal liberal democratic state and develops a general curriculum for liberal political education based on the type of citizens needed to preserve and take advantage of such a state. It concludes by introducing two potentially illiberal outcomes of this curriculum: children's forced development of the capacity for autonomy, and the reduction of diversity in the state. Section II argues that the development of autonomy is actually central to liberal theory and liberal education more broadly conceived, while Section III suggests that civic and social diversity will persist, but rightly play a secondary role to the goals of liberal political education. The article concludes, therefore, with a reassertion of the content and importance of liberal political education.     

Civic Respect, Civic Education, and the Family

We formulate a distinctly 'political liberal' conception of mutual respect, which we call 'civic respect', appropriate for governing the public political relations of citizens in pluralist democratic societies. A political liberal account of education should aim at ensuring that students, as future citizens, learn to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. While children should be required to attend educational institutions that will inculcate in them the skills and concepts necessary for them to be free and equal citizens, parents should be granted as much freedom as is compatible with the requirements of civic respect to raise their children in accordance with their respective 'comprehensive doctrines' (systems of beliefs and values, including religious doctrines). We consider an objection to our position drawn from the account of upbringing recently advanced by Matthew Clayton, namely, that the conception of civic respect that we advance rests on an implausible view about the limited scope of the requirements of political justice. We develop an account of the 'basic structure of society' as the appropriate subject of political justice that can overcome this objection.     

哈耶克眼中的保守主义与自由主义

当代自由主义哲学家哈耶克认为保守主义由于其拒绝面对现实的态度,由于其所持有的积极的政治观,由于其反民主倾向,以及由于其与民族主义,帝国主义之间的密切联系,从而与自由主义互不相容,这也是哈耶克从不自称保守主义的原因。     

面对多元价值冲突的困境——伯林论题的再考察

以塞亚.伯林主张价值多元论的观点同时也坚持自由主义的立场,但这两者之间的关系并不是自明的,政治哲学界对此一直存在着争议。通过考察伯林多元性论题的内在困境,分析当代自由主义思想家对多元价值冲突问题的回应,我们提出在“反基础主义”的视野中来应对价值冲突的可能性与必要性。     

Freedom of Conscience and Illiberal Socialization: The Congruence Argument

This paper addresses the question of whether the interest liberal societies have in producing liberal citizens gives liberal societies the right to regulate the affairs of illiberal groups. It claims that attempts by Rawls and Galston to make liberalism more "pluralism friendly" by reducing the demands for liberal citizenship fail, and it explores arguments by Amy Gutmann, Susan Moller Okin, Eamonn Callan and Will Kymlicka that support a stronger interest in regulating the socialization practices of illiberal groups. The main conclusion of the article is that we must seek for a context-sensitive balance between the need to produce liberal citizens and other liberal values such as freedom of conscience.     

基佐论政治权力的社会基础和道德基础

弗朗索瓦.基佐是19世纪法国著名的自由主义政治家和学者,但与主流自由主义思想家不同的是,他从社会基础和道德基础的角度,对政治的积极意义重新做了说明。他主张,政治权力要建立在一定的社会基础之上,政治应该以服务社会、增进福祉为宗旨,政治治理应该以政府与社会合作的方式来进行,这样才能使全体社会成员认识到政治参与的必要性。他批评了人民主权观,认为真正的主权是"理性、正义、真理"。这种理性主权思想的目的不只是限制权力,而是为政治权力设定道德基础而予以重新肯定。按照他的理解,正当的政治权力必然要以道德为基础,政治权力是德性的正当体现,因而是值得追求的目的。当今,有识之士已经认识到,现代政治的最大难题并非如何在政治和社会之间划清界限,而是如何加强两者的结合。研究基佐关于政治权力的社会基础和道德基础的思想,不但有助于加深对自由主义思想的理解,还可以为现代人解决这一难题提供有益的启示。