The ‘Physically Educated’ Person: Physical education in the philosophy of Reid,Peters and Aristotle

Abstract

This article will derive a definition and account of the physically educated person, through an examination of the philosophy of Andrew Reid, Richard Peters and Aristotle. Initially, Reid’s interpretation of Peters’ views about the educational significance of practical knowledge (and physical education) will be considered. While it will be acknowledged that Peters was rather disparaging about the educational merit of some practical activities in Ethics and Education, it will be argued that he elsewhere suggests that such practical activities could be educationally worthwhile in and of themselves. In Education and the educated man he specified that practical activities should be regarded as educationally important if they are either transformed by theoretical understanding and/or pursued to the point of excellence. In suggesting that education involves the cultivation of both theoretical and practical human excellences it is argued that Peters’ philosophy of education begins to take on a more Aristotelian bent. After exploring Aristotle’s notion of virtue (human excellence) and his discussion of physical training in The politics, it is claimed that physical education activities might be most worthwhile when they extend the moral habits and/or modes of thought of pupils, towards excellence. It is concluded that physically educated persons should be defined as those who have learned to arrange their lives in such a way that the physical activities they freely engage in make a distinctive contribution to their long-term flourishing.     

R. S. Peters and J. H. Newman on the Aims of Education

Abstract

R. S. Peters never explicitly talks about wisdom as being an aim of education. He does, however, in numerous places, emphasize that education is of the whole person and that, whatever else it might be about, it involves the development of knowledge and understanding. Being educated, he claims, is incompatible with being narrowly specialized. Moreover, he argues, education enables a person to have a different perspective on things, ‘to travel with a different view’ [Peters, R. S. (1967). What is an educational process? In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The concept of education (pp. 1–23). Routledge and Kegan Paul]. In asserting this about education, Peters has more in common with another great English educator, John Henry, Cardinal Newman, than one might expect, given they are separated by about a century and start from different philosophical perspectives, namely Kant to a significant degree in the former and Aristotle in the latter. Both nevertheless acknowledge the importance of reason and its development in any education worthy of the name. I will argue that in describing the ‘educated person’ Peters is not far from the view of Newman, who saw education as being about the ‘enlargement of mind’. Although Newman hesitates to call ‘enlargement of mind’ wisdom, and Peters does not use either term, there are good grounds for proposing that in distinguishing between education and training, and in asserting education is moral education because it is concerned to improve persons, Peters acknowledges the higher purposes of education and hence, we can add, its connection with wisdom. Significantly, what such a reading of Peters emphasizes is his insistence on the intrinsic value of education, a view seemingly lost in modern market-driven conceptions of education.     

The poverty of contractarian moral education

ABSTRACT

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand claims that a directive moral education that seeks to persuade children that a particular conception of contractarian morality is justified can be undertaken without falling foul of the requirement not to indoctrinate. In this article, we set out a series of challenges to Hand’s argument. First, we argue that Hand’s focus on ‘reasonable disagreement’ regarding the status of a moral conception is a red-herring. Second, we argue that the endorsement of moral contractarianism and the prohibition on indoctrination pull in different directions: if contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments should be less worried about indoctrination than Hand suggests. Third, we argue that moral contractarianism is mistaken; teachers should look elsewhere for guidance on the moral norms and principles towards which they should direct their pupils.     

R.S. PETERS AND JÜRGEN HABERMAS: PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PRACTICAL REASON AND EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE

A bstract .  The contribution of philosophical ethics to the development of a just conception of education becomes increasingly complex under modern conditions of democratic pluralism. This is because the justification of moral policies for education faces the skeptical challenge of showing how the substantive moral principles upon which a policy rests do not arbitrarily privilege one culturally situated conception of justice over others. In this essay, Christopher Martin argues that this challenge highlights how any legitimate moral point of view on education requires public justification, where a valid moral policy must be demonstrated to be worthy of recognition in a public setting and justified through the reciprocal exchange of reasons. He develops the scope and nature of public justification through an analysis of R.S. Peters's Ethics and Education and the work of Jürgen Habermas. Both Peters and Habermas argue that public justification entails necessary and unavoidable presuppositions of practical reason, presuppositions that form the basis of a procedural theory of moral justification. Martin discusses the implications of such a procedural approach for the development of educational policy.     

Why there is no education ethics without principles

Moral education and ethical reflection are always dependent on the content of the internalized norms, principles and values of the individual. As we demonstrate, this also means that there is no instance of feeling, emotion, spontaneity, or care that can be independent of norms, rules, and values outside human discourse. In light of this, Noddings’ theory of the ethic of care is a contentious theory of child education, as it is linked with the presupposition that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, to the network of rules/principles and their values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from caring, without being derived from reflection on education’s specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist ideology and racist education. This is not, of course, something that the ethic of care would advocate; however, as an educational theory, it is flawed in that, due to the rejection of reflection through principles in general, it fails to provide the educator with a conceptual apparatus through which he/she could analyze and reflect upon—could understand—what he/she is doing with regard to the norms of his/her culture. Society and educators cannot tacitly allow or be benevolent toward such fundamental mistakes in moral education.     

Inclusion vs. Fairness

A policy of inclusion may, in certain circumstances, be justified but inclusion is not an inherently moral principle. On occasion, the practice of inclusion may clearly offend against the principles of fairness. It is crucially important to distinguish between empirical arguments for inclusion and would-be moral arguments. That having been done, it is not clear that there are in general any compelling empirical arguments for a widespread policy of inclusion, and it is tolerably clear that inclusion is not morally incumbent upon us.     

The Place of Philosophy in the Training of Teachers: Peters revisited

Abstract

In 1964, Richard Peters examined the place of philosophy in the training of teachers. He considered three things: Why should philosophy of education be included in the training of teachers; What portion of philosophy of education should be included; How should philosophy be taught to those training to be teachers. This article explores the context of the time when Peters set out his views, describes philosophy of education at the London Institute of Education at one period in Peters’ time there, and then discusses the current state of philosophy of education, using New Zealand as an example of opportunities and challenges. Finally, asking whether Peters was nearly right about the place of philosophy in the training of teachers, it is concluded that he was right about its importance but got it wrong about his conception of philosophy.     

The Punishment of Children: a review of experimental studies

Abstract

This paper argues that punishment and moral education are compatible and attempts to refute the arguments put forward by J. D. Marshall in an earlier article in this journal to the effect that they are not. It is also argued here that punishment can assist moral education by providing necessary pre‐conditions for its success and can on occasion actually teach the child morally relevant information.     

The significance in using role models to influence primary school children’s moral development: Pilot study

ABSTRACT

This article reports on a pilot study aiming to examine a role-modelling character education project through an Aristotelian framework, by adopting a virtue-led approach. Aristotle famously believed virtues should be taught to children at a young age through habituation, which gradually develops into phronesis-guided virtuosity, and he considered what nowadays is referred to as ‘role modelling’ as having a large influence on children through the emotion of emulation (zēlos). Therefore, the pilot study aims to answer the question to what extent a virtue-led role modelling intervention in character education can influence students’ moral development. The intervention teaches school-appropriate virtues to students in a primary school in Saudi Arabia. While the study is just starting, this article focuses on some pertinent and problematic preliminary questions about conceptual assumptions and research design.     

Wildly wise in the terrible moment: Kant,Emerson, and improvisatory Bildung in early childhood education

Abstract

This paper aims to show how Emerson provides a reworking of Kantian understandings of moral education in young children’s Bildung. The article begins and ends by thinking of Emersonian self-cultivation as a form of improvisatory or wild Bildung. It explores the role of Bildung and self-cultivation in preschools through a philosophy that accounts for children’s ‘Wild wisdom’ by letting Emerson speak to Kant. The paper argues that Kant’s vision of Bildung essentially involves reason’s turn upon itself and that Emerson, particularly in how he is taken up by Cavell, shows that such a turn is already present in the processes of children inheriting, learning, and improvising with language. This improvisatory outlook on moral education is contrasted with common goals of moral education prescribed in early childhood education where the Swedish Curriculum for the Preschool Lpfö 98 is used as an example.     

Does Aristotle believe that habituation is only for children?

ABSTRACT

Full virtue and practical wisdom comprise the end of neo-Aristotelian moral development, but wisdom cannot be cultivated straight away through arguments and teaching. Wisdom is integrated with, and builds upon, habituation: the acquisition of virtuous character traits through the repeated practice of corresponding virtuous actions. Habit formation equips people with a taste for, and commitment to, the good life; furthermore it provides one with discriminatory and reflective capacities to know how to act in particular circumstances. Unfortunately, habituation is often understood primarily as a method suitable only for children. This article examines whether Aristotle limited habituation to children and, if not, what the relationship between habituation and wisdom beyond childhood might look like. This article concludes that wisdom-guided habituation is also possible for adults who continue and confirm their already established virtuous habits. The implications of this for professional moral education are subsequently discussed.     

Moral Reasoning and Moral Education

Abstract

It is argued that R.W. Beardsmore's account of moral reasoning provides the most satisfactory explanation of moral behaviour and this is supported by an examination of his main criticisms of R.M. Hare and Philippa Foot. The chief educational implication of Beardsmore's account of moral development is, it is suggested, that, though educators cannot be uncommitted on fundamental moral issues, they can, nevertheless, ensure that rational procedures are followed. A committed teacher is not, therefore, necessarily a moral indoctrinator. In conclusion it is suggested that arguments for neutrality rest on mistaken assumptions about the nature of morality and that, without a background of established and accepted values moral education cannot even be considered.     

Toward a Postmodern Notion of Human Rights

Abstract

A central element of Richard Peters’ philosophy of education has been his analysis of ‘education as initiation’. Understanding initiation is internally related to concepts of community and what it may mean to be a member. The concept of initiation assumes a mutually interdependent, dynamic relationship between the individual and community that claims to be justified on cognitive, moral and practical grounds. Although Peters’ analysis is embedded in a different discourse, his insights are relevant to current discourse on the individual in community. A fruitful conversation can be developed between Peters’ account of the learner’s ‘initiation’ into ‘bodies of knowledge and awareness’ and Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of ‘practices’; and how both assume a notion of ‘tradition’ within partly overlapping accounts of ‘community’. Secondly, I will consider how ‘initiation’ touches the concept of ‘social justice as membership’ developed by current philosophers, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer, and what import Peters’ analysis has for different degrees of active and passive membership and participation. Thirdly, I will consider Charles Taylor’s ‘social imaginary’ as a contextual framework for processes surrounding ‘education as initiation’. This article does not argue that Peters’ concept of initiation cannot be contested at some points but rather that it can inform, and be informed by, the conversation with those who contend that community is itself a good essential for human flourishing.     

The dark side of the exceptional: On moral exemplars,character education,and negative emotions

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on negative exemplarity-related emotions (NEREs) and on their educational implications. In this article, we first argue for the nonexpendability of negative emotions broadly conceived by defending their instrumental and intrinsic role in a good and flourishing life. We make the claim more specific by focusing on the narrower domain of NEREs and argue for their moral and educational significance by evaluating whether they fit the arguments provided in the previous section. We go on to propose three educational strategies to foster NEREs’ positive moral role. In conclusion, we point out that an exemplarist approach to character education would greatly benefit from a more fine-grained account of the emotions involved in the educational process and from a broader perspective on which of these emotions should be taken as valuable for educational purposes.     

R. S. Peters and the Periphery

Abstract

Paul Hirst claimed that Richard Peters ‘revolutionised philosophy of education’. This does not accord with my experience in the Antipodean periphery. My experience of the work of Wittgenstein, Austin and Kovesi before reading Peters and Dewey, Kuhn and Toulmin subsequently meant that Peters was a major but not revolutionary figure in my understanding of philosophy of education.     

Stress in Year 11 School Children

In this article David Lambert argues in support of the humanities in the secondary school curriculum and underlines the contribution that they can make to citizenship education. He emphasizes but does not restrict his arguments to geography and offers a wide view encompassing the humanities as a whole. He explores the links between the humanities, moral education and citizenship and argues against the citizenship-as-subject approach.     

The feminist civics lesson of 19: The Musical

ABSTRACT

This essay examines 19: The Musical—a memorial project that marks the suffrage centennial. The author employs an intersectional lens to examine the arguments this memorialization makes about a suffrage past as well as a feminist present and future. This intersectional emphasis is especially important given the prevalent present-day assumption of the suffrage movement as an entirely white women's endeavor—one that especially forgets the racism and exclusivity that riddled the suffrage movement.     

Review Article: John Wilson as moral educator

Abstract

John Wilson's work as moral educator is summarized and evaluated. His rationalist humanistic approach is based on a componential characterization of the morally educated person. Such a person consistently manifests a unity of reflection, feeling, belief, and acting under the logically structured rubrics of PHIL, EMP, GIG and KRAT, and exemplifying the formal features of ‘moral opinion’. The rationale and conceptual status of the components is discussed, as is the view that the concept of education entails that teachers be moral educators. This involves cultivating autonomous rationality with respect to the unconscious, motivation, day‐to‐day moral decision‐making, and the emotions; in the latter case there are extensive applications in religious education. Finally, certain weaknesses and pre‐eminent strengths of Wilson's position are indicated, and comparisons briefly made with the views of McPhail, Peters, Frankena and Kohlberg.