Kohl berg's Cognitive‐Developmental Theory in Educational Settings: Some Possible Abuses

Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.     

Moral and Religious Education

Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.     

Piaget,Moral Development and the Curriculum

Abstract

In The Moral Development of the Child Piaget proposes a sketch of a developmental account of moral judgments, and the sequence of stages which he there proposes have been widely taken to provide a basis for any adequate developmental account. However, if Piaget's work on cognitive development is taken as providing a standard by which to judge such theories it is doubtful that moral development can be accounted for through the use of the equilibrium concept. The very notion of ‘a moral judgment’ with which Piaget works imposes severe restrictions on the adequacy of the theory, leading him necessarily to ignore important issues. Furthermore, there seems to be no underpinning available to secure the necessary order of the stages, and as a matter of fact some children seem to show evidence of a capacity to make advanced moral judgments at an early age. It is argued, therefore, that the search for developmental structures of this kind should be abandoned.     

Differences in Achievement Test Scores Associated with Item Exposure Time and Audio Reinforcement

Abstract

Using the Hartshorne and May circles test, cheating behavior was detected among 152 undergraduates under two situations: high threat, high supervision (HTHS) and low threat, low supervision (LTLS). Rest’s Defining Test was used to assess level of moral development. Among all subjects and across both situations it was found that subjects high in moral development cheated less than other subjects (p >.01). However, it was also found that in the LTLS situation, subjects high in moral development were just as likely to cheat as subjects low in moral development. The implications of the findings for moral education and the cognitive developmental theory of moral development are discussed.     

Chinese Malaysian Adolescents' Social‐Cognitive Reasoning Regarding Filial Piety Dilemmas

This study examined the social‐cognitive reasoning of 52 Chinese Malaysian preadolescents (9–12 years old; M = 11.02, SD = 0.94) and 68 adolescents (13–18 years old; M = 14.76, SD = 1.39) in resolving filial dilemmas within the personal and moral domain. Preadolescents deferred to parental authority, whereas adolescents endorsed filial obligation reasoning to justify compliance in the personal domain. Both appealed to filial obligation, pragmatic, or welfare and safety reasoning to justify compliance but fairness or rights reasoning to justify their noncompliance, for the moral issue. Distinctions between authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety reasoning were revealed. Findings demonstrated complex decision‐making and cognitive reasoning processes among Chinese Malaysian adolescents as they negotiate their filial obligations and autonomy development.     

Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues

Abstract

After some preliminary doubts about Kohlberg's method of assessing moral reasoning, his ‘stage‐structural’ theory is criticized under six heads. (1) The claim that the stages constitute structural wholes, representing unified and differentiated patterns of thought: it is argued that the available evidence, and Kohlberg's own methodology, unambiguously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures. (2) Invariance, which, after counter‐evidence led to a revision in the theory, has yet to be demonstrated. (3) Cultural Universality: it is argued that, because of an ambiguity in the notion of a universal principle, Kohlberg's arguments against cultural relativism tend, if anything, to support it. (4) Logical Necessity: it is argued that Kohlberg shows at most that the sequence forms a hierarchy, from which neither its logical nor even its psychological necessity follows. (5) Increasing Cognitive Adequacy, with the associated claim that it is cognitive conflict which produces movement from one stage to another: it is argued that the empirical evidence conflicts with the theoretical claims, and that the theoretical arguments establish, at most, an increase in moral understanding, which could well increase, rather than decrease, cognitive conflict. (6) Increasing Moral Adequacy: this claim is as yet unjustified in any of its three possible interpretations. Finally it is suggested that Kohlbergian theory is in danger of becoming, in Lakatos's terms, a degenerating research programme.     

Reasoning strategies of students in solving chemistry problems as a function of developmental level,functional M‐capacity and disembedding ability

Achievement in science depends among other factors on hypothetico‐deductive reasoning ability, that is, developmental level of the students. Recent research indicates that the developmental level of students should be studied along with individual difference variables, such as Pascual‐Leone's M‐capacity (information processing) and Witkin's Cognitive Style (disembedding ability). The purpose of this study is to investigate reasoning strategies of students in solving chemistry problems as a function of developmental level, functional M‐capacity and disembedding ability. A sample of 109 freshman students were administered tests of formal operational reasoning, functional M‐capacity, disembedding ability and chemistry problems (limiting reagent, mole, gas laws). Results obtained show that students who scored higher on cognitive predictor variables not only have a better chance of solving chemistry problems, but also demonstrated greater understanding and used reasoning strategies indicative of explicit problem‐solving procedures based on the hypothetico‐deductive method, manipulation of essential information and sensitivity to misleading information. It was also observed that students who score higher on cognitive predictor variables tend to anticipate important aspects of the problem situation by constructing general figurative and operative models, leading to a greater understanding. Students scoring low on cognitive predictor variables tended to circumvent cognitively more demanding strategies and adopt others that helped them to overcome the constraints of formal reasoning, information processing and disembedding ability.     

Role‐taking Revisited: narrative and cognitive‐developmental interpretations of moral growth

Abstract

For some decades the cognitive‐developmental approach to moral psychology has dominated discussions of moral action and growth, and the concept of role‐taking has been central to related understandings. Narrative, both as conceptual approach and as method of investigation and interpretation, is presented here as a critical and complementary adjunct to the cognitive‐developmental case.     

The Place of the Good in a Justice Reasoning Approach to Moral Education

Abstract

Relying on developmental studies of reasoning about the good life, a model of moral education that integrates the good and the right is put forth. It is claimed that while Kohlberg's justice reasoning provides a justifiable aim for such curricula, how individuals attribute value will also significantly affect their moral actions. The notion of a ‘critical period’ for moral education during adolescence is also presented.     

Moral Reasoning and Conduct of Selected Elementary School Students

Abstract

In order to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and conduct, 38 Grade Six students, deemed by their teachers to display ‘delinquent’ or ‘non‐delinquent’ characteristics, were administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (Kohlberg et al., 1973) and an IQ test. Subjects were then randomly assigned to three treatment groups: a) experimental‐‐discussion of moral dilemmas; b) placebo‐‐social studies games; c) control. A month later Kohlberg's instrument was readministered.

Findings indicated that ‘delinquents’ and ‘non‐delinquents’ differed significantly (p = .001) on moral reasoning scores at both testing times. There was no statistically significant treatment effect (p = .06). Intelligence quotient was significantly and positively related to moral reasoning for ‘non‐delinquents’, but not for ‘delinquents’.     

The Existentialists and Problems of Moral and Religious Education: 2. Tillich and Jaspers

Abstract

This assessment of L. Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a dialectical critique focusing on his claim that the sixth stage of moral development is morally adequate, specifically, that it is both comprehensive and fully equilibrated. The dialectical method employed follows the generalized empirical method advanced by B. Lonergan. The paper includes a brief account of this method and of the sixth stage of moral reasoning as outlined by Kohlberg. Employing the dialectical notions of intellectual conversion and moral conversion, it uncovers certain unresolved conflicts of this stage and points to the need for a further moral stage of development, which would be both more highly differentiated and more fundamentally based.     

Moral development: Theory and applications

Kohlberg's theory of moral development explores the roles of cognition and emotion but focuses primarily on cognition. Contemporary post‐formal theories lead to the conclusion that skills resulting from cognitive‐affective integration facilitate consistency between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Rest's four‐component model of moral development delineates these skills specifically. The components, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral reasoning and moral character, operate as multidimensional processes that facilitate moral development and subsequently promote moral behaviour. The relationships between these components have been relatively unexplored, thereby missing the opportunity to unpack the processes underlying moral growth and development. In this study, moral motivation (spirituality), moral sensitivity (post‐formal skills) and moral reasoning are operationalized to examine the mediational effects of moral sensitivity of medical students. In the complex moral environment of medical students opportunities arise to question values and develop cognitive‐affective skills, among them spirituality and post‐formal thinking which are linked to increases in post‐conventional moral reasoning. The models tested indicate that moral sensitivity mediates the relationship between moral motivation and moral reasoning.     

Kohlberg's Theory Applied to the Moral and Sexual Development of Adults 1

Abstract

Previous research has shown that children and adolescents can progress in the stages of moral judgment. However, in the case of adults, Kohlberg (1973) suggested there might be crystallization after the age of 25.

The purpose of this study was to establish whether the structure of moral judgment of adults could be systematically encouraged toward change. Thirty‐six adults (three groups) enrolled in an adult sexology course were assessed to determine stage level at the beginning of the course, and post‐tested at the completion of the course. Four dilemmas were used: two for general moral judgment, and two for sexual moral judgment. During the 45‐hour course, subjects were systematically introduced to arguments of a higher stage, and discussions focused on the axiological aspects of the adults’ sexual life.

Results show that there was a significant increase in the scores at the post‐test, both in general and in sexual moral judgments; subjects over 25 also increased their scores, thus indicating that the structure of moral judgment is not crystallized after that age. The existence of a differential between general and sexual moral judgments was also corroborated.

Implications with regard to the use of the ‘+1 stage’ technique for adult education, and more particularly for adult sexual education, are discussed.

     

Human Rights Education through the ‘Facing History and Ourselves’ Program

Abstract

This study examined the effects of the Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO) human rights program on moral development and psychological functioning. The FHAO curriculum significantly increased 8th grade students’ moral reasoning (Rest's 1979 Defining Issues Test) without adversely impacting on their psychological well‐being (scores on depression, hopelessness or self‐worth inventories). Girls were more empathic and had higher levels of social interest; boys had higher global self‐worth scores; there were no differences between boys and girls in their moral reasoning scores and no gender differences in the psychological impact of the course. This study adds to the literature which suggests that human rights education positively affects students’ moral development.     

Developing Model‐Based Reasoning

Key elements of the structure and function of models in mathematics and science are identified. These elements are used as a basis for discussing the development of model‐based reasoning. A microgenetic study examines the beginnings of model‐based reasoning in a pair of fourth‐ and fifth‐grade children who solved several problems about chance and probability. Results are reported in the form of a cognitive model of children's problem‐solving performance. The cognitive model explains a transition in children's reasoning from tacit reliance on empirical regularity to a form of model‐based reasoning. Several factors fostering change in children's thinking are identified, including the role of notations, peer interaction, and teacher assistance. We suggest that model‐based reasoning is a slowly‐developing capability that emerges only with proper contextual and social support and that future study should be carried out in classrooms, where these forms of assistance can also be part of the object of study.

Model‐based reasoning is a significant intellectual milestone because it bridges the worlds of personal, intuitive knowledge, on the one hand, and mathematical‐scientific theory, on the other. However, across disciplines, consensus is still forming about what model‐based reasoning comprises, and there is little knowledge about its ontogenetic origins or how it develops. We consider analogy as the core of modeling, because in model‐based reasoning a system in one domain is used to understand a system in another. To understand how models come to play a role in reasoning, it is important to initiate study of their origins. Accordingly, we report a microgenetic study examining the beginnings of model‐based reasoning in a pair of young children solving problems about chance and probability. In this study we are engaged in the enterprise of modeling the development of modeling. That is, we report our results in the form of a cognitive model of children's problem‐solving performance that explains a transition in reasoning from a tacit reliance on empirical regularity to a form of model‐based reasoning. It is important to note the two distinct meanings for the term model used in this article. The first describes how children come to understand and appropriate a system of reasoning exemplified in practices of modeling. The second describes a research tool, a model of human reasoning—specifically, how children in this study began to use models of probability to reason about uncertain events. In this report, we use the terms model or model‐based reasoning to refer to the former interpretation, whereas references to a cognitive model denote the simulation of children's thinking—in this case, implemented as a computer program.

Before describing the empirical work, we first identify some key elements of the structure and function of models. Next, these elements of modeling are used as the basis for generating some conjectures about the development of model‐based reasoning. We describe a task that we used as a window to understanding progression in student reasoning toward reliance on models as tools for thought. We present our rationale for developing cognitive models of student performance and explain some choices concerning the implementation of the cognitive model reported here. Finally, we turn to the children's performance on chance and probability tasks and explain how that performance illuminates both what children do not understand about models and the kinds of relevant knowledge that they are acquiring.     

Stages of moral judgment development: Applying item response theory to Defining Issues Test data

ABSTRACT

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has been the dominant measure of moral development. The DIT has its roots in Kohlberg’s original stage theory of moral judgment development and asks respondents to rank a set of stage typed statements in order of importance on six stories. However, the question to what extent the DIT-data match the underlying stage model was never addressed with a statistical model. Therefore, we applied item response theory (IRT) to a large data set (55,319 cases). We found that the ordering of the stages as extracted from the raw data fitted the ordering in the underlying stage model good. Furthermore, difficulty differences of stages across the stories were found and their magnitude and location were visualized. These findings are compatible with the notion of one latent moral developmental dimension and lend support to the hundreds of studies that have used the DIT-1 and by implication support the renewed DIT-2.     

Self‐complexity and Self‐integration: Theory and Therapy in Clinical‐Developmental Psychology

Abstract

The growing field of clinical‐developmental psychology has been influenced by Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral judgement. Too literal a use of structural theory, however, has hindered this field's advancement. This paper argues that a new theory of self is required to apply appropriately developmental theory to clinical practice. The model consists of two related dimensions of self: self‐complexity and biographical themes (schemata and themata). A perspective on normal and atypical development given by the interactions between these components is described and implications for practice are discussed.     

Motivation and Morality

Abstract:

Of the three aspects of moral development‐‐the development of empathy, moral reasoning and related problem‐solving strategies‐‐we know least about empathy. Possible reasons for this are explored. Some of the relevant literature is reviewed. A new stage‐theory by M. L. Hoffman is described which shows how the development of person permanence, the capacity for role‐taking, and the awareness of personal identity may create the conditions under which the young child moves from a primitive response to the mother's physical distress to sympathetic distress, altruism, and eventually to guilt. The article concludes with implications for socialization, comments relating to future research, and a comprehensive bibliography.     

Social Interaction and the Development of a Sense of Right and Wrong in Young Children

Abstract:

Cognitive developmental research has neglected the very early stages of moral development. Three recent attempts to fill this gap are briefly described. The first is Martin Hoffman's stage theory account of the origins of empathy. The second is Selman's theory of the development of social perspective‐taking. The third is Damon's account of the development of ‘positive justice’ in early childhood. The implications of these approaches for early moral education are then discussed.