Christian Contributions to Moral Education

Abstract

Moral Education theory commonly attacks religion‐based morality as authoritarian and wants to divorce ME from RE. Three significant Christian documents, the Fourth R (the Durham Report on RE), Teaching Christian Ethics and The Child in the Church are used to support the claims that the relationship between Christianity and Ethics is more subtle, and that Christians can help young people consider issues in moral education in a balanced way and thus arrive at their own conclusions. A study of Christianity has significant contributions to make to moral education.     

Ethics before Equality: Moral education after Levinas

Emptiness, indeed nihilism, is a characteristic of so much contemporary discourse regarding morality and moral education. This is found in facile notions of teaching right and wrong but also in the prevalence of rights-talk, with its sacrosanct assumptions about equality. This article examines this discourse in the light of Levinas' account of the primacy of ethics - of my absolute responsibility in the face of the other, of the asymmetry of my relation to the other. It seeks an account of receptivity that releases the ethical from the limitations of moral reasoning.     

Moral Socialisation in a Multi‐Racial Community

Abstract:

Various claims have been made for a connection between moral education and science. The most prominent of these‐‐'evolutionary ethics’ ‐‐ is examined and found to be philosophically unjustifiable. However, after an analysis of the form and content of scientific reasoning, it is concluded that some other claims are justifiable, in that there are connections of identity between science and morality in terms of logic, relevant knowledge, perspectives, and certain virtues, especially virtues of the will. These connections can be of value for moral education.     

An Interpretation of Principled Morality

Abstract

The commonly used notion of principled morality is interpreted philosophically and psychologically. Five sets of philosophical assumptions embedded in this notion are identified, dealing with the purpose of morality, the place of reason in morality, the autonomy of the moral agent, the autonomy of moral discourse and the nature of moral principles. An attempt is made to make these assumptions more meaningful to the non‐philosophical reader by offering a phenomenological account of how they might be reflected in the real processes of moral judgment. The interpretation emphasizes the dynamic nature of principled moral judgment.     

Management in Education

Abstract

This paper uses Durkheim's critique of Kant to criticize Kohlberg's theory of morality. After examining the applicability of Durkheim's criticism of Kant's definition of morality to Kohlberg's equation of morality with justice structures, it explores Durkheim's psychological views on emotional and dispositional aspects of morality, which are typically neglected by Kantians. Some standard criticisms of Durkheim's moral theory are re‐examined and the argument is advanced that Durkheim's social ethic is substantively at Stage Six on Kohlberg's developmental schema. Several modifications of Kohlberg's theory are proposed, using Durkheimian insights.     

The Poverty of Empirical Research in Moral Education: Beyond John Wilson

Abstract

Goodlad and colleagues argue that teacher education curricula do not include rigorous discourse about the moral dimensions of teaching. This paper offers guidance for developing such curricula drawn from the author's experience devising and implementing a professional ethics curriculum for dentistry. Grounded in Rest's Four Component Model of Morality, the curriculum includes methods and measures for assessing (1) ethical sensitivity; (2) moral reasoning and judgement; (3) moral motivation and commitment; and (4) moral implementation outcomes as well as instructional strategies to facilitate their development. Evidence drawn from the extensive literature on the psychology of morality, and from outcome studies of the effectiveness of the dental ethics curriculum, illustrate that a curriculum of rather modest duration can influence ethical development in measurable ways.     

Mapping the moral assumptions of multi-faith religious education

ABSTRACT

When Religious Education (RE) in England and Wales transitioned from Christian confessionalism to a multi-faith approach in the latter half of the twentieth century, the subject’s moral aims were reasserted. In this article, we explore the moral assumptions of this transformation and map some of their connections to other theological and ethical ideas. Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor of a rhizome, we make two novel contributions to scholarship in this regard. First, through some salient examples we show the connections between the moral aims of multi-faith RE and the assumptions of Kantian moral religion. The second contribution, building on this analysis, identifies three moral justifications of multi-faith RE: universalist (founded on assumptions of moral universals across religions), vicarious (the support of a religious worldview by using other religions’ moral teachings) and instrumentalist (a moral justification based on the supposed extrinsic benefits of studying religions). We then go onto consider how these assumptions may differ from the moral commitments of the religions they appropriate, suggesting they disrupt and recombine theocentric concepts into pedagogic ones.     

Private and Public Morality: Some Misconceptions Explored. A Reply to John Sword

Abstract

Some objections to an earlier article of mine concerning the use of hypothetical moral situations in moral education are first examined. It is then argued that to characterize morality as a wholly ‘public’ or ‘private’ affair is mistaken, as moral decision‐making must involve a combination of both features.     

John Dewey and Character Education

Abstract

Some of the character education programmes that were implemented in American public schools during the first three decades of this century are examined. The educational theory underlying these programmes is contrasted to John Dewey's ideas on moral education. Character education programmes reflected a trait‐inspired approach to morality: character was assumed to be a structure of virtues and vices. Dewey's conception of morality was broader; he held that character embraced all the purposes, desires, and habits that affect human conduct. Dewey's recommendations for moral education differed significantly from those put forward by the advocates of character education, as Dewey,’s proposals were basically proposals for school reform. Because character education programmes were aimed at developing specific virtues in students, the programmes were narrowly conceived and were unable to affect major changes in educational practice.     

Motivation and Methodology in Moral Education

Abstract

Two basic worries about moral education are considered. The first ‐‐ whether there are or are not fundamental principles of reason and procedure which govern moral decision‐making ‐‐ is argued to be unnecessary, since there plainly are some such procedures. The second ‐‐ how and in what direction pupils should be motivated to attend to such principles ‐‐ is a more complex and difficult matter, which has to be tackled whatever one's particular philosophical views on morality. It is argued that the proper object of motivation is primarily allegiance to certain principles of rationality and justice, natural sympathy or personal benevolence being regarded as desirable but too fragile.     

Moral Reasoning and Moral Education

Abstract

It is argued that R.W. Beardsmore's account of moral reasoning provides the most satisfactory explanation of moral behaviour and this is supported by an examination of his main criticisms of R.M. Hare and Philippa Foot. The chief educational implication of Beardsmore's account of moral development is, it is suggested, that, though educators cannot be uncommitted on fundamental moral issues, they can, nevertheless, ensure that rational procedures are followed. A committed teacher is not, therefore, necessarily a moral indoctrinator. In conclusion it is suggested that arguments for neutrality rest on mistaken assumptions about the nature of morality and that, without a background of established and accepted values moral education cannot even be considered.     

Studying Morality Within the African Context: a model of moral analysis and construction

Abstract

For centuries researchers have studied the universality of matters of ethics and morality. Now, the challenge is to make theoretical contributions which account not only for the universals, but also for the life conditions and cultural circumstances of various people in different societies. This paper attempts to capture the essence of morality and ethics in the African context and to elucidate forms of moral wisdom and behaviour grounded in the web of the African community.     

Interpretation-Something New

Abstract

The ecological worldviews of 95 undergraduates were assessed via Blaikie's Ecological World View scale (1992). Positive ecological worldviews were associated with receptivity to arguments for preserving endangered species based on ethics and morality, the importance of a species to the ecosystem, and one's ability to make a difference; the type of organism that was endangered was not a factor in determining the effectiveness of a message. There was no relationship between ecological worldviews and receptivity to arguments on the basis of aesthetics or economics. Women had more positive ecological worldviews and found moral arguments to be more persuasive than did men.     

The Impossibility of Teaching a Private Morality

Abstract

The rejection of hypothetical questions about moral action, as a method of teaching in moral education, is a rejection of rules. The rejection of rules in favour of a morality that is private to the individual leads to the contradiction that action taken on the basis of private moral decision‐making is the opposite of what we mean by ‘morality’. Nothing is left to constitute moral education.     

Goethe's Faust Revisited: Lessons from DIT research

The argument is made that psychometric forms of assessment are essential to the large-scale adoption of developmental approaches to moral education. In this respect, the Defining Issues Test has been an invaluable tool for research and practice in moral education. However, because such instruments are based upon previous developmental research, they are by definition derivative and unsuited for basic research on moral development. In addition standardised measures, while essential to educational research on the correlates of moral growth, run the risk of reifying extant views and assumptions about morality and moral development. Thus, such measures may stand in the way of generating new knowledge and/or impeding the assimilation of alternative conceptions of morality and social development within educational research and practice. To avoid these problems, while at the same time benefiting from the utility of measures such as the DIT, requires a constant reciprocal interaction between the generation of standardised measures and basic developmental research.     

Schooling,Morality and Race

Abstract

In this paper the authors examine the nature and significance of the interface between race, culture and morality and the implications for the classroom teacher in relation to schooling generally and moral education in particular.

They argue that morality is circumscribed by the culture(s) from which it derives and within which it operates. It is therefore, impossible to consider one without the other. The same applies in relation to race and culture and similarly to the holism of race, culture and morality.

Having argued that culture in Britain has been increasingly racialized, they make the case for an anti‐racist approach to moral education which debunks the racial baggage from contemporary conceptions of morality.

They finally argue that since teachers, like pupils, bring their own values and perceptions with them to school, teachers need to acknowledge this and respond positively within the context of a ‘multi‐ethnic’ Britain.     

The Teacher As Moral Agent

Abstract

Lawrence Kohlberg's work in moral education appears to be significant enough philosophically that one is tempted to use much of it to resolve basic problems of long standing. In this essay it is argued that it would prove more fruitful for Kohlberg or anyone else to avoid applying his developmentalist position to the settling of such problems as utilitarian/formalist supremacy or the search for a ‘best’ morality. Instead, emphasis could be placed on the explicating of the fundamental requirements of a non‐relativistic, non‐egoistic morality of whatever sort.

Such basic moral requirements serve to highlight of what principled morality (Stages Five and Six) consists, and why it need not be tied to a Rawlsian Formalism, or to any other normative ethical position. In fact, there is considerable cause for supposing that what Kohlberg really achieves with clarity is nothing more than a sequential typology of development in moral thinking from egoism to universalism, and from situation‐specific rules to universalizable and reversable judgments of principle. This in itself constitutes, of course, an enormous undertaking and, if successfully defended, would be a very significant breakthrough in Psychology, Education and Philosophy. It is what Kohlberg ought to be about, rather than something unnecessarily contentious.     

Six Views of a Relationship

Abstract

The papers on the relation of ME to RE in the May issue of this Journal are examined, and related to the points made by the author in his paper in that issue. Thus it is hoped to illuminate both the subject, and all six papers.     

Educating for Moral Ability: Reflections on moral development based on Vygotsky's theory of concept formation

The idea examined here is that the development of moral ability shares important similarities with the development of conceptual thinking as outlined in the work of Lev Vygotsky. Most notably, the mature forms of both processes are ways of constructing meaning that are not governed by pre-established modes of behaviour. The principal suggestion here is that Vygotsky's theory of concept formation can be used as a generative model for understanding the development of moral ability in a way that challenges the notion of morality as rule-following behaviour. Understanding moral ability as a present-centred aptitude for creating meaning carries a two-fold significance for educators: it is theoretically useful for understanding the learning process in the context of a fundamental or universal interdependency, and of practical value inasmuch as it focuses on the importance of learning to think and act in the here and now.     

Parenting Huckleberry Finn

Abstract

We suggest in this paper that attempts to segregate social‐conventional reasoning from the moral domain may represent an artifactual division, one that ignores major philosophic and psychological traditions and cultural constructs regarding the moral self. We address such issues as the individual, social, and relational dimensions of morality; the cultural context of moral development and behavior; and whether morality is solely a matter of justice, harm and welfare considerations, or concerned as well with culturally variable definitions of the good self and the good society, with role obligations, and with caring and affective aspects of human experience. We conclude with a call for continuing narrative and anthropological approaches to the study of moral development in order to reach a fuller understanding of the multiple facets of moral life.