Moral Leadership in the 21st Century: Everyone Is Watching—Especially the Students

Educational leaders continually must be vigilant about their actions as they speak volumes about the values that the leader supports. It is impossible for an educational leader to take an action without generating some comment about how things should be done—which by definition is moral action. What's more, everyone is watching—especially the students.

This article explores leadership relationships, interrelationships, and interdependence—and how administrative “moral leadership” rests with the institution's leader. First, it examines the concept of systems thinking to determine how relationships, support structures, and decisions made by school leaders impact the entire school—especially the students and the community at large. Second, it explores and furthers our understanding of moral leadership models by synthesizing concepts in the literature and offers a new paradigm of moral leadership for educational leaders in the 21st century.     

CURRICULUM AND IDEOLOGY: INDOCTRINATION AS AN INAPPROPRIATE APPROACH TO CONSERVATIVE JEWISH EDUCATION

Education is a dynamic discipline. Dynamic because an educational system does not stand on its own, apart from the social structure of which it is an extension. It must be steeped with its culture's moral and sociological beliefs in order to ensure the survival and growth of that particular culture through each new generation.     

The social nature of saintliness and moral action: a view of William James's Varieties in relation to St Ignatius and Lawrence Kohlberg

This article argues that William James's thinking in The Varieties and elsewhere contains the view that social institutions, such as religious congregations and schools, are mediators between the private and public spheres of life, and are necessary for transforming personal feelings, ideals and beliefs into moral action. The Exercises of St Ignatius and the Just Community moral education approach serve as examples. Criticisms of the more commonly held view that James recognised only individual personal experiences as valid religious expressions are marshalled. Furthermore, we argue that moral action or saintliness, the ultimate expression of religious faith according to James, is fundamentally social. The commonalities that the phenomenologies of moral action of St Ignatius and Lawrence Kohlberg have with William James's view are used to support the argument.     

Some Antecedents of Educational Philosophy in Britain with Particular Reference to Social Science

It would be convenient to pretend that the histories of educational philosophy in Britain and, by extension, the USA and Australia, were responses to a common social and intellectual history but convenience in this case could only be accomplished at the expense of explanatory power. The history of educational philosophy in these three places is parallel but not in common. Philosophy of education in Britain is more closely related to philosophy than is philosophy of education in the USA. Philosophy of education in the USA appropriated the lead of the American Social Science Association and initially retained closer connections with social science than did its English counterpart. Nevertheless, it is argued here that educational philosophy's reference to social science—Victorian and modern—is the missing explanatory element in modem histories of the discipline. The appropriation of education by social science—a common feature of the intellectual history of education in Britain, Australasia, and the USA—leavened the research agenda of educational philosophy in Britain. Peters’ educational work can be best understood as an attempt to reunite education with moral philosophy such that the study of education would resume a profile similar to its nineteenth‐century counterpart, when it was moral philosophy that provided the most interesting discussions of human nature, primitive customs, and social institutions—education among them.     

Wonder and Moral Education

Many authors have claimed a moral and educational significance for wonder. In this article Anders Schinkel assesses these claims in order to address the question whether we do indeed have reason to stimulate the sense of wonder and to provoke experiences of wonder in education with a view to its moral effects or importance. Are there moral effects of wonder — or does wonder have a moral significance — that give us a (further) reason to promote children's sense of wonder and to attempt to elicit the experience of wonder in children? And if so, will any experience of wonder do, from a moral perspective, or do only some experiences of wonder — in specific contexts, or with a specific object — have the desired effect? Schinkel argues that, although there is certainly a case to be made for wonder's moral (educational) importance, it needs to be made cautiously. Wonder coheres more easily with some emotions and attitudes than with others, but in the end its moral significance depends to a large extent on how we interpret or make sense of our wonder and what we wonder at. In moral education, therefore, the value of wonder depends on how it is framed and morally charged.     

Beyond the Search for Truth: Dewey's Humble and Humanistic Vision of Science Education

In this essay, David Waddington and Noah Weeth Feinstein explore how Dewey's conception of science can help us rethink the way science is done in schools. The authors begin by contrasting a view of science that is implicitly accepted by many scientists and science educators — science as a search for truth — with Dewey's instrumentalist, technological, and nonrealist conception of science. After demonstrating that the search‐for‐truth conception is closely linked to some ongoing difficulties with science curricula that students find particularly alienating, they then analyze some of the educational opportunities that Dewey's vision opens up. Ultimately, Waddington and Weeth Feinstein argue that Dewey offers a humble and humanistic vision of science and science education practice that captures the power of science by connecting it clearly to everyday human activities and challenges.     

Kant's Philosophy of Education: Between Relational and Systemic Approaches

The purpose of this paper is to view Kant's approach to education in the broader context of Kant's philosophy of culture and history as a process whose direction should be reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the light of man's moral vocation. In this context, some characteristic tensions of his enlightened approach to education appear. Thus, while Kant takes the educational process to be a radically moral enterprise all the way through—and hence, placed in a relational context—he also aspires to constitute education as a science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving the way for a systemic approach to education; in spite of its moral inspiration, his systemic approach not only could enter into conflict with the moral demand of taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic paradox, already involved in the ambiguity of the term ‘humanity’, which might mean a) humanity as a moral disposition present in each individual human being or b) humanity as a whole, as the ‘human species’.     

Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian Habituation

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non‐cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view.     

Passionate Utterance and Moral Education

This paper explores Stanley Cavell's notion of ‘passionate utterance’, which acts as an extension of/departure from (we might read it as both) J. L. Austin's theory of the performative. Cavell argues that Austin having made the revolutionary discovery that truth claims in language are bound up with how words perform, then gets bogged by convention when discussing what is done ‘by’ words. In failing to account for the less predictable, unconventional aspects of language, the latter therefore washes his hands of the expressive passionate aspects of speech. To ignore such aspects is to ignore an important moral dimension of language. Finally, I bring Cavell's approach to bear on the epistemic criterion, which Michael Hand applies in his paper ‘Should We Teach Homosexuality as a Controversial Issue?’. I suggest that Hand's approach, by failing to account for the linguistic dimension of truth and the expressive quality that accompanies this dimension, presents an overly narrow conception of moral education.     

Practical reason and positioning

This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as ‘positioning theory’ is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points of resemblance between MacIntyre's analysis of practical reason and Rom Harré's positioning theory. Following a pragmatist view of social theories, I suggest that positioning theory can be seen as explicating an understanding of social episodes that we need to acquire in order to learn to act as capable practical reasoners, but which quite often is left implicit in our everyday lives. Finally, I consider how positioning theory could be used to train the capacity for practical reasoning in moral education.     

Thriving With Social Purpose: An Integrative Approach to the Development of Optimal Human Functioning

This article responds to the need to synthesize theory and research in educational psychology by introducing the Thriving with Social Purpose (TSP) conceptual framework. TSP results when the four components of human motivation—goals, capability beliefs, context beliefs, and emotions—are amplified in dynamic, mutually reinforcing patterns. The centerpiece of the TSP motivational pattern is an active approach goal orientation informed by a fundamental concern for others (social purpose). This orientation is supported and strengthened by a firm belief in one's ability to make progress toward meaningful goals (personal optimism), a persistent tendency to imagine alternative pathways when progress is challenged (mindful tenacity), and intentional efforts to align emotions and circumstances in ways that will best facilitate goal progress (emotional wisdom). The TSP framework also emphasizes positive (discrepancy increasing) feedback cycles that accelerate learning and competence development, facilitate meaningful change, and promote personal and social well-being.     

论中国传统德育思想的基本特征

中国传统德育思想是中华伦理化的有机组成部分,它具有四大基本特征,即合知行基础上的以行为旨归,合内外基础上的以内为根本,同真善基础上的以善为核心,一群己基础上的以群体为最高价值取向。此外,强调学校德育与家庭德育、社会德育的密切联系,持“生活即德育”的大德育观,也是中国德育思想的基本特征。     

‘To Be Is To Respond’: Realising a Dialogic Ontology For Deweyan Pragmatism

Dewey's pragmatism rejected ‘truth’ as indicative of an underlying reality, instead ascribing it to valuable connections between aims and ends. Surprisingly, his argument mirrors Bishop Berkeley's Idealism, summarised as ‘esse est percepi’ (to be is to be perceived), whose thinking is shown to be highly pragmatist—but who retained a foundationalist ontology by naming God as the guarantor of all things. I argue that while this position is unsustainable, pragmatism could nonetheless be strengthened through an ontological foundation. Koopman's charges of foundationalist ‘givenism’ in Dewey's work, and in his promotion of the scientific method, are not proven. However, Koopman's ‘genealogical pragmatism’ may develop Deweyan educational theory by addressing dilemmas around curricular study. Koopman's arguments also point towards a missing ontological piece in Dewey's theory of knowledge. In the final section of the article I offer a dialogic ontology as compatible with pragmatism. This dialogical ontology provides both an ethical foundation through interrelatedness, and a generative theory of meaning and experience, as emergent from the encounter with difference. In this framework, to be is to respond—or be responded to. I offer the metaphor of ‘realisation’ to capture the human experience implied by this ontological stance.     

From Environmental Education to Ecopolitics. Affirming Changing Agendas for Teachers1

In this paper I examine Peirce's epistemological and ontological theories and indicate their relevance to educational practice. I argue that Peirces conception of Firsts, Seconds and Thirds entails a fundamental ontological realism. I further argue that Peirce does have a theory of truth, that it is a particular non‐traditional ‘correspondence’ theory, consistent with, and implicit in, an over‐arching position of pragmatic realism. Peirce's epistemological position is subject to misinterpretation when the ontological realism on which it rests is overlooked. Finally I suggest that such a re‐consideration of Peirce's pragmatic ontology and epistemology in an educational context is needed.     

Hegemony of the “Great Equalizer” and the Fragmentation of Common Sense: A Gramscian Model of Inflated Ambitions for Schooling

Increasingly over the past 50 years, the mission statement of schooling in dominant US-American discourse has coalesced around a Great Equalizer narrative of education; that is, it has identified schools as the primary means through which individuals can achieve social mobility. In this article, I employ a Gramscian framework to describe how this dominant yet illusory definition of purpose disorients well-intentioned educational actors and often pits them unwittingly against each other. I show that as a result of a false narrative about what schools do for society, a fragmented common sense has arisen amongst teachers, politicians, scholars and activists to the detriment of a collective theory of change. To guard against fragmentation and avert educational actors' consent to a hegemonic social order, I argue that the first step toward collective resistance is acknowledging the limited impact schools have on the socioeconomic layout of society. Accordingly, educational actors hoping to ameliorate inequality must agree upon more realistic—and less tangible—cultural goals for schooling, such as inculcating critical citizenship and fostering civic participation.     

Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind

An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.     

“What sort of person ought I to be?” – Repositioning EPs in light of the Children and Families Bill (2013)

The changes brought by the Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND) code of practice: 0 to 25 years, 2014, is an opportunity for educational psychologists (EPs) to reposition ourselves so that we can improve our contribution to the services for children and young people with special educational needs (SENs) or a disability. Underpinning such a repositioning is a reaffirmation of our core moral principles of promoting autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and social justice. Taking up a new position is difficult. However one way of thinking about it is reminding ourselves of our values. Values underpin our morality and interact with a person’s character (virtue). Socrates’ famous rhetorical questions remains unanswered for EPs “what sort of person ought I to be?” The purposes of this article is to draw attention to the moral principles that could underpin our work with the new code and lead us to build our practice around advocacy, practice based evidence and a social model of disability     

“伪装”：破除真理和知识的神话——论尼采与福柯

以达尔文论生物为了逃避天敌而＂伪装＂的自我保护行为为理论出发点来建立尼采与福柯之间的联系。在对真理、知识、社会体制的＂伪装＂的批判性分析上,米歇尔·福柯既继承了尼采,又在社会批判领域延续和深化了尼采。     

论哈贝马斯与罗尔斯对公共理性的争论

在理性多元论的情况下,为了使正义原则能够达成重叠共识,公共理性要求我们只诉诸于人们普遍接受的常识性信念和推理形式来推演正义原则。哈贝马斯批评罗尔斯的论证缺少一个公共的道德视角、混淆了可接受性与实际接受的区别,以及误解了道德真理。罗尔斯认为他的论证是一种理性的公共证明,而不是一种妥协,并且认为没有必要承认重叠共识的认知意义。我们认为,罗尔斯的无知之幕限制了公共理性,道德哲学不应该放弃道德真理的追问,哈贝马斯的道德商谈模式更能保证社会的团结。