Which Multiculturalism?

This paper discusses the debates around multiculturalism both as a politics of recognition and as a proposed epistemic position in the context of science education. It concludes that there are neither uncontroversial ethical and political grounds, nor tenable epistemic reasons, for linking a multiculturalist approach to science education with a non-universalist approach to science, nor for a refusal to make evaluative comparisons between different sorts of knowledge claims originating in different cultures.     

Culturalizing Achievement Goal Theory and Research

This article is primarily designed to provide a cultural analysis of the literature on achievement goals. First, an overview of the four dominant approaches to the study of culture—namely, cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology, indigenous psychology, and psychological anthropology—is offered. Second, we analyze the extant body of research on achievement goals according to the three metatheoretical orientations of absolutism, relativism, and universalism and argue that cultural research on motivation should adopt a universalist approach as it is most consistent with a motivational science perspective. Finally, we conclude with concrete recommendations for how future research on culture and motivation should proceed in light of a universalistic perspective.     

Nudging the public sphere: a Habermasian perspective on public deliberation as an aim of moral education

This article offers an account of the understanding citizens need in order to justify moral principles in the public sphere and it identifies an important role for moral education in the promotion of that civic understanding. I develop this account through a contrastive analysis of Phillip Kitcher’s conception of public knowledge and Jurgen Habermas’ Discourse Ethics. Kitcher is focused on the social conditions necessary for the circulation of scientific knowledge in advanced democracies; the analysis offered in this article expands on what Habermas and other deliberative democrats claim are epistemic conditions necessary for the construction and circulation of moral understanding. I use this account to critically assess public policy that aims to ‘get around’ public deliberation by using strategies derived from behavioral economics in order to shift civic behavior in specific (moral) directions. Finally, I specify how such strategies have the potential to undermine moral understanding in the public sphere and I argue for a central role for moral education in mitigating such effects.     

A Reply on Behalf of the Relativist to Mark Mason's Justification of Universal Ethical Principles

Mark Mason, in his ‘A Justification, After the Postmodern Turn, of Universal Ethical Principles and Educational Ideals’ Educational Philosophy and Theory, 37 (2005), attempts to justify transcultural multiculturalism. In this paper I argue that he fails to refute moral relativism, and that multiculturalism as he interprets it is not morally acceptable.     

Transcending and Attending to Difference in the Multicultural Classroom

In this paper, I hope to reconcile two conflicting moral ideals within the multicultural classroom. I argue that increased attention to cultural difference in both education and moral philosophy is vitally important, but that it should not undermine the value of generalised respect, which grounds formal equality. I argue that an intersubjective account of respect explicitly integrates the generalised and particular moral perspectives, and thus serves as an ideal for interactions in the multicultural classroom. Through the analysis of two examples, I show that both forms of respect are logically dependent on one another and have a mutually supportive place in the practice of teaching.     

Epistemology of the Nakba in Israeli education

In Israel, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is the most fundamental political and moral issue current and future citizens face. If we accept the maxim that schools should prepare citizens for participation in determining the future of their state, Israeli students must be introduced to the historical, political and moral questions at the heart of the conflict. But this responsibility of Israeli schools and teachers is a highly contentious issue. The most important issue in Israeli political education is thus the hardest to teach. In this article I argue that, despite considerable educational and political risks, teaching Jewish Israeli students about the 1948 Palestinian Nakba (alternatively known as the Israeli War of Independence) holds substantial potential for their epistemic development as capable knowers. I begin by reviewing the political, dialogical, cognitive and epistemic deficits in Israeli education, highlighting how the Nakba is suppressed in history and citizenship education. By analysing the epistemic context of the Nakba in Israeli society and education, I present two pedagogical approaches for teaching controversial issues, arguing for an inquiry-based approach over the widely held approach. I demonstrate the benefits of an inquiry-based approach in the context of history education. In the final section of the article, I build on the case of the Nakba to argue for a new epistemic framework for Israeli citizenship education. I begin by outlining the shortcomings of the current epistemic framework of the subject and point to possible future directions for the subject.     

Book Reviews

This paper reviews an ongoing debate about moral standards for vocational education in German speaking countries. At the centre of the controversy is the question of universalistic versus domain‐specific moral orientations, namely the question of whether business people ought to develop different moral points of view in different situations (such as ‘private’ versus ‘professional’). Of pivotal importance in this context is also a prominent ethical approach (by Karl Homann, a philosopher in the tradition of liberal economists) which serves as a foundation for those who advocate domain specificity and which is strongly criticized by their counterparts. This approach is also presented, since the author believes that it does not entail all of what its protagonists claim. Moreover, as argued in the last section, the purported dichotomy of universalism versus domain specificity may even be entirely overcome. The point is that Homann's ethics perhaps do not fit into the framework of Kohlberg's six stages and might therefore be reconstructed as entailing moral segmentation. However, it is well accommodated by a more comprehensive stage taxonomy suggested by the author.     

On the Prerequisites of Moral Education: a Wittgensteinean perspective

In this paper I distinguish between education and its prerequisites and try to defend the ontological and epistemological priority of the latter. This distinction parallels Wittgenstein's distinctions between knowledge and its river-bed, justification and its grounds, explaining and showing, learning and acquisition. With respect to moral thinking and education, I argue that the fundamental moral principles occupy a position akin to that of the river-bed propositions; that these principles are embedded in ordinary human activities and forms of life and, therefore, ought to be taught by example and by practice and not by abstract moral thinking or contrived moral dilemmas, as some rationalist moral theorists sugges‡     

Citizenship, Competence and Profound Disability

In this paper I argue that reflection on competence and enfranchisement in relation to profound disability forces re-examination of the grounds of citizenship, with implications for theories of distributive justice in education. The primary purpose is less to point up that some people are disenfranchised without injustice; it is more to advance the view that, since enfranchisement is not an option for some profoundly disabled people, we require a conception of citizenship that is more sensitive to their distinctive needs and interests.     

Constructivisms and Objectivity: Disentangling Metaphysics from Pedagogy

We can distinguish the claims of cognitive constructivism from those of metaphysical constructivism, which is almost entirely irrelevant to science education. Cognitive constructivism has strong empirical support and indicates important directions for changing science instruction. It implies that teachers need to be cognizant of representational, motivational and epistemic dimensions which can restrict or promote student learning. The resulting set of tasks for a science teacher are considerably larger and more complex than on the older more traditional conception, but the resources of cognitive sciences and the history of science can provide important parts of the teachers intellectual tool kit. A critical part of this conception of science education is that students must develop the skills to participate in epistemic interchanges. They must be provided opportunities and materials to develop those skills and the classroom community must have the appropriate features of an objective epistemic community.     

Pedagogy Without Pedagogy: Dancing with Living,Knowing and Morale

This article takes its retrospective lead from the oppressive schooling years during the Chinese Cultural Revolution to reflect on the educational significance of artistic activities through considering aesthetic virtues and moral agency cultivated in these activities. Describing an unconventional educational milieu where schooling was deliberately ‘dismantled’, I emphasize the important role that artistic endeavours can play in building a person’s aesthetic strength and moral power to overcome the adversity of life, hence for the fuller human development. By blending philosophical discussion with historical manifestation, I stress the less articulated educational discourse that makes dance relevant to the educational formation of epistemic virtues and moral sensibilities. Joining in the emerging efforts to improving the worlds of schools, curricula, and pedagogies, I argue that the contingent integration of different histories, life conditions, and social and cultural discourses are ‘transformative’ sites for pedagogy. Thus, I seek to shed historically fresh light on the ways of thinking of schooling, education, and the arts for hope and possibility to ultimately argue for ways that can speak to the diversity of global societies today.     

The poverty of contractarian moral education

ABSTRACT

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand claims that a directive moral education that seeks to persuade children that a particular conception of contractarian morality is justified can be undertaken without falling foul of the requirement not to indoctrinate. In this article, we set out a series of challenges to Hand’s argument. First, we argue that Hand’s focus on ‘reasonable disagreement’ regarding the status of a moral conception is a red-herring. Second, we argue that the endorsement of moral contractarianism and the prohibition on indoctrination pull in different directions: if contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments should be less worried about indoctrination than Hand suggests. Third, we argue that moral contractarianism is mistaken; teachers should look elsewhere for guidance on the moral norms and principles towards which they should direct their pupils.     

Moral Rules, Utilitarianism and Schizophrenic Moral Education

R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare's attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis.     

Postcolonial Interventions Within Science Education: Using postcolonial ideas to reconsider cultural diversity scholarship

In this paper, I utilise key postcolonial perspectives on multiculturalism and boundaries to reconsider some of science education's scholarship on cultural diversity in order to extend the discourses and methodologies of science education. I begin with a brief overview of postcolonialism that argues its ability to offer theoretical insights to help revise science education's philosophical frameworks in the face of the newly intercivilisational encounters of contemporaneity. I then describe the constructs of multiculturalism, and borders and ‘border thinking’ (after ) that become useful to develop postcolonial readings as an active methodology of critique able to intervene and develops more revealing interpretations of some of science education's scholarship and differentiated experiences. As the focus of these interventions, I have selected ) ‘Defining “Science” in a Multicultural World: Implications for science education’ and ) ‘Multiculturalism, Universalism and Science Education: In search of common ground’ from the ongoing discussion on multiculturalism and cultural diversity within the journal Science Education. Finally, I conclude this paper with some general comments regarding postcolonialism and the science education scholarship on cultural diversity.     

Political Liberalism and Civic Education: The Liberal State and its Future Citizens

This article evaluates the conception of citizenship embodied in political liberalism as the core ingredient of a national syllabus designed to provide an uncontroversial yet substantial education in moral and political values in a liberal democratic state system. I argue ( pace recent work by Stephen Macedo) that Rawls's paradigmatic version of political liberalism fails to avoid begging the political question against those who do not share liberal values. I contend in particular that Rawls's defence of the distinction between comprehensive and political values and his assignment of priority to the latter, invokes an idea of what is politically reasonable that involves a comprehensive and therefore controversial liberal conception of the person.     

Can we measure practical wisdom?

ABSTRACT

Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option.     

The Cosmopolitan Turn and the Primacy of Difference

Cosmopolitanism is commonly understood as a universal norm—moral and political—in the light of enduring differences, and for that reason it has historically embodied a seemingly inevitable dilemma of universality/particularity. Since its inception, cosmopolitan thinkers have struggled with the dilemma and have attempted ways to address the question of difference so that the universal norm and obligation can be justified and defended. One of the most common strategies is to give primacy to universal humanity and override difference; another recent strategy is to give up universalism to take difference seriously and frame difference in agonistic terms. I argue in this article that both strategies are inadequate and unsatisfactory in conceptualising and dealing with difference. Briefly tracing some of the major cosmopolitan approaches, I argue that the conceptualisation of difference and human subjectivity is at the core of the problem as well as the solution. Drawing on Lévinas and his emphasis on the primacy of difference in the constitution of human subjectivity and community, I propose a new understanding of the self and the Other for the success of the cosmopolitan project.     

What’s the use of ethical philosophy? The role of ethical theory in special educational needs

This article examines the relevance of modern moral philosophy to education, with particular reference to special educational needs. Where moral philosophers explore the tension between utilitarian and deontological reasoning, they often consider the balance between the rights of the individual and the benefits or costs for the majority. I argue that the debate is predicated on a false dichotomy between minority and majority which is best overcome by a return to virtue ethics. In exploring this ethical debate, I draw on a case study from Australia of a student excluded from mainstream education on the basis that inclusion will not serve the greater good of the majority of students. My intention here is not to offer practical guidance in the complex day-to-day deliberations of educators dealing with issues of inclusion, but to elaborate the structure of the present thinking about inclusion. It is hoped that an appreciation of the deeper basis of ethical reasoning will itself lead to a greater recognition of the need for exploring the ethical grounds of teaching and learning. I will argue that any dichotomy between the utilitarian happiness of the many and the deontological commitment to the rights of the individual is based on a misconception of human identity. The false choice between the many and the one rests upon the assumption that morality is fundamentally about restricting personal preferences in favour of the good of the majority, that there exists a fundamental conflict between what is good for the individual and what is good for society as a whole. This will lead me to argue that we need to reinterpret human identity as constituted by its social relations and that this reorientation is best achieved by reference to virtue ethics.     

Education,Despair and Morality: A Reply to Roberts

In a recent thought‐provoking piece, Peter Roberts argues against the central role of happiness as a guiding concept in education, and argues for more attention to be paid to despair. This does not mean cultivating despair in young people, but allowing them to make sense of their own natural occasional despair, as well as the despair of others. I agree with Roberts about happiness, and about the need for more attention to despair, but I argue that focusing too much on despair is dangerous without paying simultaneous attention to goodness. Roberts argues that students must be helped to face the despair born of the realisation that (i) we can never be sure of the moral grounds on which our actions are based, (ii) we can never fully know ourselves, and that (iii) education should make us more appreciative of what we don't know. I argue against all three claims: (i) there are some moral truths that we can know; (ii) we can know enough of ourselves in certain contexts; (iii) education should not only teach intellectual humility, it should also give us confidence in appreciating the sources of meaning that are ordinarily available, e.g. personal relationships. The paper concludes with a response to the objection (perhaps by Roberts, as well as by liberals) that my position is little more than old‐fashioned moralism and conservatism.     

Indoctrination,Moral Instruction,and Nonrational Beliefs: A Place for Autonomy?

The manner in which individuals hold various nonevidentiary beliefs is critical to making any evaluative claim regarding an individual's autonomy. In this essay, I argue that one may be both justified in holding nonrational beliefs of a nonevidentiary sort while also being capable of leading an autonomous life. I defend the idea that moral instruction, including that which concerns explicitly religious content, may justifiably constitute a set of commitments upon which rationality and autonomy are dependent. I situate this discussion against the backdrop of a minimalist notion of autonomy. I then consider the case for nonrational beliefs, examining the difference between those whose content is objectionable on evidentiary grounds and those that are immune to verification. Next, I consider the indoctrination/moral instruction distinction through examining the various ways in which indoctrination is defined. I also consider the role that value coherence plays in shaping our identities, paying particular attention to fundamental commitments as defined by our respective families, cultures, and communities. Finally, I argue that individual psychology is central to our ability to assess the outcome of an upbringing purported to be indoctrinatory, and I emphasize the important role that experience and agency play in enabling us to evaluate our beliefs.