Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)?

Several scientists, scientific institutions, and philosophers have argued that science is committed to Methodological Naturalism (MN), the view that science, by virtue of its methods, is limited to studying ‘natural’ phenomena and cannot consider or evaluate hypotheses that refer to supernatural entities. While they may in fact exist, gods, ghosts, spirits, and extrasensory or psi phenomena are inherently outside the domain of scientific investigation. Recently, Mahner (Sci Educ 3:357–371, 2012) has taken this position one step further, proposing the more radical view that science presupposes an a priori commitment not just to MN, but also to ontological naturalism (ON), the metaphysical thesis that supernatural entities and phenomena do not exist. Here, we argue that science presupposes neither MN nor ON and that science can indeed investigate supernatural hypotheses via standard methodological approaches used to evaluate any ‘non-supernatural’ claim. Science, at least ideally, is committed to the pursuit of truth about the nature of reality, whatever it may be, and hence cannot exclude the existence of the supernatural a priori, be it on methodological or metaphysical grounds, without artificially limiting its scope and power. Hypotheses referring to the supernatural or paranormal should be rejected not because they violate alleged a priori methodological or metaphysical presuppositions of the scientific enterprise, but rather because they fail to satisfy basic explanatory criteria, such as explanatory power and parsimony, which are routinely considered when evaluating claims in science and everyday life. Implications of our view for science education are discussed.     

Disaggregating the Creationist Challenge to Liberal Neutrality

In the US and elsewhere, creationist groups have challenged the mandatory science curriculum because it introduces the theory of evolution as the true story of biodiversity. This paper disaggregates this challenge in two distinctive levels. On the substantive level, creationists claim that Darwinian evolution is not value-neutral, as most scientists portray it, but it works as a philosophically-loaded theory that amounts to naturalism, which is a comprehensive doctrine that undermines traditional theism. Creationists then contend that its exclusive teaching violates the liberal promise of religious neutrality. To restore metaphysical fairness, they propose to include non-naturalistic theories into the official curriculum as a way of balance. On the epistemic level, creationists criticise liberal institutions—from courts of justice to educational boards and executive officials—that demarcate science in a way in which supernatural hypotheses can never compete for the best factual explanation. Under the guise of a purely methodological naturalism, they argue, liberals are opting for a cognitive filter that is biased against the belief that God intervenes in cosmic history. To restore epistemological fairness, they propose that theories that suggest supernatural agency should be rehabilitated and eventually included in the science curriculum. In these two distinct levels, the creationist claim is advanced as a logical implication of political liberalism's purported commitment to religious impartiality.     

On the Possibility of a Scientific Theory of Scientific Method

Normative naturalism (NN), advocated by Larry Laudan, understands the principles of scientific method to be akin to scientific hypotheses which are then open to test like any principles of science. It uses a meta-inductive rule to test methodological principles against suitably presented episodes in the history of science. One strength of NN is that it provides the basis for a philosophical/historical research programme into the methodological strategies actually employed in the sciences. But for the philosopher interested in the grounds of scientific rationality NN is not without it difficulties such as: it adopts a strongly empiricist account of meta-method which rules out realist principles of scientific method from the test procedures; it uses principles of test which are either not agreed upon, or stray from the meta-inductive rule; it reveals its limits in presupposing answers, rather than offering solutions, to problems of scientific rationality.     

论库恩哲学与伽达默尔哲学的异同

库恩和伽达默尔对语言的重视、“先见”和范式在认识中的相似作用、是否可通约的分歧等 ,使我们直接把握到侧重于自然科学的库恩哲学与伽达尔的哲学解释学在文化领域的相通。这有可能导致将科学置于人的生活世界之中而不再超然     

Current Status of Research in Teaching and Learning Evolution: I. Philosophical/Epistemological Issues

Scholarship that addresses teaching and learning about evolution has rapidly increased in recent years. This review of that scholarship first addresses the philosophical/epistemological issues that impinge on teaching and learning about evolution, including the proper philosophical goals of evolution instruction; the correlational and possibly causal relationships among knowing, understanding, accepting, and believing; and the factors that affect student understanding, acceptance, and/or belief. Second, I summarize the specific epistemological issues involved, including empiricism, naturalism, philosophical vs methodological materialism, science vs religion as non-overlapping magisteria, and science as a way of knowing. Third, the paper critically reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the research tools available to measure the nature of science, epistemological beliefs, and especially the acceptance of evolution. Based on these findings, further research in these areas, especially study of the factors that cause lack of explanatory coherence as well as replications of studies that promise to explain current confusing findings about the interrelationships among student understanding, acceptance, and belief in evolution, are called for. In addition, this review calls for more longitudinal studies to delineate causal connections as well as improved measurement tools.     

论规范自然主义的方法论

方法论构成了规范自然主义中最重要的一环。该理论认为,方法论规则应被看作是假言命令式,方法论规则与它要实现的认知目标之间的关系可以得到历史的考察,以此为基础我们就能对方法论做出取舍。因此,方法论是一项经验性的事业,有合理的评价模式,但史料分析可以否证这种自然主义方法论。对方法论规则的多样化和普遍性程度的研究,揭示了方法论评价的概念维度,而这正是规范自然主义的方法论没考虑到的。     

浅述非线性科学及其对自然科学与自然观的影响

本文对非线性科学的形成及其三大理论前沿进行了简要的概述 ,并浅述了非线性科学对自然科学和自然观的影响。这对帮助读者了解当今科学前沿课题有一定的参考价值。     

Philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional design faculty and professionals

The purpose of this research was to probe the philosophical beliefs of instructional designers using sound philosophical constructs and quantitative data collection and analysis. We investigated the philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional designers, including 152 instructional design faculty members and 118 non-faculty professionals. We used the Philosophy of Social Science Inventory, a 52-item questionnaire, to measure 20 beliefs within four categories. We probed four ontological beliefs (ontological realism, ontological relativism, physicalism, and idealism); five epistemological beliefs (epistemological relativism, fallibilism, epistemological objectivity, rationalism, and empiricism); three axiological beliefs (ethical realism, ethical relativism, and valueneutrality in research); and eight methodological beliefs (nomothetic, idiographic and critical methods, scientific naturalism, humanism, and quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods). Our research questions included (a) What are the predominant philosophical and methodological beliefs of instructional designers? (b) Do instructional design faculty and non-faculty instructional designers, identifying with different research methodologies, hold different sets of philosophical beliefs? and (c) What relationships exist between philosophical beliefs and age, gender, ethnicity, level of education, and/or years of service? Overall, the philosophical profile of instructional designers can reasonably be described as pragmatic. Belief characterizations of methodological subgroups (e.g., those identifying with qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods research) generally supported our hypotheses. Although demographic variables (except gender) were not singularly important, our analyses suggest that a combination of ethnicity, gender, research preference, and level of education can be used to predict philosophical and methodological beliefs.     

Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism

The structure of David’s Bloor argument for the Strong Programme (SP) in Science Studies is criticized from the philosophical perspective of anti-skeptical, scientific realism. The paper transforms the common criticism of SP—that the symmetry principle of SP implies an untenable form of cognitive relativism—into the␣clear philosophical issue of naturalism versus Platonism. It is also argued that the concrete patterns of SP’s interest-explanations and its sociological definition of knowledge involve philosophical skepticism. It is claimed, then, that the most problematic elements of SP reside primarily in philosophical skepticism. It is also claimed that this sort of criticism can be directed against other more radical, versions of constructivism in science and science education studies.     

Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews?

Several prominent scientists, philosophers, and scientific institutions have argued that science cannot test supernatural worldviews on the grounds that (1) science presupposes a naturalistic worldview (Naturalism) or that (2) claims involving supernatural phenomena are inherently beyond the scope of scientific investigation. The present paper argues that these assumptions are questionable and that indeed science can test supernatural claims. While scientific evidence may ultimately support a naturalistic worldview, science does not presuppose Naturalism as an a priori commitment, and supernatural claims are amenable to scientific evaluation. This conclusion challenges the rationale behind a recent judicial ruling in the United States concerning the teaching of “Intelligent Design” in public schools as an alternative to evolution and the official statements of two major scientific institutions that exert a substantial influence on science educational policies in the United States. Given that science does have implications concerning the probable truth of supernatural worldviews, claims should not be excluded a priori from science education simply because they might be characterized as supernatural, paranormal, or religious. Rather, claims should be excluded from science education when the evidence does not support them, regardless of whether they are designated as ‘natural’ or ‘supernatural’.     

Models and Modelling in Physics Education: A Critical Re-analysis of Philosophical Underpinnings and Suggestions for Revisions

The model-based view (MBV) of science education, which strives for authenticity in science teaching, is currently seeking support from the philosophical positions related to the Semantic View of Theories (SVT). These recent advances are promising steps towards establishing a robust philosophical framework, but they need revision in so far as they are meant to apply to physics and physics education. It is suggested here that in physics education, attention needs to be guided to the notion of the empirical reliability of models and modelling, and to the methodological question of how empirical reliability is established in the process of making a match between theory and experiment. The suggested picture – intended for the purposes of physics teacher education – replaces the current more limited philosophical frameworks used in science education with one of a wider scope. Moreover, the revised philosophical background gives a more authentic picture of physics as science, and the modelling activity within it, than the other current stances in the science education.     

当代外语教学的哲学基础

哲学对一切具体科学和实践活动具有普遍方法论的指导作用。应用语言学作为一门独立的学科自创立以来,还没有学者明确而全面地阐释它的哲学基础,外语教学法的哲学基础更是一地鸡毛。外语教学法的哲学基础一日不确定,教师就不会拥有一种较为恒久的教学思想。笔者研究发现,当代外语教学逐步建立在人本主义哲学基础之上。本文从目前外语教学课程的设计、教学方法的选择和教学活动的安排等方面对此做了阐释。     

Mario Bunge: Physicist and Philosopher

Mario Bunge was born in Argentina in the final year of the First World War.He learnt atomic physics and quantum mechanics from an Austrian refugeewho had been a student of Heisenberg. Additionally he taught himself modernphilosophy in an environment that was a philosophical backwater. He was thefirst South American philosopher of science to be trained in science. Hispublications in physics, philosophy, psychology, sociology and the foundationsof biology, are staggering in number, and include a massive 8-volume Treatiseon Philosophy. The unifying thread of his scholarship is the constant and vigorousadvancement of the Enlightenment Project, and criticism of cultural and academicmovements that deny or devalue the core planks of the project: namely its naturalism,the search for truth, the universality of science, rationality, and respect for individuals.At a time when specialisation is widely decried, and its deleterious effects on science,philosophy of science, educational research and science teaching are recognised – it is salutary to see the fruits of one person's pursuit of the Big' scientific and philosophical picture.     

Teaching the Nature of Science from a Philosophical Perspective

This paper draws attention to basic philosophical perspectives which are of theoretical and methodological interest for science education, general education and curriculum research. It focuses on potential contributions philosophy class can offer if philosophy education opens up for science and for a collaboration of teachers in the context of post-compulsory education. A central educational goal is to connect basic philosophical skills with any curricular intellectual practice. This implies the possibility of crossing disciplinary boundaries. Hence, the present paper questions the disciplinary rigidity of education and aims at bridging the artificial gap between teaching philosophy and teaching science in order to enrich the individual school subjects involved. Towards this end, this article sketches out a conceptual framework for the issue of interdisciplinarity with regard to philosophy and science in upper secondary school. This framework takes into account aspects of the nature of science (NOS), history and philosophy of science (HPS) and the critical thinking approach which have significant implications for teaching. It aims to facilitate a basic understanding of the significant positive impact philosophy could have on improving scientific literacy as well as decision-making in general. I set forth methods of cross-curricular teaching which can promote innovation in education as interdisciplinarity already does in research since there is growing appreciation of collaboration and partnership between philosophy and science.

     

Mario Bunge, Systematic Philosophy and Science Education: An Introduction

Mario Bunge was born in Argentina in 1919 and is now in his mid-90s. He studied atomic physics and quantum mechanics with Guido Beck (1903?C1988), an Austrian refugee and student of Heisenberg. Additionally he studied modern philosophy in an environment that was a philosophical backwater becoming the first South American philosopher of science to be trained in science. His publications in physics, philosophy, psychology, sociology and the foundations of biology, are staggering in number, and include a massive 8-volume Treatise on Philosophy. The unifying thread of his scholarship is the constant and vigorous advancement of the Enlightenment Project, and criticism of cultural and academic movements that deny or devalue the core planks of the project: namely its naturalism, the search for truth, the universality of science, the value of rationality, and respect for individuals. At a time when specialisation is widely decried, and its deleterious effects on science, philosophy of science, educational research and science teaching are recognised, and at a time when ??grand narratives?? are thought both undesirable and impossible??it is salutary to appraise the fruits of one person??s pursuit of the ??Big?? scientific and philosophical picture or grand narrative. In doing so this special issue brings together philosophers, physicists, biologists, sociologists, logicians, cognitive scientists, economists and mathematicians to examine facets of Mario Bunge??s systematic philosophy and to appraise its contribution to important issues in current philosophy and, by implication, education.     

Naturalized philosophy of science and natural science education

A major controversy in contemporary philosophy of science concerns the possibility and desirability of its naturalization. In this paper I review the philosophical controversy concerning naturalism, and investigate the role it might play in the science classroom. I argue that science students can benefit from explicit study of this controversy, and from explicit consideration of the extent to which philosophy of science can be studied naturalistically. More specifically, I suggest that such consideration can enhance students' understanding of the nature of natural science, of the nature and importance of philosophy of science, and of the relationship between the two — and that these benefits accrue to science education whichever philosophical view concerning naturalization proves to be correct. My hope is that the paper demonstrates the benefits to be gained from explicit consideration in the science classroom of an important issue in the philosophy of science.     

科学知识的客观性及其可能——论约翰·齐曼的自然主义认识论立场

齐曼认为科学是一种自然种类,对它的研究应该采取自然主义的立场。客观性是齐曼科学学研究的核心问题。他通过阐释科学知识的主体际性特征,以及“客观”的涵义,描绘出他所认识的科学的形象。齐曼的自然主义认识论立场打破了自然科学与人文科学的传统划界,祛除了传统遗产赋予科学的“决不犯错”的神性,还科学以本来面目。     

自然科学的研究发展与哲学思维的产生形影相随

科学的发展表明,哲学是对社会科学与自然科学的总结,是开展对两类科学研究的钥匙。其一,通过对哲学与自然科学产生与发展的关联性,来探究二者之间的相互关系。其二,揭示现代哲学思维的五个核心内涵及特点,并从深层次领悟哲学对国家理政和经济发展决策的主心骨轻重导向的重要作用。其三,论述了善于观察、懂得比较、敢于质疑、富于想象是解开科学秘密的“万能钥匙”,从而达到通过实证论证,讲述现代大学生如何运用哲学思维去发现、思考、解决问题的理念,最终使我们能科学地将哲学的思维方法应用于对专业的学习和研究,从而为民族的伟大复兴挑起时代的重担。     

庄子的自然主义意蕴（之一）

《庄子》一书整体体现出一种自然主义的哲学倾向,而其自然主义哲学的关注点和主导指向是人类的自然主义的生存态度,其超越的、理想化的自然主义的境界,是心灵的转化和内在超越,是对黑暗社会现实的大胆揭露,是对人类文明的批判和反思,是对人类生存的本然状态以及本然状态中的人类自由的追求,体现出庄子自然主义的独特意蕴,它奠定了中国传统文化的自然主义思想的基础,对中国文化的人文精神产生了深远的影响。     

The Postmodern Sin of Intelligent Design Creationism

That Intelligent Design Creationism rejects the methodological naturalism of modern science in favor of a premodern supernaturalist worldview is well documented and by now well known. An irony that has not been sufficiently appreciated, however, is the way that ID Creationists try to advance their premodern view by adopting (if only tactically) a radical postmodern perspective. This paper will reveal the deep threads of postmodernism that run through the ID Creationist movement’s arguments, as evidenced in the writings and interviews of its key leaders. Seeing their arguments and activities from this perspective highlights the danger to science posed by both ID Creationism and radical postmodernism.