Determinate Values for Quantum Observables

This is a comment on J. A. Barrett's article ‘The Preferred-BasisProblem and the Quantum Mechanics of Everything’ ([2005]),which concerns theories postulating that certain quantum observableshave determinate values, corresponding to additional (oftencalled ‘hidden’) variables. I point out that itis far from clear, for most observables, what such a postulateis supposed to mean, unless the postulated additional variableis related to a clear ontology in space-time, such as particleworld lines, string world sheets, or fields.     

De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence

Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishingthat the principle of countable additivity is a condition ofcoherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons thatare at first sight perplexing. I show that he rejected countableadditivity, and hence the Dutch Book argument for it, becausecountable additivity conflicted with intuitive principles aboutthe scope of authentic consistency constraints. These he oftenclaimed were logical in nature, but he never attempted to relatethis idea to deductive logic and its own concept of consistency.This I do, showing that at one level the definitions of deductiveand probabilistic consistency are identical, differing onlyin the nature of the constraints imposed. In the probabilisticcase I believe that R.T. Cox's ‘scale-free’ axiomsfor subjective probability are the most suitable candidates.

1 Introduction

2 Coherence and Consistency

3 The InfiniteFair Lottery

4 The Puzzle Resolved—But Replaced by Another

5 Countable Additivity, Conglomerability and Dutch Books

6The Probability Axioms and Cox's Theorem

7 Truth and Probability

8 Conclusion: ‘Logical Omniscience’

     

Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes

The traditional Bayesian qualitative account of evidential support(TB) takes assertions of the form ‘E evidentially supportsH’ to affirm the existence of a two-place relation ofevidential support between E and H. The analysans given forthis relation is C(H,E) =_def Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). Now it is wellknown that when a hypothesis H entails evidence E, not onlyis it the case that C(H,E), but it is also the case that C(H&X,E)for any arbitrary X. There is a widespread feeling that thisis a problematic result for TB. Indeed, there are a number ofcases in which many feel it is false to assert ‘E evidentiallysupports H&X’, despite H entailing E. This is known,by those who share that feeling, as the ‘tacking problem’for Bayesian confirmation theory. After outlining a generalizationof the problem, I argue that the Bayesian response has so farbeen unsatisfactory. I then argue the following: (i) There exists,either instead of, or in addition to, a two-place relation ofconfirmation, a three-place, ‘contrastive’ relationof confirmation, holding between an item of evidence E and twocompeting hypotheses H₁ and H₂. (ii) The correct analysans ofthe relation is a particular probabilistic inequality, abbreviatedC(H₁, H_2, E). (iii) Those who take the putative counterexamplesto TB discussed to indeed be counterexamples are interpretingthe relevant utterances as implicitly contrastive, contrastingthe relevant hypothesis H₁ with a particular competitor H₂.(iv) The probabilistic structure of these cases is such thatC(H₁, H₂, E). This solves my generalization of the tacking problem.I then conclude with some thoughts about the relationship betweenthe traditional Bayesian account of evidential support and myproposed account of the three-place relation of confirmation.

1 The ‘tacking problem’ and the traditional Bayesianresponse

2 Contrastive support

3 Concluding comments

     

Is Standard Quantum Mechanics Technologically Inadequate?

In a recent issue of this journal, P.E. Vermaas ([2005]) claimsto have demonstrated that standard quantum mechanics is technologicallyinadequate in that it violates the ‘technical functionscondition’. We argue that this claim is false becausebased on a ‘narrow’ interpretation of this technicalfunctions condition that Vermaas can only accept on pain ofcontradiction. We also argue that if, in order to avoid thiscontradiction, the technical functions condition is interpreted‘widely’ rather than ‘narrowly’, thenVermaas, argument for his claim collapses. The conclusion isthat Vermaas' claim that standard quantum mechanics is technologicallyinadequate evaporates.

1 Introduction

2 The Narrow Interpretation

3 The Wide Interpretation

4 The Teleportation Scheme

5Conclusions

     

Crick's notion of genetic information and the 'central dogma' of molecular biology

An assessment is offered of the recent debate on informationin the philosophy of biology, and an analysis is provided ofthe notion of information as applied in scientific practicein molecular genetics. In particular, this paper deals withthe dependence of basic generalizations of molecular biology,above all the ‘central dogma’, on the so-called‘informational talk’ (Maynard Smith [2000a]). Itis argued that talk of information in the ‘central dogma’can be reduced to causal claims. In that respect, the primaryaim of the paper is to consider a solution to the major difficultyof the causal interpretation of genetic information: how todistinguish the privileged causal role assigned to nucleic acids,DNA in particular, in the processes of replication and proteinproduction. A close reading is proposed of Francis H. C. Crick'sOn Protein Synthesis (1958) and related works, to which we owethe first explicit definition of information within the scientificpractice of molecular biology.

1. Introduction

   1.1 The basicquestions of the information debate

   1.2 Thecausal interpretation(CI) of biological informationand Crick's‘central dogma’

2. Crick's definitions of genetic information
3. The main requirementfor (CI)
4. Types of causation in molecular biology

   4.1 Structuralcausation in molecular biology

   4.2 Nucleicacids as correlativecausal factors

5. The ‘central dogma’ withoutthe notion of information
6. Concluding remarks

     

Why There's No Cause to Randomize

The evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is widelyregarded as supplying the ‘gold standard’ in medicine—wemay sometimes have to settle for other forms of evidence, butthis is always epistemically second-best. But how well justifiedis the epistemic claim about the superiority of RCTs? This paperadds to my earlier (predominantly negative) analyses of theclaims produced in favour of the idea that randomization playsa uniquely privileged epistemic role, by closely inspectingthree related arguments from leading contributors to the burgeoningfield of probabilistic causality—Papineau, Cartwrightand Pearl. It concludes that none of these further argumentssupplies any practical reason for thinking of randomizationas having unique epistemic power.

1 Introduction

2 Why theissue is of great practical importance—the ECMOcase

3Papineau on the ‘virtues of randomization’

4 Cartwrighton causality and the ‘ideal’ randomizedexperiment

5 Pearl on randomization, nets and causes

6 Conclusion

     

The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem's Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation

Going back at least to Duhem, there is a tradition of thinkingthat crucial experiments are impossible in science. I analyseDuhem's arguments and show that they are based on the excessivelystrong assumption that only deductive reasoning is permissiblein experimental science. This opens the possibility that someprinciple of inductive inference could provide a sufficientreason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses on thebasis of an appropriately controlled experiment. To be sure,there are analogues to Duhem's problems that pertain to inductiveinference. Using a famous experiment from the history of molecularbiology as an example, I show that an experimentalist versionof inference to the best explanation (IBE) does a better jobin handling these problems than other accounts of scientificinference. Furthermore, I introduce a concept of experimentalmechanism and show that it can guide inferences from data withinan IBE-based framework for induction.

1. Introduction
2. Duhem onthe Logic of Crucial Experiments
3. ‘The Most BeautifulExperiment in Biology’
4. Why Not Simple Elimination?
5. SevereTesting
6. An Experimentalist Version of IBE

   6.1 Physiologicaland experimentalmechanisms

   6.2 Explaining the data

   6.3IBE and the problemof untested auxiliaries

   6.4 IBE-turtlesall the way down

7. Van Fraassen's ‘Bad Lot’ Argument
8. IBE and Bayesianism
9. Conclusions

     

Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens

By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful replyto our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of hisarticle on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]).But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply(and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properlyaddresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder,we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challengefor Strevens's approach to QD.

1 Strevens's ‘clarifications’

2 Strevens's new-and-improved ‘negligibility arguments’

     

DNA, Inference, and Information

This paper assesses Sarkar's ([2003]) deflationary account ofgenetic information. On Sarkar's account, genes carry informationabout proteins because protein synthesis exemplifies what Sarkarcalls a ‘formal information system’. Furthermore,genes are informationally privileged over non-genetic factorsof development because only genes enter into arbitrary relationsto their products (in virtue of the alleged arbitrariness ofthe genetic code). I argue that the deflationary theory doesnot capture four essential features of the ordinary conceptof genetic information: intentionality, exclusiveness, asymmetry,and causal relevance. It is therefore further removed from whatis customarily meant by genetic information than Sarkar admits.Moreover, I argue that it is questionable whether the accountsucceeds in demonstrating that information is theoreticallyuseful in molecular genetics.

1. Introduction
2. Sarkar's InformationSystem
3. The Pre-theoretic Features of Genetic Information

   3.1Intentionality

   3.2 Exclusiveness

   3.3 Asymmetry

   3.4 Causalrelevance

4. Theoretical Usefulness
5. Conclusion

     

Causation and Its Relation to 'Causal Laws'

Many have found attractive views according to which the veracityof specific causal judgements is underwritten by general causallaws. This paper describes various variants of that view andexplores complications that appear when one looks at a certainsimple type of example from physics. To capture certain causaldependencies, physics is driven to look at equations which,I argue, are not causal laws. One place where physics is forcedto look at such equations (and not the only place) is in itshandling of Green's functions which reveal point-wise causaldependencies. Thus, I claim that there is no simple relationshipbetween causal dependence and causal laws of the sort oftenpictured. Rather, this paper explores the complexity of therelationship in a certain well-understood case.

1 Introduction

2 The Causal Covering-Law Thesis

3 The Laws of String Motion

4 Green's Functions and Causation

5 Green's Functions andBoundary Conditions

6 The Green's Function as a Violationof the Wave Equation

6.1The Green's Function and other Sensesof ‘Causal Law’:Temporal Propagation and LocalPropagation

7 The Distributional Wave Equation

8 Whyis not the Green's Function a ‘Causal Law’?

9Conclusion

     

Whence Philosophy of Biology?

A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biologyabout the history of their field. According to the receivedview, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglectinganalyses of the ‘special sciences’, including biology.The subdiscipline of philosophy of biology emerged (and couldonly have emerged) after the decline of logical positivism inthe 1960s and 70s. In this article, I present bibliometric datafrom four major philosophy of science journals (Erkenntnis,Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and the British Journal forthe Philosophy of Science), covering 1930–59, which challengethis view.

1 Introduction

2 Methods

3 Results

4 Conclusions

     

E-democracy,E-Contestation and the Monitorial Citizen*

It is argued that Pettit’s conception of “contestatory democracy” is superior to deliberative, direct and epistemic democracy. The strong and weak points of these conceptions are discussed drawing upon the work of a.o Bruce Bimber. It is further argued that ‘contestation’ and ‘information’ are highly relevant notions in thinking about, just, viable and sustainable design for E-democracy. *A version of this paper was presented at Ethicomp 2002, Lisbon.     

Chinese Rooms and Program Portability

I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle'sChinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention.The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church–Turingthesis. Searle assumes that the Church–Turing thesis licencesthe assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. Iargue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. Anumber of possible objections are considered and rejected. Myconclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument tohold onto the claim that understanding consists in the runningof a program.

1 Searle's Argument

1.1 The Church–Turingthesis

2 Criticism of Searle's Argument

3 Objectionsand Replies

3.1 The virtual brain machine objection

3.2The brain-basedobjection

3.3 The syntax/physics objection

3.4 The abstractionobjection

3.5 The ‘same conclusion’objection

3.6 The ‘unnecessary baggage’ objection

3.7The Chinese gym objection

3.8 The syntax/semantics objection

3.9 Turing's definition of algorithm

3.9.1 Consequences

3.9.2 Criticism of the defence

4 Conclusion

     

What Are the New Implications of Chaos for Unpredictability?

From the beginning of chaos research until today, the unpredictabilityof chaos has been a central theme. It is widely believed andclaimed by philosophers, mathematicians and physicists alikethat chaos has a new implication for unpredictability, meaningthat chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way that other deterministicsystems are not. Hence, one might expect that the question ‘Whatare the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’has already been answered in a satisfactory way. However, thisis not the case. I will critically evaluate the existing answersand argue that they do not fit the bill. Then I will approachthis question by showing that chaos can be defined via mixing,which has never before been explicitly argued for. Based onthis insight, I will propose that the sought-after new implicationof chaos for unpredictability is the following: for predictingany event, all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilisticallyirrelevant.

1. Introduction
2. Dynamical Systems and Unpredictability

   2.1 Dynamical systems

   2.2 Natural invariant measures

   2.3Unpredictability

3. Chaos

   3.1 Defining chaos

   3.2 Definingchaos via mixing

4. Criticism of Answers in the Literature

   4.1 Asymptotic unpredictability?

   4.2 Unpredictability dueto rapid or exponential divergence?

   4.3 Macro-predictabilityand Micro-unpredictability?

5. A General New Implication ofChaos for Unpredictability

   5.1Approximate probabilistic irrelevance

   5.2 Sufficiently pastevents are approximately probabilisticallyirrelevant for predictions

6. Conclusion

     

浅议当好班主任应把握好的六个度

班主任是班级管理的第一责任人,肩负着一个班级学生的思想引导、习惯培养、学业进步、个性发展的引领统筹责任,需要有深厚的学识魅力和高尚的人格魅力。班主任必须具有丰富的教育智慧,把握好引领学生成长的几个度。做到对学生价值观的引领要有深度,尊重关爱学生要有热度,听取师生意见要有气度,开展班级活动要有广度,班级管理制度实施要有力度,对学生的严格要求要有适度。     

高等学校学科建设指导思想的实践探索

学科建设是高等学校发展的基础、核心和龙头,学科建设指导思想是一所高校学科发展的的总纲领、总指引,有着统领的作用,具有非常重要的地位。系统介绍了高校学科建设指导思想的内涵,学科建设指导思想的制定应结合学校类型、办学层次、学科结构、学科特色等因素。并结合实际,从学校层面对学科建设指导思想进行了许多有益的探索,通过对我国几所不同类型的高校学科建设指导思想进行分析研究,总结共性,找出个性,以期对其他高校制定学科建设指导思想起到启示和借鉴作用。     

Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry

In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevin's recentattempt to set out an argument for the ontological reductionof chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue,firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a smallpart of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extendit. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish thereduction of chemistry, properly so called.

1 Introduction

2The scope of the reductionist claim

3 The combinatorial argument

4 The strength of the ‘reduction’

5 Concludingremarks

     

Moral luck and computer ethics: Gauguin in cyberspace

I argue that the problem of ‘moral luck’ is an unjustly neglected topic within Computer Ethics. This is unfortunate given that the very nature of computer technology, its ‘logical malleability’, leads to ever greater levels of complexity, unreliability and uncertainty. The ever widening contexts of application in turn lead to greater scope for the operation of chance and the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck bears down most heavily on notions of professional responsibility, the identification and attribution of responsibility. It is immunity from luck that conventionally marks out moral value from other kinds of values such as instrumental, technical, and use value. The paper describes the nature of moral luck and its erosion of the scope of responsibility and agency. Moral luck poses a challenge to the kinds of theoretical approaches often deployed in Computer Ethics when analyzing moral questions arising from the design and implementation of information and communication technologies. The paper considers the impact on consequentialism; virtue ethics; and duty ethics. In addressing cases of moral luck within Computer Ethics, I argue that it is important to recognise the ways in which different types of moral systems are vulnerable, or resistant, to moral luck. Different resolutions are possible depending on the moral framework adopted. Equally, resolution of cases will depend on fundamental moral assumptions. The problem of moral luck in Computer Ethics should prompt us to new ways of looking at risk, accountability and responsibility.     

Maintaining the reversibility of foldings: Making the ethics (politics) of information technology visible

This paper will address the question of the morality of technology. I believe this is an important question for our contemporary society in which technology, especially information technology, is increasingly becoming the default mode of social ordering. I want to suggest that the conventional manner of conceptualising the morality of technology is inadequate – even dangerous. The conventional view of technology is that technology represents technical means to achieve social ends. Thus, the moral problem of technology, from this perspective, is the way in which the given technical means are applied to particular (good or bad) social ends. In opposition to this I want to suggest that the assumed separation, of this approach, between technical means and social ends are inappropriate. It only serves to hide the most important political and ethical dimensions of technology. I want to suggest that the morality of technology is much more embedded and implicit than such a view would suggest. In order to critique this approach I will draw on phenomenology and the more recent work of Bruno Latour. With these intellectual resources in mind I will propose disclosive ethics as a way to make the morality of technology visible. I will give a brief account of this approach and show how it might guide our␣understanding of the ethics and politics of technology by considering two examples of contemporary information technology: search engines and plagiarism detection systems.     

Identity,profiling algorithms and a world of ambient intelligence

The tendency towards an increasing integration of the informational web into our daily physical world (in particular in so-called Ambient Intelligent technologies which combine ideas derived from the field of Ubiquitous Computing, Intelligent User Interfaces and Ubiquitous Communication) is likely to make the development of successful profiling and personalization algorithms, like the ones currently used by internet companies such as Amazon, even more important than it is today. I argue that the way in which we experience ourselves necessarily goes through a moment of technical mediation. Because of this algorithmic profiling that thrives on continuous reconfiguration of identification should not be understood as a supplementary process which maps a pre-established identity that exists independently from the profiling practice. In order to clarify how the experience of one’s identity can become affected by such machine-profiling a theoretical exploration of identity is made (including Agamben’s understanding of an apparatus, Ricoeur’s distinction between idem- and ipse-identity, and Stiegler’s notion of a conjunctive–disjunctive relationship towards retentional apparatuses). Although it is clear that no specific predictions about the impact of Ambient Intelligent technologies can be made without taking more particulars into account, the theoretical concepts are used to describe three general scenarios about the way wherein the experience of identity might become affected. To conclude, I argue that the experience of one’s identity may affect whether the cases of unwarranted discrimination resulting from ubiquitous differentiations and identifications within an Ambient Intelligent environment, will become a matter of societal concern.