Liberalism,Pluralism, and Political Education: Paradox or paradigm?

Inspired by concern about promoting civic participation and preserving the liberal democratic state, political theorists have recently reignited a debate about the nature of political education in a liberal society. These theorists' arguments in favor of teaching toleration are significant for the progress of education reforms currently being debated and implemented in current liberal democracies and some emerging nations. Despite the increasing attention paid to the value of liberal civic education, however, its specific content is typically left virtually blank. This article aims to redress this gap in the literature by developing a coherent and comprehensive (albeit still very general) curriculum for liberal political education. To this end, Section I analyses the nature of the ideal liberal democratic state and develops a general curriculum for liberal political education based on the type of citizens needed to preserve and take advantage of such a state. It concludes by introducing two potentially illiberal outcomes of this curriculum: children's forced development of the capacity for autonomy, and the reduction of diversity in the state. Section II argues that the development of autonomy is actually central to liberal theory and liberal education more broadly conceived, while Section III suggests that civic and social diversity will persist, but rightly play a secondary role to the goals of liberal political education. The article concludes, therefore, with a reassertion of the content and importance of liberal political education.     

A Politically Liberal Conception of Formal Education in a Developing Democracy

As discussed by John Rawls, in a well-ordered society, a public political culture’s wide educational role bears the primary responsibility for developing reasonable individuals for the stability of a politically liberal society. Rawlsian scholars have also focused on the stability and enhancement of developed liberal democratic societies by means of those societies’ education systems. In this sense, one thing that is common to Rawlsian scholars’ and Rawls’s own understanding of the role of education appears to be a concern over the stability of a politically liberal society since it is highly dependent on the character of its citizens. Also, it is usually believed that a politically liberal account of education can be implemented in a developed politically liberal society. In contrast, this study discusses the possibility of implementing a politically liberal account of education in a developing liberal society that may become a developed liberal democracy under an overlapping consensus.     

The Prudential Value of Education for Autonomy

A popular justification of education for autonomy is that autonomy possession has intrinsic prudential value. Communitarians have argued, however, that although autonomy may be a core element of a well‐lived life in liberal societies, it cannot claim such a prudential pedigree in traditional societies in which the conception of a good life is intimately tied to the acceptance of a pre‐established worldview. In this paper I examine a recent attempt made by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan Cuypers to respond to this challenge by reestablishing the intrinsic prudential value of autonomy, and I argue that although their work has merit in some respects, it suffers from a notable theoretical deficiency as well as a practical deficiency. Like Haji and Cuypers, I wish to argue that autonomy has intrinsic prudential value; but my argument is not grounded on the claim that autonomy is a necessary part of well‐being. I argue, rather, that it stands to reason—and that liberals and traditionalists alike have reason to accept—that autonomous assent to a conception of the good life is an intrinsically prudentially better state of affairs than nonautonomous assent to the same. My goal in this essay, then, is to clarify the prudential significance of (and to provide a justification for) education for autonomy in a manner that will be appealing to liberals and traditionalists alike.     

Should Students Have to Borrow? Autonomy,Wellbeing and Student Debt

The orthodox view on higher education financing is that students should bear some of the costs of attending and, where necessary, meet that cost through debt financing. New economic realties, including protracted economic slowdown and increasing austerity of the state with respect to the public funding of goods and services has meant that the same generation who have to borrow the most in order to attend face significantly fewer employment prospects upon graduation. In this context, is the current approach of shifting the costs of post‐secondary education from the general public to individual students justified? Most debate on the issue has focused on the demands of distributive justice within the modern higher education system and on the whole accepts the idea that students ought to pay. I argue that distributive arguments alone are insufficient because they tacitly endorse the provision of higher education as being much like a consumer's choice. As an alternative, I explore the place and importance of higher education in supporting personal autonomy as a central liberal democratic value. I then argue that debt financing of higher education places unreasonable constraints on student's choices with respect to the kind of democratic citizens that they would otherwise aspire to be. This constraint has negative implications for the wellbeing of individual students and the larger society.     

Social Cohesion, Autonomy and the Liberal Defence of Faith Schools

This article is a response to recent attempts by liberals to defend faith-based schools against the criticism that they are both socially divisive and prejudicial to the individual autonomy of their pupils. Geoffrey Short (2002) and Johan De Jong and Ger Snik (2002) divide faith-based schooling into moderate and strong versions and then go on to argue for a moderate version of faith schooling that is compatible with liberal educational aims in culturally diverse societies. Against this view I will argue that it is the qualities of the strong version of faith schooling that appeals to many traditional religious communities and any liberal defence of faith schooling must take account of this. The article concludes by examining the part that faith schools might play in the achievement of a range of diverse, and often incompatible, human goods—community belonging, social cohesion and individual autonomy.     

Moving beyond Mozert: Toward a democratic theory of education

Most liberal political theorists of education argue that it is better to teach students to tolerate diversity, than to protect the potentially illiberal commitments of some members of the political communities. In fact, neither approach is wholly satisfying, yet they remain the focus of much political theorizing about education. This article suggests that this misguided focus is, in part, a consequence of a focus, by liberal political theorists of education, upon the 1987 Mozert v. Hawkins court case. Mozert raised serious questions about the nature of toleration in liberal society, but from an educational standpoint, the Mozert case led political theorists to consider what curricular content is appropriate for liberal political education, rather than on the practices that democratic citizens must cultivate. I turn to Hannah Arendt to offer a critical account of the liberal responses to Mozert and then call for a theory of democratic education that fosters practices of democratic decision-making and has, as its aim, not merely to foster respect for diversity, but to allow future citizens to practice critical engagement with diversity.     

Tocqueville on democracy and inclusive education: a more ardent and enduring love of equality than of liberty

Drawing from some of the insights on the democratic condition made by Alexis de Tocqueville, this article examines critically the reasons given for inclusive education and the motives behind its growing popularity in western industrialised countries. In particular, we consider the supposed benefits of democratisation and equality that proponents of inclusive schooling usually claim. After summarising the benefits that advocates of inclusive education have articulated, we give a brief sketch of Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic societies. His observations have demonstrated that democratisation and equality are not necessarily healthy impulses in a democratic society because they have the propensity to smother individual freedom and dissent from commonly held opinions. Accordingly, we argue that the very claims of democratisation and equality are inherently problematic and are potentially inimical to individuals’ ability to judge independently. In other words, we argue that democratisation and equality are not necessarily compatible with liberty. We conclude, then, that an educational system that does not prioritise and protect intellectual development for sake of inclusion can only exacerbate these deleterious democratic tendencies. We also assert that inclusive policies reflect the relentless pursuit of equality that democratic peoples exhibit to their own disadvantage.     

THE MISREPRESENTATION OF RELIGION IN MODERN BRITISH (RELIGIOUS) EDUCATION

ABSTRACT:  The purpose of this paper is to articulate a new perspective on British multi-faith religious education that both complements and, in part, subsumes existing critiques. My argument, while controversial, is straightforward: it is that British religious education has misrepresented the nature of religion in efforts to commend itself as contributing to the social aims of education, as these are typically framed in liberal democratic societies. Contemporary multi-faith religious education is placed in context and its underlying theological and philosophical commitments identified and criticised. It is concluded that current representations of religion in British religious education are limited in their capacity to challenge racism and religious intolerance, chiefly because they are conceptually ill equipped to develop respect for difference.     

Education and citizenship in diverse societies

The question of the state's role in the control of sponsorship of education is addressed in the light of liberal political principles designed to keep peace and enforce toleration in culturally diverse societies. Some contemporary, self-described liberal philosophers argue for a much more substantial educational role for the state than liberal principles will really allow. Brian Barry's argument for that role assumes that the state can prescribe answers to controversial questions regarding the truth and the good life in which a truly liberal state would take no interest. Stephen Macedo is more accommodating to religious diversity than Barry, but his argument fails because of his rashly optimistic view of the state's effectiveness in promoting civic virtue and the possibility of reconciling that role with fundamental liberal values. Liberal regimes do not depend on civic education, even under conditions of diversity. Their life-blood is toleration and dissent rather than the widespread diffusion of civic virtue.     

Liberalism and Communitarianism: a response to two recent attempts to reconcile individual autonomy with group identity

This article is concerned with recent attempts to balance the claims for political citizenship in a liberal democracy (liberalism) with competing claims for cultural identity within traditional non‐liberal communities (communitarianism). Claims of the first kind are usually seen as universal in that they are based on what it is to be human, while claims of the second kind are seen as particular in so far as they relate to membership of a specific culture. Singh (1997) argues for discussion method as a means of reconciling the claims of democratic citizenship with those of cultural attachment in non‐liberal communities. In an earlier and related paper, Singh (1995) also seeks an accommodation between shared and particular values in a multicultural society. Halstead (1997) is concerned about the dilemmas faced by liberal educators and by Muslims with regard to the sex education curriculum and Muslim pupils. In an earlier paper, Halstead (1995) makes proposals for a curriculum which combines a communitarian commitment to the cultural integrity of non‐liberal communities with active participation in the life of a liberal democracy. I will argue that whether we begin from a liberal commitment to individual autonomy (Singh) or from a concern for the cultural integrity and survival of non‐liberal communities (Halstead), there are very real difficulties in achieving a reconciliation between liberal and communitarian perspectives.     

Autonomy and Commitment: compatible ideals

Fears of alienation and anomie in liberal societies have driven many writers to emphasize care and commitment as essential ingredients of human well-being and as educational aims. Conceiving autonomy to be incompatible with these values, they have concluded that autonomy should be replaced with alternative conceptions of human well-being and of education that emphasize care and commitment. The claim I will try to defend in this paper is that, in contrast to these views, there is no contradiction between autonomy on the one hand and care and commitment on the other; hence acknowledgment of the importance of the latter pair of values need not lead to the rejection of the ideal of autonomy.     

How and Why to Support Common Schooling and Educational Choice at the Same Time

The common school ideal is the source of one of the oldest educational debates in liberal democratic societies. The movement in favour of greater educational choice is the source of one of the most recent. Each has been the cause of major and enduring controversy, not only within philosophical thought but also within political, legal and social arenas. Echoing conclusions reached by Terry McLaughlin, but taking the historical and legal context of the United States as my backdrop, I argue that the ideal of common schooling and the existence of separate schools, which is to say, the existence of educational choice, are not merely compatible but necessarily co-exist in a liberal democratic society. In other words, we need both common schooling and educational choice. The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I explain why we need to understand something about pluralism in order to understand common schooling and school choice. In the second and third parts, I explore the normative significance of pluralism for common schooling and educational choice, respectively. In the fourth part, I show how the two can be reconciled, given a certain understanding of what pluralism demands.     

Liberalism,Parental Rights,Pupils’ Autonomy and Education

Liberals, from Mill to Rawls see personal autonomy as paramount in civil society. They see human dignity to consist essentially in personal autonomy, that is, ‘in the ability of each person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good life’ (Taylor, C. (1992) p. 27). Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” p. 57 (Princeton, Princeton University Press). This emphasis on personal autonomy underlies much of liberal emphasis on freedom of conscience, justice, rights and fairness. Its core thesis is that a just society seeks not to promote any particular view of the good life, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends consistent with a similar liberty for all others. Yet, when some citizens in America attempted to pursue their own view of the good life, they came up against head‐on conflict with the liberal state. These groups saw civic education with its emphasis on individual choice, on reflecting and weighing of alternative viewpoints and on personal autonomy, as threatening to their way of life and to their fundamental religious beliefs, and consequently they challenged the state in the courts. What ensued raised profound educational problems for educating children, parental rights, and the right of the State in a liberal democratic society, which are discussed in this paper.     

Cultivating Political Morality for Deliberative Citizens — Rawls and Callan Revisited

In this article, I will argue that the implementation of deliberative democracy needs to be supplemented by a specific political morality in order to cultivate free and equal citizens in exercising public reason for achieving a cooperative and inclusive liberal society. This cultivation of personality is literally an educational project with a robust ethical ambition, and hence, it reminds us the orthodox liberal problem concerning the relation between the state and its citizenship education. Following Callan’s reformulation of the political conception of the person, I will argue that Rawls’s political liberalism can accommodate the ethical demand of deliberative citizenship education. Liberal civic education should legitimately specify its own ethical endowments for active citizenship and need not shy away from making proposals on the cultivation of liberal character that might result in influencing individual’s conception of the good. Rawls’s theory thus redefines the state neutrality problem on education and paves the way for a framework of deliberative citizenship education.     

What is Common About Common Schooling? Rational Autonomy and Moral Agency in Liberal Democratic Education

In this essay I critique two influential accounts of rational autonomy in common schooling that conceive liberalism as an ideal form of life, and I offer an alternative approach to democratic education that views liberal theory as concerned with coexistence among rival ways of living. This view places moral agency, not rational autonomy, at the heart of schooling in liberal societies—a moral agency grounded in initiation into dynamic traditions that enable self-definition and are accompanied by exposure to life-paths other than one's own. This alternative challenges the tendency in large diverse democracies (such as those of the US and the UK) to prefer common to particularistic schools, thereby placing many types of faith and secular schools on a more equal footing and providing moral justification for education in the national cultures of small liberal republics (such as Denmark, Israel and Lithuania) that maintain special relationships to particular groups while acknowledging the rights of all citizens. I call this approach the pedagogy of difference.     

Education,Democracy and the Economy

This paper provides a critique of neo‐liberal political economy of education. It is argued that neo‐liberal ideology trades off democracy against ‘economic efficiency’. However, the consequence of the application of neo‐liberal principles to education is that overall standards of education are likely to decline, thereby creating the conditions for a low skilled, low morale workforce. It is suggested that this outcome is consistent with the Neo‐liberal creation of a low wage low technology economy. On the basis of the critique, an alternative education system concerned with meeting the aims of an education for a democratic, economically sophisticated, society is sketched.     

Educational Justice and the Value of Knowledge

How should a liberal democratic society value knowledge and understanding, and does this valuation inform how we ought to reason about the justice of our educational institutions? In scholarly and public discourse, it is orthodox to argue that because educational institutions bring about various goods—goods of character such as wellbeing or economic goods such as social mobility – they ought to be structured by principles of political justice. In this paper, I argue that knowledge and understanding valued for its own sake should also inform judgements of educational justice.     

Liberal education and the criminal justice major

New perspectives on the impact of college on students, on linking general education, the major, electives and extra-classroom experiences toward the goal of “integrated learning,” and renewed emphasis on the importance of producing liberally educated college graduates, present opportunities for criminal justice educators to make their field a keystone in the architecture of a liberal education. In this essay, I argue that the multidisciplinary perspectives that characterize the field of criminal justice, as well as its core intellectual concerns, make criminal justice well-suited to serve as the infrastructure for a high-quality undergraduate liberal education program.     

Choices in Liberal and Non-liberal Political and Educational Thought

This article examines the concept of choice with reference to liberal and non-liberal educational settings. It analyses the concept in Western liberal thought and in communitarianism, and discusses the challenges of implementing liberal democratic education in African societies (particularly former socialist countries like Tanzania) where the concept is becoming central in socio-political and curricular reforms. It is argued that the residual collectivist political values rooted in traditional African holistic understanding of the world or the cosmos, that is, the affirmation of life , present a force against the kind of liberal and democratic civic education envisaged.     

Is Inquiry Learning Unjust? Cognitive Load Theory and the Democratic Ends of Education

Cognitive load theorists Paul Kirschner, John Sweller and Richard Clark argue that an array of inquiry-based pedagogies widely promoted in teacher preparation programmes are out of step with current cognitive science and should be eliminated for novice learners. According to these cognitive load theorists, inquiry-based pedagogies are likely to increase achievement gaps between the lowest and highest achieving students while reducing total learning. On almost any theory of justice in educational provision, an educational practice that results in the acquisition of fewer total educational goods by students and greater inequality in the distribution of goods will be considered unjust. I argue that inquiry-based pedagogies can be defended, even for novice learners, not as means to other goods but as embodiments of the least controversial liberal-democratic educational ends. I claim that once understood as part of the ends of liberal democratic education, inquiry-based pedagogies cannot be rightly eliminated from educational pathways. In addition, I argue that by interpreting cognitive load theory in light of uncontroversial liberal democratic educational ends, central claims about instructional design that are advanced by both cognitive load theorists and their opponents are either moderated or overturned. Most notably, the claim that there are no domain-general inquiry skills which need to be taught, which is advanced by cognitive load theorists against inquiry theorists, is revealed to be self-refuting. Integrating cognitive load theory into processes of liberal democratic problem-solving turns out to be a biologically secondary domain-general inquiry skill of just the sort cognitive load theorists deny exists.