Political identity and moral education: A response to Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind

In The Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt claims that liberals have a narrower moral outlook than conservatives—they are concerned with fairness and relief of suffering, which Haidt sees as individualistic values, while conservatives care about authority and loyalty too, values concerned with holding society together. I question Haidt’s methodology, which does not permit liberals to express concerns with social bonds that do not fit within an ‘authority’ or ‘loyalty’ framework and discounts people who support liberal positions but do not self-ascribe as liberals. I also argue that of the six ‘moral foundations’, fairness and relief of suffering are more fundamental values than authority and loyalty, which are virtues only if their objects are worthy. Moral education programs must also encourage students to recognize some values as more urgent than others, and permit inquiry into the actual reasons for political behavior other than professed value commitments.     

The promises of moral foundations theory

In this article I examine whether Moral Foundations Theory can fulfil the promises that Haidt claims for the theory: that it will help in developing new approaches to moral education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society. I argue that, first, the model that Haidt suggests for understanding the plurality of moralities—a shared foundation underlying diverse moralities—does not help to overcome conflicts. A better understanding of the nature and background of moral conflicts can lead to a more respectful attitude towards people with conflicting views, but need not contribute to ending conflicts. Second, I show that pervasive moral conflicts should be dealt with on the level of politics. They require a morality of compromising. Third, I examine why this approach does not seem to work in the USA.     

Future Directions in the Movement Arts and Sciences

I argue in this paper that sport should be retained as an important part of the educational rationale for physical education. I consider Siedentop's critique of physical education and his alternative in the form of Sport Education. Siedentop's goals for youth sport and physical education and use of the work of Alisdair McIntyre are explored. It is argued that if we work to experience activities that are inherently pleasurable and intrinsically satisfying, then there is a possible future for activities such as sport. I conclude that school physical education is well placed to take up this challenge of sustaining sport as a moral practice and that the pedagogical tools already exist to do this in the form of a critical pedagogy.     

美国科学道德价值观与德育思路

美国的科学道德价值观和德育思路在于从科学和道德的相关性出发,阐释科学对道德的促进作用。所有的科学都具有道德价值。科学的德育思路体现在大学与大学课程的目标应该兼顾科学与道德,设计建立在科学基础上的道德课程,深入挖掘各门学科的道德文化价值,发展公共生活和课外活动来培养学生的道德情操。     

新时代师德修养的三重境界

师德修养一直是学界十分关注的重要问题。进入新时代,党和国家相关文件对师德修养提出了更高要求。究竟如何提升新时代师德修养水平,使其符合新时代的要求,是亟待我们研究的课题。新时代师德修养不可能一蹴而就,需要逐步提升,经历道德楷模、道德君子和道德圣贤三重境界。道德楷模阶段,师德表现在职业道德规范上,"社会"是教师的道德指向,教师在社会角色安排下遵守职业道德规约;道德君子阶段,师德表现在内在道德品质上,"自我"是教师的道德指向,教师在主体性意识的推动下获得内在道德品质;道德圣贤阶段,师德表现在高尚道德人格上,"他者"是教师的道德指向,教师在善良意志的驱使下实现人性完善。道德楷模、道德君子和道德圣贤三重境界必不可少,螺旋式上升,逐步达成师德修养提升目标。     

The poverty of contractarian moral education

ABSTRACT

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand claims that a directive moral education that seeks to persuade children that a particular conception of contractarian morality is justified can be undertaken without falling foul of the requirement not to indoctrinate. In this article, we set out a series of challenges to Hand’s argument. First, we argue that Hand’s focus on ‘reasonable disagreement’ regarding the status of a moral conception is a red-herring. Second, we argue that the endorsement of moral contractarianism and the prohibition on indoctrination pull in different directions: if contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments should be less worried about indoctrination than Hand suggests. Third, we argue that moral contractarianism is mistaken; teachers should look elsewhere for guidance on the moral norms and principles towards which they should direct their pupils.     

论开明自然主义的道德研究

新亚里士多德伦理学借用生物学理论阐释了语境对道德理论的限制作用,哲学的情境主义者使用社会心理学证据揭示了情境对道德行为的巨大影响,应用伦理学研究凸显了语境是实践道德重要来源这一事实。道德在规范伦理学原理层面与应用伦理学实践层面的语境敏感性,决定了实证科学介入道德研究的必要性。而自然化道德研究所取得的丰硕成果在凸显跨学科研究对于道德理论发展重要价值的同时,也暴露了实证科学在推进道德理论方面的局限性。因此,自然化道德研究应当秉承一种开明自然主义的立场,以多元主义的方法论推进道德研究不断发展。     

Deconstructing the elephant and the flag in the lavatory: promises and problems of moral foundations research

Moral Foundations research offers rich promise, opening up key questions about how affect and cognition are integrated in moral response, and exploring how different moral discourses may supply meaning and valence to moral experience. Haidt and his colleagues also associate different discourses with different political positions. However I address three problematic areas. First to what extent Haidt has succeeded in transcending the traditional dichotomy of affect and cognition, and created an integrative model of how moral intuitions actually work. Second, the analysis of cultural processes is too limited; moral responses are discursive, contextualized and constructed. Third, the political spectrum is complex and diverse; to be truly useful, the research on Moral Foundations must avoid parochial US political concerns and models.     

境遇伦理学视野下的道德高标审视

随着社会的发展,社会关系日益复杂化,道德境遇广泛出现,迫切需要理论工作者对道德境遇问题进行研究,并以此指导人们的道德判断和价值选择。本文从道德高标行为入手,尝试用境遇伦理学的视角分析个体道德行为,试图厘清对相关问题的认识和把握,进而对于学校的德育实践有所启发和帮助,从而促使个体在面对具体的道德境遇时,能够做出正确的道德判断。     

Consistency and moral integrity: A self-determination theory perspective

ABSTRACT

If acting morally can be viewed as acting consistently with a moral principle or rule, then being a person with moral integrity can be viewed as consistently applying moral principles or rules across different types of situations. We advance a view of moral integrity that incorporates three distinct, but interrelated, types of moral consistency: cognitive, emotional and motivational moral consistency. Our approach is based on Self-Determination Theory, a motivational theory that can explain when a moral rule becomes the primary motive for behavior. We argue that moral integrity is achieved when a person acts on the basis of an internal moral system of principles, emotions and motives and provide an account of the way that it develops during a person’s interaction with the environment.     

“以道驭术”在工程伦理教育中的价值映射

用“中国话语”构建本土工程伦理教育体系是传统科技思想价值反映的重要方面。“以道驭术”科技思想的价值可以由当代工程伦理教育的需求决定。“价值映射”为建立“需求”和“价值”间的决定性关系提供指向性表征。定义“以道驭术”思想元素构成的“供给集”以及工程伦理教育需求元素构成的“需求集”,分析“道德跃迁”对应法则,验证了两集合之间“价值映射”关系的合理性。“价值映射”的作用在于将“个人品德修养、共同体间关系协调、人与自然和谐相处”的“中华传统元素”融入当代中国工程伦理教育,发挥工程伦理教育在中国话语体系下的显性功能,即立足优秀传统思想和中国实际,使中国高校工程伦理教育为有效解决中国本土问题提供人才支持。     

论哈贝马斯对现代性道德哲学的重建

哈贝马斯引入社会世界的概念,对宗教的有效性基础已被动摇的道德传统进行合理重建。他接受了普遍语用学理论,对道德共识原则进行了论证,由此形成的商谈伦理学具备康德道德哲学的理论特征。哈贝马斯商谈伦理学以康德道德哲学作为理论背景并加以超越,开创了一条重建现代性道德哲学的路径。     

Faith schools in the twenty‐first century

This article is intended as an initial investigation into the foundations of moral psychology. I primarily examine a recent work in moral education, Daniel Lapsley’s and Darcia Narvaez’s ‘Character education’, whose authors seem to assume at points that criteria for discerning moral actions and moral traits can be derived apart from ethics or moral philosophy. This assumption, which appears to stem from misconceptions about both the virtues traditionally understood and the non-empirical nature of moral-philosophical theorising, is problematic: (1) it courts moral relativism, which would preclude arguing for the superiority of any model of moral education, (2) deriving or validating a morality through empirical methods involves a self-undermining stance about the nature of empirical justification and (3) empirical criteria used to delineate morality are unavoidably arbitrary. After examining similarly problematic works by David Wong and Lawrence Kohlberg, I conclude that moral psychologists must wrestle with the problem of moral criteria through substantive engagement with moral philosophy.     

Admiration,attraction and the aesthetics of exemplarity

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to show that an aesthetics of exemplarity could be a useful component of projects of moral self-cultivation. Using Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarism, I describe a distinctive, aesthetically-inflected mode of admiration called moral attraction whose object is the inner beauty of a person—the expression of the ‘inner’ virtues or excellences of character of a person in ‘outer’ forms of bodily comportment that are experienced, by others, as beautiful. I then argue that certain moral traditions deploy inner beauty within their practices of moral self-cultivation—a good example being Confucianism. Advocates of exemplarist moral education should therefore take seriously the ways that an aesthetics of exemplarity can play roles within projects of moral self-cultivation.     

Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?

There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related 'fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork 's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy.     

Distance,dialogue and reflection: Interpersonal reflective equilibrium as method for professional ethics education

The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) is well known within the domain of moral philosophy, but hardly discussed as a method in professional ethics education. We argue that an interpersonal version of RE is very promising for professional ethics education. We offer several arguments to support this claim. The first group of arguments focus on a changed practice that is more team-oriented, inter-professional and aims at shared decision-making with patients and clients. The second group of arguments relate to the core aim of professional ethics education, namely to stimulate critical moral reflection. This central aim is a core professional moral competence that entails both a dialogical approach to practice and one’s own moral beliefs as well as a more detached viewpoint on practice, reflection on types of cases and one’s attitude as a professional in practice.     

On the necessary relation between moral development and worldview

In this article we elaborate on the relationship between morality, moral development, moral education and capitalism. Based on Narvaez’s correct critique of the Western way of life, which is destroying the environment and may one day lead to extinction of life on Earth, we argue that this critique should not be stripped of its political side, meaning that it will not be complete if does not explicitly include capitalism as one of its roots. In the remainder of our commentary, we will try to show that in addition to heart, reason has a strong place in indigenous peoples’ life that is frequently misunderstood. Finally, and taking all this into account, we maintain that moral and citizenship education need to be critical and intercultural, and explicitly discuss economic and political issues that underlie and affect human moral development.     

Pensamiento e ideas fuerza de la educación en derechos humanos en Iberoamérica [Core ideas and thinking about human rights education in Iberoamerica]

ABSTRACT

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand defends the importance of teaching children moral standards, even while taking seriously the fact that reasonable people disagree about morality. While I agree there are universal moral values based on the kind of beings humans are, I raise two issues with Hand’s account. The first is an omission that may be compatible with Hand’s theory; the role of virtues. A role for the cultivation of virtues and rational emotions such as compassion is vital in accounting for the emotional aspect of morality. The second issue pertains to Hand’s foundational premise of human beings’ rough equality. Following Martha Nussbaum, I argue that contractarian approaches must be critically evaluated to ensure the social contract properly includes and accounts for the human dignity of those who are typically excluded from the benefits of society. Hand’s justificatory arguments rely upon a contractarian premise, and the contract itself needs scrutiny and adjustment if it is to support a viable theory of moral education.     

Environmental education research: to what ends?

This paper engages questions about ends in environmental education research. In doing so, I argue that such questions are essentially normative, and that normative questions are underrepresented in this field. After cautioning about perils of prescribing research agendas, I gently suggest that in environmental education key normative questions exist at the intersection of ‘education’ and ‘ethics’, and that they point to an area of research that deserves more attention. In describing the intersecting nature of these ideas, I show that how education is conceived in turn shapes interpretations of ethics, and vice versa. Seen this way, I also show how ethics inquiry in an educational context can be conceived as a means to explore controversy, dissonance, unconventional ideas, and to imagine new possibilities. Finally, I argue that research at this intersection of education and ethics can provide insights that can enable us to teach, inquire, and ultimately live as if the world mattered.