Moral Reasoning and Conduct of Selected Elementary School Students

Abstract

In order to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and conduct, 38 Grade Six students, deemed by their teachers to display ‘delinquent’ or ‘non‐delinquent’ characteristics, were administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (Kohlberg et al., 1973) and an IQ test. Subjects were then randomly assigned to three treatment groups: a) experimental‐‐discussion of moral dilemmas; b) placebo‐‐social studies games; c) control. A month later Kohlberg's instrument was readministered.

Findings indicated that ‘delinquents’ and ‘non‐delinquents’ differed significantly (p = .001) on moral reasoning scores at both testing times. There was no statistically significant treatment effect (p = .06). Intelligence quotient was significantly and positively related to moral reasoning for ‘non‐delinquents’, but not for ‘delinquents’.     

The Problem of Sophomoritis: An Educational Proposal

Abstract

‘Sophomoritis’ is identified as a period of adolescent development concerned primarily with raising all kinds of moral questions but also doubting all answers. It is suggested that this questioning often manifests itself in the form of uncritical relativism and naive egoism, and that it is potentially dangerous in that it is elevated to the status of an absolute external moral authority instead of a means to restructuring a new form of moral judgment. Criticism is leveled at educational institutions for implicitly supporting sophomoritis, particularly through ‘Introductory Ethics’ courses. A proposal is made for a course which instead utilizes the students’ natural development, together with the conceptual perspectives of moral philosophy, to stimulate development towards a principled form of moral autonomy.     

The Place of the Good in a Justice Reasoning Approach to Moral Education

Abstract

Relying on developmental studies of reasoning about the good life, a model of moral education that integrates the good and the right is put forth. It is claimed that while Kohlberg's justice reasoning provides a justifiable aim for such curricula, how individuals attribute value will also significantly affect their moral actions. The notion of a ‘critical period’ for moral education during adolescence is also presented.     

A Comparative Study of Moral Development of Korean and British Children

The present study explored Kohlberg's theory of moral development in relation to Korean and British children. A total of 128 Korean and British children aged 7-16 years were interviewed individually using Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, Form A. It was thought that the children in both cultural groups would develop moral stages at a similar rate. However, they showed cultural differences in the use of moral orientations. In addition, it was not possible to match some of the responses from the Korean children to Kohlberg's manual, implying that there are some Korean traditional concepts which affect Korean children's moral reasoning that Kohlberg was not aware of. Thus, Kohlberg's system could be used to examine children's general moral stage but was insufficient to understand fully Korean children's moral reasoning. The present study suggests that the interpretation of children's moral reasoning should be made based on consideration of cultural influence.     

Kohlberg and Piaget: Aspects of their Relationship in the Field of Moral Development

Abstract:

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment, though Piaget's work is not the only influence on Kohlberg's ideas. Piaget's system of moral growth is briefly examined, and the extent to which subsequent research has validated it, is noted, thus placing Kohlberg in a historical context. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. The concept of stages and the nature and processes of stage development are discussed, and in this context the relationship between Kohlberg's moral development and Piaget's cognitive development is examined. It is concluded on the basis both of logic and evidence that the relationship, although complex rather than isomorphic, is likely to hold considerable potential for future research.     

Content and Form in Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Abstract: R?rvik, H. 1980. Content and Form in Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 24,105‐120. One of the fundamental premises in Kohlberg's theory of moral development is the possibility of discerning between form and content, and he maintains that his test measures aspects of form alone. The present article reports on an empirical investigation of that allegation. The results of this study indicate that this part of Kohlberg's theory lacks support in the data. Thus, when teachers study groups of pupils’ answers from the Kohlberg's test, they recognize norms that the school intentionally transmits to pupils. Grading of this norm content and of motivation for choice of norm in moral decisions shows clear relations to grading advocated in connection with Kohlberg's test on moral judgment.     

Moral Reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim Adolescents

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to test the universality of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages of the development of moral judgment in Nigerian and Pakistani cultures. For the first study, 120 Nigerian Muslim Hausa secondary school adolescents (60 boys and 60 girls), whose ages ranged between 14 and 16, were questioned individually about two of Piaget's moral judgment situations, representing two different moral attributes, clumsiness and equality. In the second study, 90 subjects (30 Nigerian Muslim Hausa, 30 Nigerian Muslim Yoruba, and 30 Pakistani Muslim Punjabi adolescents), whose ages ranged between 12 and 13, were questioned about one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. The nature of the subjects’ responses suggested that moral reasoning of Nigerian and Pakistani Muslim adolescents are greatly affected by their cultural values.     

Responsibility,Moral Judgment and Moral Obligation

Abstract

This paper describes the evolution of the just community approach from Lawrence Kohlberg's earliest educational theorizing to the most recent experimental applications. The just community approach represents Kohlberg's most mature theory of moral education and has been the subject of intense research since 1975. Although Kohlberg initially recommended the discussion of moral dilemmas as a means of promoting moral development, he envisaged a far more radical and comprehensive approach. Inspired by a kibbutz school that successfully combined democratic and collectivist values, Kohlberg and his colleagues initiated a series of experimental programmes in public high schools. Evaluation of these programmes indicates that they establish cultures conducive to the development of socio‐moral reasoning and action.     

Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues

Abstract

After some preliminary doubts about Kohlberg's method of assessing moral reasoning, his ‘stage‐structural’ theory is criticized under six heads. (1) The claim that the stages constitute structural wholes, representing unified and differentiated patterns of thought: it is argued that the available evidence, and Kohlberg's own methodology, unambiguously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures. (2) Invariance, which, after counter‐evidence led to a revision in the theory, has yet to be demonstrated. (3) Cultural Universality: it is argued that, because of an ambiguity in the notion of a universal principle, Kohlberg's arguments against cultural relativism tend, if anything, to support it. (4) Logical Necessity: it is argued that Kohlberg shows at most that the sequence forms a hierarchy, from which neither its logical nor even its psychological necessity follows. (5) Increasing Cognitive Adequacy, with the associated claim that it is cognitive conflict which produces movement from one stage to another: it is argued that the empirical evidence conflicts with the theoretical claims, and that the theoretical arguments establish, at most, an increase in moral understanding, which could well increase, rather than decrease, cognitive conflict. (6) Increasing Moral Adequacy: this claim is as yet unjustified in any of its three possible interpretations. Finally it is suggested that Kohlbergian theory is in danger of becoming, in Lakatos's terms, a degenerating research programme.     

Kohl berg's Cognitive‐Developmental Theory in Educational Settings: Some Possible Abuses

Abstract

Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental theory provides teachers with a framework for understanding the change and development of moral judgment and decision‐making of their pupils. One major abuse, however, may be when teachers take the stage labels associated with the hypothesized stage levels of moral judgment as indicative of static student qualities or characteristics, by placing more emphasis on perceived and labelled qualities than on the actual moral reasoning of the student. This, it is suggested, together with some empirical examples, may obscure the developmental trend of the student's moral judgment or even affect the teacher's expectations and consequently student's performance, and fails to take into account such factors as environment and interpersonal interaction. A study is reported in which curriculum consultants exposed to moral development theory were tested to determine whether they would use Kohlbergian labels of stage content or actual moral reasoning when required to make assessments. Suggestions are put forward as to how moral development theory can be more closely linked to pedagogy.     

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development and Its Relevance to Education

Isaksson, A. 1979. Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development and Its Relevance to Education. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 23, 47‐63. The main assumptions and categories of Kohlberg's theory of moral development are succinctly outlined. New empirical studies and critical reviews are discussed, and their implications for the theory assessed. It is concluded that the theory is correct in its basic assumption of viewing moral development as a sequential progression towards more complex structural wholes that can be conceptualized as levels or stages. Empirical evidence is found to lend greater support to the identity of three sequential structural levels than to six distinct stages. Kohlberg's and his associates’ approach to moral education is briefly described. The relevance of the theory to moral education is seen as self‐evident. The conditions for the efficacy of moral educational programmes are discussed. The general conclusion of the article is that Kohlberg's approach has proven its basic theoretical and heuristic value. The theoretical framework favoured by the author is cognitive‐developmental.     

Management in Education

Abstract

This paper uses Durkheim's critique of Kant to criticize Kohlberg's theory of morality. After examining the applicability of Durkheim's criticism of Kant's definition of morality to Kohlberg's equation of morality with justice structures, it explores Durkheim's psychological views on emotional and dispositional aspects of morality, which are typically neglected by Kantians. Some standard criticisms of Durkheim's moral theory are re‐examined and the argument is advanced that Durkheim's social ethic is substantively at Stage Six on Kohlberg's developmental schema. Several modifications of Kohlberg's theory are proposed, using Durkheimian insights.     

Moral and Religious Education

Abstract

Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning postulates a supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending, labelled Stage Six. Kohlberg identifies this with a principle of justice, though without adequately justifying the elimination of other autonomous universal principles. The claim that this principle provides consistent, reversible and universalizable moral judgements is criticized: by itself a purely formal principle of justice can provide no particular moral judgements at all; for that we need independent values, such as the value of life which Kohlberg appeals to, but does not justify, in his discussions of the Heinz dilemma. More generally there is no reason to expect that any form of moral reasoning will be supremely adequate in Kohlberg's sense, providing a solution to all moral problems and dilemmas. The principle of justice is merely one among the many specifically moral principles which Kohlberg locats at Stage Five, albeit the one which he personally happens to favour.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Lawrence Kohlberg's many accounts of his cognitive‐developmental theory of moral reasoning is the crucial importance which he attaches to the form of reasoning labelled Stage Six, when it is a stage of development that only a tiny minority of individuals actually attain. Indeed it appears that even that number has had to be revised downward in the light of changes to the theory and scoring system, until it begins to seem that only a handful of saints and heroes, such as Socrates or Martin Luther King, remain. In fact so slender is the empirical evidence for a separate form of Stage Six reasoning that the official scoring manual (Kohlberg et al., 1977) prefers to ignore it altogether. Clearly, then, the case for Stage Six must be almost wholly theoretical, not to say philosophical, as the supremely adequate form of moral thinking to which all other stages are tending. And by the same token it may seem that criticisms of Kohlberg's claims for Stage Six will leave the rest of the theory untouched. But that, I think, is to underestimate the significance of Stage Six. It is the apogee of his system, providing both a focus and a rationale for the stage‐development that allegedly leads to it; it is as crucial to the theory as Kohlberg's own writings make it. Without Stage Six the cognitive‐developmental account stands in need of radical re‐thinking, to put it no higher.     

Social Interaction and the Development of a Sense of Right and Wrong in Young Children

Abstract:

Cognitive developmental research has neglected the very early stages of moral development. Three recent attempts to fill this gap are briefly described. The first is Martin Hoffman's stage theory account of the origins of empathy. The second is Selman's theory of the development of social perspective‐taking. The third is Damon's account of the development of ‘positive justice’ in early childhood. The implications of these approaches for early moral education are then discussed.     

Self‐complexity and Self‐integration: Theory and Therapy in Clinical‐Developmental Psychology

Abstract

The growing field of clinical‐developmental psychology has been influenced by Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral judgement. Too literal a use of structural theory, however, has hindered this field's advancement. This paper argues that a new theory of self is required to apply appropriately developmental theory to clinical practice. The model consists of two related dimensions of self: self‐complexity and biographical themes (schemata and themata). A perspective on normal and atypical development given by the interactions between these components is described and implications for practice are discussed.     

The Teacher As Moral Agent

Abstract

Lawrence Kohlberg's work in moral education appears to be significant enough philosophically that one is tempted to use much of it to resolve basic problems of long standing. In this essay it is argued that it would prove more fruitful for Kohlberg or anyone else to avoid applying his developmentalist position to the settling of such problems as utilitarian/formalist supremacy or the search for a ‘best’ morality. Instead, emphasis could be placed on the explicating of the fundamental requirements of a non‐relativistic, non‐egoistic morality of whatever sort.

Such basic moral requirements serve to highlight of what principled morality (Stages Five and Six) consists, and why it need not be tied to a Rawlsian Formalism, or to any other normative ethical position. In fact, there is considerable cause for supposing that what Kohlberg really achieves with clarity is nothing more than a sequential typology of development in moral thinking from egoism to universalism, and from situation‐specific rules to universalizable and reversable judgments of principle. This in itself constitutes, of course, an enormous undertaking and, if successfully defended, would be a very significant breakthrough in Psychology, Education and Philosophy. It is what Kohlberg ought to be about, rather than something unnecessarily contentious.     

A Model of Intervention for Improving Moral Reasoning: an experiment in the Basque country

Abstract

The experiment presented falls within Kohlberg's constructivist model, and attempts to respond to the need for work on those interpersonal values which may be called ethical or moral, in practical education. The intervention took place in a state school in Vizcaya (Basque Country), with a sample of 97 subjects between the ages of 9 and 14 years. A pre‐test‐‐post‐test design was used in order to check for the achievement of more mature states of moral development. The main working strategy was the discussion of hypothetical and real values dilemmas in class discussion groups. The results show that many advances were made. The data indicate that discussing dilemmas leads to higher levels of moral reasoning in students.     

Moral Education and the Training of Teachers

Abstract

In this study of the relationship between moral behaviour, level of moral development, and motivation, moral behaviour was assessed in an experimental situation in which it was necessary to violate the experimenter's authority to help someone; level of moral development was assessed by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, and motivation by a post‐experimental interview.

Although 72 per cent of the subjects stated afterwards that they felt that they should help, only 43 per cent did, and only 6 per cent volunteered their own service. As the level of moral development rose, an increasing percentage of subjects helped. Subjects interpreted the same situation differently and were motivated to make the same response for different reasons, which varied with their level of moral development.     

An Overview of the Minnesota Approach to Research in Moral Development

This article traces the history of the Minnesota approach to moral judgement research. It is claimed that this history can be subdivided into four phases, each one associated with a different goal and theoretical consideration. Attention is also given to the issues motivating the different research goals as well as highlights of the outcomes of this work. It is concluded that the Minnesota approach has been a progressive force in the field, promoting change in both theory and measurement and also serving as a stabilising force by reaffirming Kohlberg's basic view that moral judgements are both cognitive and developmental.