哈耶克法哲学所面临的挑战和出路

当前对哈耶克法哲学的挑战来自三方面：一是调和休谟和康德两种不同认识论指责;二是对哈耶克保守主义的指责;三是对哈耶克功利主义的指责。这些指责误解的成分多于真实的成分。哈耶克现代自由主义法哲学的困境在于,忽视了道德情感在现代法治社会的纽带作用,把＂厚＂实的古典自由主义变＂薄＂了。其出路在于重新回到古典自由主义,在法律正义的主导下,营造出温情、友爱和互助的社会共同体。     

DEVELOPMENTAL LIBERALISM

A bstract .  In this essay, Randall Curren identifies a type of liberalism that incorporates empirical claims about the development of agency and rationality, and responds to the criticism that liberalism rests on an incoherent conception of autonomous agency . He argues that moral agents did indeed "become ghosts" somewhere en route from Aristotle to Kant, but not for the reasons supposed, nor with the consequences for liberalism alleged by its critics. Curren concludes that an Aristotelian form of developmental liberalism, resting on a conception of rational agency as embodied, incremental, and developmentally contingent on social and circumstantial factors, can survive the familiar critiques of the "liberal self" and enable the liberal tradition to further expand the range of educational matters it can fruitfully address.     

解读康德建构主义思想的缘起、内涵及当代教育启示

当前对于建构主义的很多片面理解与误读仍然在教育理论界和实践界普遍存在,这对开展有效的教育教学改革无疑产生了诸多影响和障碍。从德国古典哲学家康德的思想体系中去进行追本溯源式的挖掘是对建构主义思想形成更加深刻和正确理解的一个重要研究路径。康德的建构主义思想产生于经验主义向传统理性主义的挑战过程之中,并通过调和理性与经验而得以产生;其核,心内涵体现在认识结构的确立、自由精神的彰显、理性认识的不可能性以及有价值知识的辨析等四个方面。康德的建构主义思想表明：建构主义应定位为认识论而非本体论;人不能超越自身的知识经验去建构知识,知识的建构是有方向性和标准性的;建构主义不是一种实践方法的标签,而是一种指向人的深层认识及其机制的理论解析,更是一种判断各种流变不居的教学实践方法的价值准绳。     

徐訏早期对西方文化思潮的接受

徐Yu早期广泛摄取诸种西方化思潮。他既对马克思主义产生了强烈兴趣，又服赝康德、柏格森的唯心主义哲学，同时也认同了弗洛伊德精神分析学，最终确立了自由主义的价值观，从而与左翼思潮分道扬镳。     

康德的知识来源论解析

康德哲学的基本问题之一是知识问题,它围绕着什么是知识,知识如何可能,人类理性的界限在哪里而展开。在康德之前,哲学家形成了关于知识来源的两类学说：经验论和唯理论。康德通过提出＂先验感性论＂对此实现了综合和超越,完成了哲学上的＂哥白尼式的革命＂。     

康德的知识来源论解析

康德哲学的基本问题之一是知识问题,它围绕着什么是知识,知识如何可能,人类理性的界限在哪里而展开。在康德之前,哲学家形成了关于知识来源的两类学说:经验论和唯理论。康德通过提出"先验感性论"对此实现了综合和超越,完成了哲学上的"哥白尼式的革命"。     

体验生命 实现自我——对《简·萨默斯的日记》中女主人公的康德式解读

康德的伦理学理论论述了意志、自由、幸福、义务等概念,在二十一世纪的“后现代”社会中,它们诠释了人类应如何对自身的行为负责,分辨善、恶,以及怎样在纷杂的群体中寻求幸福。多丽丝·莱辛的小说《简·萨默斯的日记》女主人公简内在的“人性”行为切合了康德的伦理学理论。     

论康德的道德自由与德性论

理性与自由是康德伦理学的重要概念,如若把康德的“理性”概念分为理论理性和实践理性,那么他的“自由”概念同样也可分为理性的自由和道德的自由。理论理性和理性的自由是属于思辨哲学研究的范畴,实践理性和道德的自由是属于伦理学研究的范畴。在康德看来,道德自由是人的道德活动之原因,德性是人的道德活动之结果。因此,在康德伦理学中道德自由与德性之间有着内在的逻辑联系,不仅如此,这种道德自由与德性之内在的逻辑联系恰恰体现着康德理性主义伦理思想的精神内涵。     

早期鲁迅与西方自由主义原典理论

鲁迅是否是一个自由主义者迄今仍是一个争论不休的问题。纠缠于鲁迅是否自由主义者身份似乎并不必要,重要的是明晰鲁迅在哪些方面和自由主义产生确凿有据的关联。鲁迅的一生特别是早期曾多次引用自由主义理论家的言论,鲁迅的＂以众陵寡＂论和自由主义的＂多数暴政＂、＂多数统治＂主张如出一辙,鲁迅的＂任个人而排众数＂的立场、鲁迅对于自由和平等的理解也在自由主义那里得到回应,鲁迅事实上对自由主义并无厌恶之感。鲁迅的独异之处在于他是＂无所属＂的,他不属于任何主义,但又和包括自由主义在内的多种主义发生深刻的关联。     

马克思国家学说的德国古典哲学渊源

德国古典哲学的国家普遍性思想是马克思国家学说的渊源之一。德国古典哲学起于康德、终于黑格尔,对马克思有重大影响的费尔巴哈哲学不能列位于德国古典哲学的系谱之中。德国古典哲学以国家为普遍意志的体现形式,作为普遍物的国家是公共利益的现实映射,达至普遍利益是国家这一共同体的本然目的;国家高于市民社会的国家主义观点是典型的国家中心论,从而有别于古典自由主义的社会中心论。德国古典哲学家,包括黑格尔,并未能真正地区分国家和社会的界域,马克思通过批判黑格尔的国家观而把国家归为由市民社会所决定的私利性的控制工具而非裹有道德迷雾的公益性的共同体组织。马克思对国家的理解也是社会中心论的工具主义范式。     

CITIZENSHIP: THE POLITICAL AND THE DEMOCRATIC

ABSTRACT:  Citizenship as a compulsory subject was added to the National Curriculum in England in 2002 following the 1998 report, 'Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools'. It was little noticed at the time that the report stressed active citizenship much more strongly than democracy. The underlying presupposition was what historians call 'civic republicanism', the tradition from the Greeks and the Romans of good government as political government, that is, citizens reaching acceptable compromises of group interests and values by public debate. This is contrasted to modern liberalism. To stress 'democracy' unduly in citizenship education can lead to definitional dogmatics about multiple meanings of the term, even to disillusionment. Democracy is a necessary element in good government but not a sufficient one, unless subjective opinion is enshrined over knowledge through education. The practices of free politics are both historically and logically prior to democracy.     

Knowledge,education and aesthetics

Abstract

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant has been important in education theory, especially in the historical context of the Enlightenment and its legacies on contemporary understandings of global education. Particular reference is given to Kant’s writing on Enlightenment thinking and especially to his 1803 Über Pädagogik/Lectures on pedagogy whose groundwork tends to be thought from an empirical anthropology. This paper aims to question education, though from the perspective of a Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience, a perspective developed initially from my reading of Denis J. Schmidt’s Lyrical and Ethical Subjects (2005). In the Critique of Judgement (1986), Kant develops an ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ that offers transcendental grounds for the possibility of aesthetic experience. In doing so, he discusses, somewhat briefly, training in the fine arts and even more briefly offers, somewhat indirectly, a far-reaching transcendental ground for pedagogy. It is these two brief accounts that form the substance of this paper, requiring a somewhat extended introduction to Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement in order to develop its analysis. From this analysis, two key questions arise: if fine art cannot be learned, and if imitation would ultimately aim at producing an objectively determinable rule—via a determinable concept—for the production of art works, how does one proceed with education in the fine arts? And, secondly, as a corollary, if genius is reserved for precisely what cannot be learned but yet can be conceived and communicated, what possible purpose is served by aesthetic ideas with respect to cognition itself?     

Interpreting Kant in Education: Dissolving Dualisms and Embodying Mind – Introduction

This introduction to my Interpreting Kant in Education: Dissolving Dualisms and Embodying Mind begins with a disturbing puzzle. Immanuel Kant is one of the most significant thinkers of modern times, with unrivalled influence, but he receives a great deal of criticism in educational theory. The widespread, supposedly ‘Kantian’ picture – according to which mind structures or makes sense of experience and imposes its meaning and maxims – is frequently disparaged for its alleged dualisms, intellectualism and disembodied mind, detached from real life. But this ‘Kantian’ Kant stands in sharp contrast to the Kant to be found in more careful exegesis and contemporary work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. By contrasting interpretations of some of Kant's central terms and insights, the chapters that follow seek to show that Kant can be understood in an altogether different and more valuable way. Exploring Kant's philosophy is at the same time delving into different ideas about knowledge and concepts, about rationality, about what it means to be minded and to be human, and about the role of education in these. This introduction gives a taste of Kant's status in educational theory. It lays the way for the argument that his conception of mind, as a capacity for knowledge, can be read as embodied and his idea of the human subject understood as embedded and engaged in everyday life.     

Further Attempts to Balance Liberal Virtues with Claims for Cultural Identity within Traditional Non-liberal Communities. A reply to Neil Burtonwood

In a recent paper, Neil Burtonwood (Educational Studies, 24(3), pp. 295–304, 1998) argued that 'recent attempts to balance the claims for political citizenship in a liberal democracy (liberalism) with the claims of cultural identity within traditional non-liberal communities...' (p. 295) are bound to fail; because 'liberalism cannot be neutral between ... cultures that value individual autonomy and those that do not', any 'attempts at reconciling' those two perspectives 'are bound to fail' (p. 303). His claim is that whatever position we begin from, there are real difficulties in achieving a reconciliation between the two perspectives, which he sees as exclusive. He refers to my papers (Singh, Educational Review, 47(1), pp. 11-24, 1995; Educational Studies, 23(2), pp. 169-184, 1997) where discussion method has been suggested as a means of reconciling the two positions. I still favour this method. This paper agrees with Burtonwood that liberalism is non-neutral in relation to liberal virtues such as equality and respect for persons, and no groups including liberal ones, should be privileged with respect to non-interference from the state. Although the paper acknowledges the value of 'Popperian critical method', it sees this method as very limited in respect of settling conflicts arising from comprehensive or world-views. Liberals and liberal societies have long realised this and have made attempts to accommodate cultural practices of traditional groups. Although the two positions exclude each other at a deep level, at a more mundane, every-day level, they share much that is common to both, which makes intercultural understandings possible. Education must capitalise on this and take us beyond a single framework. The difficulty is, of course, what do we do and how can we assess the situation, when frameworks themselves clash? The paper argues for dialogue, tolerance and accommodation within limits, set by respect for persons. This is not to ask liberalism to give up what is foundational to liberalism, as Burtonwood suggests, but to reinforce liberalism itself, as we show below.     

康德善良意志的先天性原则

康德善良意志的先天性起源于他的理性范畴论,这是个很奇怪的命题,既然是先天的,然而它又是可以分析的,那么康德的这种先天性原则的分析法是否就能证明其实践理性的完全合法性及其在现实的实践中的法则作用?这是需要加以认真探讨的话题。应该说,康德对休谟怀疑论的综合批判并没有从根本上消除道德与伦理的二元悖论,更没有在根本上澄清"是"与"应该"的经验与规范的二律背反,这种无休止的争论的谜团构成了康德自身的批判理论的永恒元素。但反过来说,善良意志的这种无法解决的矛盾,恰恰是其所具有的内在批判性所在,唯有如此,在其遭遇现实经验时才能具备自身的理论张力。     

THE DEWEY‐HUTCHINS DEBATE: A DISPUTE OVER MORAL TELEOLOGY

In this essay, James Scott Johnston claims that a dispute over moral teleology lies at the basis of the debate between John Dewey and Robert M. Hutchins. This debate has very often been cast in terms of perennialism, classicism, or realism versus progressivism, experimentalism, or pragmatism. Unfortunately, casting the debate in these terms threatens to leave the reader with the impression that Dewey and Hutchins were simply talking past each other, that one was wrongheaded while the other correct, or that they held incommensurable ideological standpoints. Such an understanding obscures a deeper conflict that divided these two men and overlooks the depth of the differences in their moral outlooks. Johnston argues that both thinkers knew very well what morally significant principles and practices were at stake in the debate and, further, that this awareness, rather than the question of which foundation for education was better for students, informed their responses to one another.     

康德伦理学在俄罗斯民族生命中——关于康德伦理学思想的一种跨文化阐释

在面对俄罗斯近二三百年的历史之谜时,人们也总是不免要产生这样的疑惑,即这个本来野蛮、落后、没有文化的民族,何以在短短一两个世纪中就获得了这样高度的精神发展。像超越时代的理想主义,彻底清醒的批判现实精神,以及他们对于正义、善良和爱的刻意执着,所有这些现代俄罗斯精神都很难从它的古典传统中得到解释。在某种意义上讲,它们只能根源于康德晦涩的伦理学体系。这两者之间的本质联系可以表述为,康德为现代俄罗斯提供了关于伦理实践的先验构架,而俄罗斯人则以不屈不挠的奋斗牺牲承担了那种崇高的道德律令。一言以蔽之,这是伟大的思想形式和强劲的现实力量的完美结合。     

试论康德的教育学立场

阿伦特通过研究康德的《判断力批判》提出了理解康德“人是什么”一问的三种思路,即永久进步的人类总体,具有道德尊严的理性存在者(单数的人),以及生活于社会共同体之中以相互交往为目的的人(复数的人)。这三种思路也可用于研究《康德论教育》。按照这一线索,《康德论教育》既是关于人类发展其自身的全部自然禀赋的教育设想.也通向成年人的自我教育或自我启蒙,最后又落脚到旨在将成长着的一代培养为“自由行动者”的集体性的教育。     

Kant and prejudice,or, the mechanical use of reason

This paper examines an issue of recent Kant scholarship on education: the supposed disconnect between his theory of morals and his theory of character. While the debate is often couched in terms of Kant’s ‘phenomenal–noumenal’ distinction, or the distinction between moral theory and culture, I follow scholarship suggesting the best way to understand Kant’s distinction is by following his account of the ‘conduct of thought.’ Doing so demonstrates the Lectures on Logic and particularly, his account of prejudice, as playing a large role in the articulation of what it is to think subjectively. We also see the importance of conducting our thinking from the subjective standpoint to an objective (moral) one in order to fulfill our obligations to both think and act morally.     

康德的“自在之物”新解

传统观点认为康德把"自在之物"看作是不可认识的,因而康德是不可知论者。本文对这种观点提出异议。无论从认识的对象还是从认识能力来说,世界永远存在着不可认识的"自在之物"。康德认为通过先天形式认识到的是现象,而不是"自在之物"。应该说这是正确的,因为人认识客观世界总是带有主观性、主观成分,因而所认识到的东西不可能是原来的样子,康德称为现象或表象。康德提出的理论理性所追求的最大统一体:灵魂、世界、上帝,以及实践理性所追求的以自由意志为根据的无条件统一体"至善":灵魂不朽,上帝存在,虽然是"自在之物",但却是人们思维的对象。从今天的现实来看,这种观点是可以成立的。