A new solution to the gamer’s dilemma

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts.     

Objections to Ostritsch’s argument in “The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation”

This paper raises three objections to the argument presented by Ostritsch in The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation, in which the amoralist’s mantra “it’s just a game” is viewed as an illegitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to (typically violent) video games. The first objection focuses on Ostritsch’s ‘strong sense’ of player enjoyment, which I argue is too crude, given the moral work it is meant to be doing. Next, I question the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim that certain video games are immoral. I examine what is involved in making this claim and what would be required for a normative position to be established: none of which is addressed by Ostritsch. Finally, I challenge the legitimacy of his claim that players are obliged not to play certain video games in certain ways (i.e., games endorsing immorality as ‘fun games’). I distinguish between immoral and suberogatory actions, arguing that the latter is in fact more applicable to cases Ostritsch has in mind, and that one is not obliged not to engage in these actions.     

The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation

According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for the so-called “endorsement view” according to which there is nevertheless a sense in which games themselves can be morally problematic, viz. when they do not only represent immoral actions but endorse a morally problematic worldview. Based on the endorsement view, I argue against full blown amoralism by claiming that gamers do have a moral obligation when playing certain games even if their moral obligation is not categorically different from that of readers and moviegoers.     

Resolving the gamer’s dilemma

Morgan Luck raises a potentially troubling problem for gamers who enjoy video games that allow the player to commit acts of virtual murder. The problem simply is that the arguments typically advanced to defend virtual murder in video games would appear to also support video games that allowed gamers to commit acts of virtual paedophilia. Luck’s arguments are persuasive, however, there is one line of argument that he does not consider, which may provide the relevant distinction: as virtual paedophilia involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, it is therefore an instance of child pornography. I argue that virtual paedophilia involves the depiction of sexual acts involving children, which amounts to child pornography. I then draw on arguments to show that child pornography is morally objectionable. Finally, depictions of virtual murder are not instances of pornography, and so are not morally objectionable for this reason. So, there is a relevant moral distinction to draw between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia that is able to justify the former but not the latter.     

What’s happening to our universities?

In recent decades, many universities have been moving in the direction of a more hierarchical and centralised structure, with top-down planning and reduced local autonomy for departments. Yet, the management literature over this period has stressed the numerous benefits of flatter organisational structures, decentralisation and local autonomy for sections or departments. What might explain this paradox? And why have academics remained strangely quiet about this, meekly accepting their fate? This proposition paper critically examines the dangers of centralised top-down management, increasingly bureaucratic procedures, teaching to a prescribed formula, and research driven by assessment and performance targets, illustrating these with a number of specific examples. It discusses a number of possible forces driving these worrying developments, and concludes by asking whether academics may be in danger of suffering the fate of the boiled frog.     

Social constructivist account of the world’s largest gay social app: Case study of Blued in China

Abstract

Given China’s political conservativism and limited social acceptance of sexual minorities, it is paradoxical to find that Blued, a gay social app headquartered in Beijing, has become the largest app of this kind globally. Informed by the social construction of technology perspective and based on a yearlong ethnography, this article identifies three major factors that have shaped the developmental trajectory of Blued: (1) work with the Communist Party of China to employ Blued as a health education platform; (2) switch in orientation from a hookup app to a social app; and (3) push for the commercialization and internationalization of the app. This article spotlights that the voices of users were missing in the development process and argues that, for Blued to continue maintaining its success, it must stop relying on the “I-methodology” in its design and development. Lastly, it contributes to the SCOT scholarship and social app studies by deciphering the role of the state in app development in the Chinese context.     

Anatomy of use-inspired researchers: From Pasteur’s Quadrant to Pasteur’s Cube model

Pasteur’s Quadrant model, published by Stokes in 1997, presents a two-dimensional abstract conceptual framework that proved immensely helpful to study and discuss institutional and policy arrangements in science. However, during the last 10 years the PQ model was also applied in a series of large-scale, survey-based studies worldwide to classify individual modern-day researchers according to their research orientation and performance.This paper argues that such applications are inadequate to capture key characteristics of individual researchers, especially those within the heterogeneous ‘Pasteur type’ group who engage in ‘use-inspired’ basic scientific research. Addressing this shortcoming, Pasteur’s Cube (PC) model introduces a new heuristic tool. Departing from a three-dimensional conceptual framework of research-related activities, the model enables a range of typologies to describe and study the large variety of academics at today’s research-intensive universities. The PC model’s analytical robustness was tested empirically in two interrelated ‘proof of concept’ studies: an exploratory survey among 150 European universities and a follow-up case study of Leiden University in the Netherlands. Both studies, collecting data for the years 2010–2015, applied a metrics-based taxonomy to classify individual academic researchers according to four performance categories: scientific publication output, research collaboration with the business sector, patents filings, and being engaging in entrepreneurial activities.The collective results of both studies provide more clarity on relevant subgroups of use-inspired researchers. The PC model can be used to guide empirical, metrics-based investigations of research activities and productivities, applies this approach to two case studies, and demonstrates the utility of the method while also reinforcing and enriching the growing body of literature showing that cross-sectoral and cross-functional research activities are more scientifically productive than research carried out in isolation of the context of use. Introducing the ‘Crossover Collaborator’ subtype helps to explain why Pasteur type researchers tend to outperform other types of researchers in terms of publication output and citation impact.     

Offering Advisory Service to China’s S&T Development

The CAS Academic Divisions (CASAD) is es-tablished on June 1, 1955. At present, it has sixdivisions of mathematics & physics, chemistry,life sciences & medical sciences, earth sciences, in-formation sciences and technical sciences. In 1984,the State Council defined its principal function inclear terms, i.e. “the highest advisory body of theState in science and technology” while the CAS mem-bership is “the highest academic title conferred bythe State to an individual in the fields of …