Spiritual Language and the Ethics of Redemption: a Reply to Jim Mackenzie

I argue in this paper that Jim Mackenzie's critique of my recent work on religious and spiritual education fails on two main counts. First, his imputation to me of a confessional approach to religious education is simply misdirected, insofar as my previous papers are quite clearly concerned to sketch an alternative to both confessional and phenomenological approaches. Secondly, his attempt to reduce my 'spiritual truths' to moral and other claims turns on some question-begging decontextualisation of such judgements, as well as upon demonstrable ambiguities in his use of the terms 'moral' and 'soul'. In particular, I argue that the language of spirituality is indexed to an 'ethics of redemption' which is clearly distinguishable from any discourse of secular morality.     

Beyond Culture: a reply to Mark Halstead

This paper is a response to Mark Halstead's communitarian argument for a curriculum which includes education for cultural attachment. In particular it explores the difficulty of combining education for cultural attachment with education for democratic citizenship and cross-cultural understanding wherever the cultural attachment excludes the culture of liberalism. Halstead bases his proposals on a view of minority communities as separate and distinct cultural entities each determining the way of life of its members. This paper concludes by offering a different view of culture and identity, one which suggests a curriculum for going beyond culture.     

Differing to agree: a reply to Hammersley and Abraham

In this paper Gewirtz and Cribb offer a response to Hammersley and Abraham's criticisms of their arguments about the place of values in social research published in this issue of BJSE. In doing so, they make clear that most of the positions that Hammersley and Abraham attribute to them are ones that they do not identify with and that, like Hammersley and Abraham, they would reject. In order to further clarify and specify their own position, Gewirtz and Cribb argue that: their advocacy of ethical reflexivity rests on the assumption that there are many incompatible sets of values in play within even a single vantage point; researchers should sometimes take an interest in knowledge use although they should not always be required to do so; and, whilst at the level of propositions it is always possible to abstract out and distinguish between factual claims and value claims, at the level of practice there can be significant resonances and linkages between the two, so it is important to be ethically reflexive about these entanglements. Finally, the authors agree that values should not be seen purely as a source of contamination but that attention to values can help to underpin ‘objectivity’.