Practical reason and positioning

This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as ‘positioning theory’ is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points of resemblance between MacIntyre's analysis of practical reason and Rom Harré's positioning theory. Following a pragmatist view of social theories, I suggest that positioning theory can be seen as explicating an understanding of social episodes that we need to acquire in order to learn to act as capable practical reasoners, but which quite often is left implicit in our everyday lives. Finally, I consider how positioning theory could be used to train the capacity for practical reasoning in moral education.     

The ethical claim of partiality: practical reasoning,the discipline,and teacher education

Practical reasoning refers to a teacher's capacity to discern particulars and make wise judgements about how to act in pedagogical situations. But how do teachers know what is right? How are teachers' preferences to be grounded and their choices justified? I explore the disciplines as one source of moral perception. Assuming that narrative unities underscore the coherence and continuity of an individual's experience, I generated data in the context of a 2‐year teacher education programme. The case study of an aspiring teacher of secondary school language arts illustrates how the intellectual virtues of a discipline can influence a student teacher's practical reasoning. I conclude that teacher educators must attend to the complex ways in which a prospective teacher's prior discipline may influence aspiring teachers' orientations to experience, their consideration of educational ends, and, finally, their characters.     

Moral Intuitions,Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning1

In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model for moral development, proposed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, not only teaches us how we acquire intuitive moral judgements, it also shows the interconnectedness of intuitive thinking and deliberate reasoning. Analysing the expertise model in more detail, I show that it cannot do justice to the importance of reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are needed because we expect people to be able to argue for their standpoints. I conclude that moral education should not only aim at improving intuitive moral judgements, but also at acquiring reasoning skills.     

R.S. PETERS AND JÜRGEN HABERMAS: PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PRACTICAL REASON AND EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE

A bstract .  The contribution of philosophical ethics to the development of a just conception of education becomes increasingly complex under modern conditions of democratic pluralism. This is because the justification of moral policies for education faces the skeptical challenge of showing how the substantive moral principles upon which a policy rests do not arbitrarily privilege one culturally situated conception of justice over others. In this essay, Christopher Martin argues that this challenge highlights how any legitimate moral point of view on education requires public justification, where a valid moral policy must be demonstrated to be worthy of recognition in a public setting and justified through the reciprocal exchange of reasons. He develops the scope and nature of public justification through an analysis of R.S. Peters's Ethics and Education and the work of Jürgen Habermas. Both Peters and Habermas argue that public justification entails necessary and unavoidable presuppositions of practical reason, presuppositions that form the basis of a procedural theory of moral justification. Martin discusses the implications of such a procedural approach for the development of educational policy.     

Sex between people with "mental retardation": an ethical evaluation

Is sex between people with "mental retardation" [1] morally permissible and, if at all, under what conditions? This paper tries to answer this question, but only with regard to sex between biologically mature individuals with mild or moderate mental retardation. First, the concepts of "sexual activity" and mental retardation" are analysed briefly, which is challenging given the widely divergent and sometimes rather awkward definitions of these concepts. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the liberal principle of mutual consent, if taken as a necessary condition of permissible sex, has unacceptable consequences for people with mental retardation. Many forms of sex between them would be morally impermissible, given the fact that their limited powers of practical reasoning will often make valid consent well-nigh impossible. As an alternative to the liberal principle of permissible sex, conditions are specified that include the additional consent of caretakers. If people with mental retardation do not have the capacities of practical deliberation required for valid consent, care providers with mature reasoning powers should act as their substitutes. Finally, some important implications for the moral education of future care professionals are spelled out.     

Vocational training and moral judgement: are there gender-specific traits among apprentices in commercial business?

Since Carol Gilligan (1982) presented her conception of “two morals”, several empirical studies have been carried out to verify her assumption that the moral reasoning of men and women generally follows different principles. These research findings led to an examination of gender-specific traits in a sample of insurance apprentices. The data suggest that Gilligan’s assumption cannot be upheld although the detailed analysis of moral reasoning and the conditions of its development seem to be gender-biased. Gender differences in moral judgments should not be dealt with as a matter of the quality of moral reasoning (“different voice-hypothesis”), but rather as a matter of perceiving social role concepts in a deciding situation (“different role-hypothesis”). Thus, the intra- and interpersonal differences in moral judgment found in this study might not be explained by the internal structure of “moral competence” alone. To a certain extent they are also caused by the interaction among the social situation, the individual’s personal and moral self, and moral competence.     

L'ÉDUCATION DES MONIALES DU PARACLET AU TEMPS D'HÉLOÏSE

The author investigates the educational motifs in the theoretical work of the poet and theorist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729‐1781), such as the development of mankind towards perfection, of education towards critical thinking and towards the creation of a man of genius, the search for truth, the priority of action instead of mere reasoning, the enlightenment of all people, the repressing of emotions in moral education, and happiness as the goal of life. These motifs and the educational practice following from them are reconstructed on the background of Lessing's conception of human nature. The criticism of the enlightenment philosophy by postmodern philosophers is briefly touched upon.     

Virtue through Challenge: Moral Development and Self‐transformation

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.     

Developmental delay or regression in moral reasoning by juvenile delinquents?

This study extends research on moral reasoning competence in juvenile delinquents to their practical reasoning and perception of an institutional moral atmosphere in order to find out whether a delay in moral competence is one of the causes of the offence or one of the consequences of institutionalization or both. The study involved 64 delinquent adolescents from a modern, humane, high security detention centre and 81 secondary school pupils, all males. Delinquent adolescents exhibited lower moral competence than non‐delinquents, particularly in the value area ‘obeying the law’, but the difference was smaller than previously reported. Juvenile delinquents' perception of the moral atmosphere in the detention centre was no lower than that of pupils regarding their school and their low moral competence could not be attributed to a poor moral atmosphere in the centre. Thus, the small delay found in moral competence is likely to precede detention. In both the delinquent and pupil groups perception of a poor moral atmosphere was a more important indicator of self‐reported antisocial behaviour than low moral competence. Our conclusion is that improving the perception of the institutional moral atmosphere in school and in prison is more likely to reduce antisocial behaviour among adolescents than only improving their moral competence.     

Identifying mediating factors of moral reasoning in science education

The purpose of this research was to examine how science content knowledge, moral reasoning ability, attitudes, and past experiences mediate the formation of moral judgments on environmental dilemmas. The study was conducted in two phases using environmental science majors and nonscience majors of college age. Phase One determined if environmental science majors exhibited higher levels of moral reasoning on nontechnical environmental social issues than on general social issues and examined the extent to which possible mediating factors accounted for differences in moral reasoning. Phase Two was qualitative in nature, the purpose of which was to observe and identify trends in conversations between subjects as to how certain mediating factors are revealed as people form moral judgments. The framework on which this study was constructed incorporates a progressive educational position; a position that views science education as being interdisciplinary, and a social means to a social end.     

论原始社会中的道德教育

原始社会存在道德教育。原始社会的道德教育形式主要有:原始宗教、神话与传说、巫术与禁忌。这些道德教育形式告诉原始初民"应当怎么做"和"如何做才是对的",因而一定程度上可视为早期人类所采取的调整人与人关系和人与社会关系的最初的道德范畴体系。原始社会中的道德教育植根于原始初民的生活实践,并为原始人类的生存和发展提供了精神力量。     

PLC课程项目化教学中的德育渗透研究

在高职院校专业教学中进行德育渗透,是教师教书育人的体现,可以帮助学生在学习理论知识和实践技能的同时树立正确的人生观,形成理想人格,塑造良好的个性。文章研究教师在PLC课程项目化教学中进行德育渗透时需要把握的一些问题,探讨如何结合先进的教学手段和科学的教学方法,灵活自然地进行德育渗透教育。     

学以为己与以文“化”之

道德教化的本质是促使人们心灵内在、整体地成长,各种道德病症的根源是人们心灵的各种成分发展的不平衡。道德教化的目标在于形成人们的人格统一性,获得教养和培养心灵品质,既能在理智上认识道德价值,又能形成对道德价值的情感赞同,并能形成必行道德之志。而要获得这样的道德品质,就需要以优秀的理智文化、情感文化、道德文化、制度文化作品深入地陶冶、涵养和塑造人们的心灵,这将能贞立我们的道德人格,获得人性的尊严和丰满。     

Ethics education seen through the lens of Habermas’s conception of practical reason: the Québec Education Program

This paper examines the Québec Education Program (QEP), particularly the new course in ethics and religious culture (ERC), in the light of Habermas’s conception of the moral and ethical uses of practical reason. Habermas’s discursive theory of morality is used to assess the program’s understanding of what it means to be competent in moral matters. Specifically, the paper considers whether or not the program limits the exercise of practical reason to its purely pragmatic form, and the extent to which the program takes into account the intersection between the subjective and social world of learners. The Québec program serves as a context for thinking about the level(s) of practical reason an ethics education program ought to cultivate in learners.     

Anxieties of Knowing

There is a lack of writing on the issue of the education rights of people with disabilities by authors of any theoretical persuasion. While the deficiency of theory may be explained by a variety of historical, philosophical and practical considerations, it is a deficiency which must be addressed. Otherwise, any statement of rights rings out as hollow rhetoric unsupported by sound reason and moral rectitude. This paper attempts to address this deficiency in education rights theory by postulating a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with disabilities. The theory is developed from communitarian writings on the role of education in democratic society. The communitarian school, like the community within which it nests, is inclusive. Schools both reflect and model the shape of communitarian society and have primary responsibility for teaching the knowledge and virtues which will allow citizens to belong to and function within society. Communitarians emphasise responsibilities, however, as the corollary of rights and may require the individual good to yield to the community good when the hard cases arise. The article not only explains the basis of the right to an inclusive education, therefore, but also engages with the difficult issue of when such a right may not be enforceable.     

Can we measure practical wisdom?

ABSTRACT

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option.     

学生品德“知行不一”现象及应对策略

小学生的道德意志薄弱,自控能力水平低,道德行为缺乏坚持性,极容易受到各种因素的影响。"知行不一"的现象在小学生道德品质形成过程中时有出现,教师应该针对小学生的特点,在课堂内外锻炼他们的道德意志,促进学生良好道德品质的形成。     

Felt moral obligation and the moral judgement–moral action gap: toward a phenomenology of moral life

The step-off point for this article is the problem of the ‘moral judgement–moral action gap’ as found in contemporary literature of moral education and moral development. We argue that this gap, and the conceptual problems encountered by attempts to bridge it, reflects the effect of a different, deeper and more problematic conceptual gap: the ‘ontological’ gap between meaningful moral events and the underlying natural structures or mechanical processes presumed to produce them. We contend that the very real fact that moral reasoning does not reliably produce moral action consistent with one’s moral reasoning cannot be adequately understood or clarified by appealing to natural structures and mechanical processes. Rather, a radically holistic perspective is required. It is for this reason that we look to an alternative metaphysical grounding for moral behaviour in the work of the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas.     

Promoting moral reasoning and multicultural competence during internship

This paper reports a study designed to increase the moral reasoning and multicultural competence of White students in a counselling internship. An intervention was conducted to determine the effectiveness of using a deliberate psychological education (DPE) approach that incorporated issues of cultural competence, oppression and diversity. This study attempted to discern if the DPE model could make a difference in the promotion of moral reasoning and multicultural competence of counsellor interns. The Intervention Group showed significant gains compared to Comparison Group 1 and 2 in moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test‐2, as well as significant gains on the Knowledge subscale of the Multicultural Counseling Knowledge and Awareness Scale.