Training Preschoolers on First‐Order False Belief Understanding: Transfer on Advanced ToM Skills and Metamemory

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty‐two 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first‐order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first‐order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory.     

Theory of Mind and Language in Childhood Epilepsy

We examined theory of mind (ToM; mental state understanding) and language in children with epilepsy (EP; n = 10; mean age = 9.92, SD = 2.34) and with typical development (TD; n = 20; mean age = 10.05, SD = 2.08). The EP group demonstrated worse ToM compared to the TD group (t(28) = ?1.11, p = .28, d = .44) but differences did not persist when controlling for language. Syntactic language was correlated with ToM in the EP group (rho (10) = .79, p < .01). This study confirms language is important for ToM in a group of children with a neurological disorder and indicates that children with epilepsy are at risk for difficulties in understanding the mental states of others due to their language deficits. This may help to explain the social difficulties these children have with their peers.     

Steps in theory-of-mind development for children with deafness or autism

Prior research demonstrates that understanding theory of mind (ToM) is seriously and similarly delayed in late-signing deaf children and children with autism. Are these children simply delayed in timing relative to typical children, or do they demonstrate different patterns of development? The current research addressed this question by testing 145 children (ranging from 3 to 13 years) with deafness, autism, or typical development using a ToM scale. Results indicate that all groups followed the same sequence of steps, up to a point, but that children with autism showed an importantly different sequence of understandings (in the later steps of the progression) relative to all other groups.     

3～6岁回、汉族儿童心理理论发展的比较研究

采用经典＂错误信念＂任务,以181名回族幼儿、174名汉族幼儿为被试,探讨了不同文化背景下回、汉儿童心理理论发展的异同。研究发现：回、汉幼儿心理理论发展不存在显著性差异。回、汉幼儿的心理理论均随着年龄的增长而提高,总体上呈同步发展趋势,但回族幼儿心理理论发展速度要低于汉族幼儿;散居幼儿心理理论的发展速度低于在园幼儿;回族散居女童的心理理论发展速度缓慢。大力发展民族地区幼儿教育,重视民族女童教育是促进幼儿心理理论能力发展的重要途径。     

The mind behind the message: advancing theory-of-mind scales for typically developing children, and those with deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome

Children aged 3-12 years (n = 184) with typical development, deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome took a series of theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks to confirm and extend previous developmental scaling evidence. A new sarcasm task, in the format of H. M. Wellman and D. Liu's (2004) 5-step ToM Scale, added a statistically reliable 6th step to the scale for all diagnostic groups. A key previous finding, divergence in task sequencing for children with autism, was confirmed. Comparisons among diagnostic groups, controlling age, and language ability, showed that typical developers mastered the 6 ToM steps ahead of each of the 3 disabled groups, with implications for ToM theories. The final (sarcasm) task challenged even nondisabled 9-year-olds, demonstrating the new scale's sensitivity to post-preschool ToM growth.     

Hearing mothers and oral deaf children: an atypical relational context for theory of mind

The study assessed Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in a group of oral deaf children and in their hearing mothers using a battery of ToM tasks. It also investigated the connection between mother and child in ToM performance. Participants were: 17 oral deaf children (aged 5 to 14 years) were paired by gender, age, and mental age with 17 hearing children; 17 hearing mothers of deaf children and 17 hearing mothers of hearing children. Compared to the hearing children, the deaf children faced difficulties in all ToM tests, and the hearing mothers of the deaf children were less capable than the mothers of the hearing children in all the ToM tests. Further, a specific ToM interaction model was found between the hearing mothers and the deaf children. The results confirmed ToM poor performance faced by the oral deaf children, showed the ToM level of hearing mothers of deaf children, and the ToM style of hearing mothers–deaf children dyads. Also, findings underline some educational implications related to the socio-relational origin of the ToM deficit in oral deaf children.     

孤独症儿童对道德和习俗规则的判断

在Blair(1996)研究范式的基础上,增加了权威去道德化和泛习俗化两组问题,考察孤独症和正常儿童对道德和习俗规则的判断及其与他们心理理论的关系。结果发现,孤独症儿童错误信念理解成绩低于接受性言语匹配的正常儿童,两组儿童在道德判断上表现不同,而在习俗判断上的表现没有差异。结果提示,道德判断需要心理理解能力,而习俗判断则与训练和社会化有关。     

Why We Think We Can't Dance: Theory of Mind and Children's Desire to Perform

Theory of mind (ToM) allows children to achieve success in the social world by understanding others' minds. A study with 3‐ to 12‐year‐olds, however, demonstrates that gains in ToM are linked to decreases in children's desire to engage in performative behaviors associated with health and well‐being, such as singing and dancing. One hundred and fifty‐nine middle‐class children from diverse backgrounds in a Northeastern U.S. metropolitan area completed the study in 2011. The development of ToM is associated with decreases in self‐esteem, which in turn predicts decreases in children's willingness to perform. This shift away from performance begins at age 4 (when ToM begins to develop), years before children enter puberty.     

Spatial Ability and Theory of Mind: A Mediating Role of Visual Perspective Taking

This research tests the role of visual perspective taking (VPT) in mediating the relation between spatial ability and theory of mind (ToM). Study 1 demonstrated such mediation correlationally in seventy 3.5- to 4-year olds. In Study 2, twenty-three 3.5- to 4-year-olds were trained on using play blocks to copy preassembled models as a way to promote spatial ability. Resultant increases in VPT and ToM were compared to those from a control group learning to draw instead (n = 23). Both studies showed that the effect of spatial ability on ToM depended on VPT, suggesting a role of embodiment in ToM development in early childhood. These findings provide an alternative way to think about ToM development and the psychological mechanism that may be involved.     

Developing Preschoolers’ Social Skills: The Effectiveness of Two Educational Methods

This study tested whether and how methods called ‘Play Time/Social Time’ and ‘I Can Problem Solve’ contribute to the improvement of social skills and the development of theory of mind (ToM) in children. The participants in the experiment were nearly 200 (N = 196) preschool children with low social functioning, with and without disabilities. The study showed that social skills and the level of ToM in children attending the lessons improved more than those of children from the control group. Both methods turned out to be effective in the case of social skills and ToM development among children with and without disabilities. It is worthwhile to popularise these methods among preschool teachers.     

Specific language impairment, theory of mind, and visual perspective taking: evidence for simulation theory and the developmental role of language

Recent research has found that the acquisition of theory of mind (ToM) is delayed in children with specific language impairment (SLI). The present study used a battery of ToM and visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks to investigate whether the delayed acquisition of ToM in children with SLI is associated with delayed VPT development. Harris' (1992, 1996) simulation theory predicts that the development of VPT will be delayed. Participants were 20 children with SLI (M=62.9 months) and 20 typically developing children (M=61.2 months) who were matched for nonverbal ability, gender, and age. The results supported Harris' theory and a role for language in ToM and VPT development.     

Children with autism illuminate the role of social intention in word learning

To what extent do children with autism (AD) versus typically developing children (TD) rely on attentional and intentional cues to learn words? Four experiments compared 17 AD children (M age=5.08 years) with 17 language- and 17 mental-age-matched TD children (M ages=2.57 and 3.12 years, respectively) on nonverbal enactment and word-learning tasks. Results revealed variability in all groups, but particularly within the AD group. Performance on intention tasks was the most powerful predictor of vocabulary in the AD group but not in the TD groups. These findings suggest that word learning cannot be explained exclusively by either attentional or intentional processes, and they provide evidence of a special role for intentional understanding in the vocabulary development of AD children.     

Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind

An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false-belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false-belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false-belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false-belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true-belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true- and false-belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true-belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true-belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English-speakers. Children were recruited from university-sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3-option false-belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false-belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM-related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.     

Signposts to development: theory of mind in deaf children

Possession of a "theory of mind" (ToM)--as demonstrated by an understanding of the false beliefs of others--is fundamental in children's cognitive development. A key question for debate concerns the effect of language input on ToM. In this respect, comparisons of deaf native-signing children who are raised by deaf signing parents with deaf late-signing children who are raised by hearing parents provide a critical test. This article reports on two studies (N = 100 and N = 39) using "thought picture" measures of ToM that minimize verbal task-performance requirements. These studies demonstrated that even when factors such as syntax ability, mental age in spatial ability, and executive functioning were considered, deaf late signers still showed deficits in ToM understanding relative to deaf native signers or hearing controls. Even though the native signers were significantly younger than a sample of late signers matched for spatial mental age and scores on a test of receptive sign language ability, native signers outperformed late signers on pictorial ToM tasks. The results are discussed in terms of access to conversation and extralinguistic influences on development such as the presence of sibling relationships, and suggest that the expression of a ToM is the end result of social understanding mediated by early conversational experience.     

Siblings,Theory of Mind,and Executive Functioning in Children Aged 3–6 Years: New Longitudinal Evidence

Longitudinal data were obtained from 157 children aged 3 years 3 months to 5 years 6 months at Time 1. At Time 2 these children had aged an average of 12 months. Theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) were measured at both time points. Results suggest that Time 1 ToM scores predict Time 2 EF scores. Detailed examination of sibling influences suggests that benefits—in terms of advanced ToM development—accrue to children with siblings versus without, and to those with a larger number of child‐aged siblings. Any advance in either area (ToM or EF) is likely to benefit the other, and early sibling interaction appears to act as a catalyst.     

Young Children's Theory of Mind Predicts More Sharing With Friends Over Time

Children (predominantly white and middle class) between 3 and 6 years (M = 55.12 months, N = 145 at Time 1, N = 102 at Time 2) participated in the prosocial choice test at two time points approximately 10 months apart. Children could share with strangers, close friends, nonfriends, and in a control, no recipient condition. Children shared more rewards with friends over time. Age interacted with recipient type such that older children had a higher probability of prosocial allocations toward friends and strangers compared to younger children. Theory of mind (ToM) predicted more prosocial allocations to friends over time, and the youngest children with higher ToM scores showed the largest increase in sharing with friends over time.     

Individual differences in inhibitory control and children's theory of mind

This research examined the relation between individual differences in inhibitory control (IC; a central component of executive functioning) and theory-of-mind (ToM) performance in preschool-age children. Across two sessions, 3- and 4-year-old children (N = 107) were given multitask batteries measuring IC and ToM. Inhibitory control was strongly related to ToM, r = .66, p < .001. This relation remained significant controlling for age, gender, verbal ability, motor sequencing, family size, and performance on pretend-action and mental state control tasks. Inhibitory tasks requiring a novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response (Conflict scale) and those requiring the delay of a prepotent response (Delay scale) were significantly related to ToM. The Conflict scale, however, significantly predicted ToM performance over and above the Delay scale and control measures, whereas the Delay scale was not significant in a corresponding analysis. These findings suggest that IC may be a crucial enabling factor for ToM development, possibly affecting both the emergence and expression of mental state knowledge. The implications of the findings for a variety of executive accounts of ToM are discussed.     

Theory of Mind Predicts Emotion Knowledge Development in Head Start Children

Research Findings: Emotion knowledge (EK) enables children to identify emotions in themselves and others, and its development facilitates emotion recognition in complex social situations. Sociocognitive processes, such as theory of mind (ToM), may contribute to developing EK by helping children realize the inherent variability associated with emotion expression across individuals and situations. The present study explored how ToM, particularly false belief understanding, in preschool predicts children's developing EK in kindergarten. Participants were 60 Head Start children ages 3 to 5 years. ToM and EK measures were obtained from standardized child tasks. ToM scores were positively related to performance on an EK task in kindergarten after we controlled for preschool levels of EK and verbal ability. Exploratory analyses provided preliminary evidence that ToM serves as an indirect effect between verbal ability and EK. Practice or Policy: Early intervention programs may benefit from including lessons on ToM to help promote socioemotional learning, specifically EK. This consideration may be most fruitful when the targeted population is at risk.     

Temperament Dimensions in Preschool Children: Links With Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind

Research Findings: The present cross-sectional study investigated the question of whether 6 different temperament dimensions (inhibition to novelty, social orientation, motor activity, positive emotionality, negative emotionality, and attention) influenced cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM) in 168 children (86 three/four-year-olds and 82 four/five-year-olds). Temperament was measured via a parent-report questionnaire, cognitive ToM via a classical false-belief task, and affective ToM via a comprehensive test tapping 3 levels of emotion comprehension (external, mental, and reflexive). In addition, language competence was assessed with a direct test evaluating both receptive and expressive language. The results showed that after we controlled for language ability, inhibition to novelty predicted higher levels of cognitive ToM in 4/5-year-old children. In addition, higher levels of social orientation predicted better comprehension of the external aspects of emotion in both younger and older children. Practice or Policy: Our results highlight the importance of the early identification of less sociable children, who might benefit from training interventions aimed at increasing their affective ToM abilities. At the same time, they are also consistent with previous evidence indicating that an inhibited approach to social interaction can promote false-belief understanding.     

Language facility and theory of mind development in deaf children

Deaf children with signing parents, nonnative signing deaf children, children from a hearing impaired unit (HIU), and oral deaf children were tested on three first-order theory of mind (ToM) tasks--a subset was also given a second-order task (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). A British Sign Language (BSL) receptive language task (Herman, Holmes, & Woll, 1999) and four nonverbal executive function tasks were also administered. The new BSL task allowed, for the first time, the receptive language abilities of deaf children to be measured alongside ToM abilities. Hearing children acted as controls. These children were given the same tasks, except the British Picture Vocabulary Scale was substituted for the BSL task. Language ability correlated positively and significantly with ToM ability, and age was correlated with language ability for both the deaf and hearing children. Age, however, underpinned the relationship between ToM and language for deaf children with signing parents and hearing children but not for nonnative signing, HIU, or oral deaf children. Executive function performance in deaf children was not related to ToM ability. A subset of hearing children, matched on age and language standard scores with signing deaf children, passed significantly more ToM tasks than the deaf children did. The findings are discussed with respect to the hypotheses proposed by Peterson and Siegal (1995, 2000) and Courtin (2000).