Herculean “Myth” Aspects of Athletics

This paper argues that recent treatments of ethics in sport have accorded too much importance to the promotion and portrayal of a sport’s excellences, and too little to the consent of participants First, I consider and reject a fundamental challenge to the idea that consent should play a central role in determining the morality of action in sport – namely, Sean McAleer’s argument to the effect that consent is incapable of rendering normally impermissible actions permissible in sport. I then offer a preliminary examination of the proper relation in the moral evaluation of action in sport between considerations of consent and ‘internalist’ considerations regarding the nature and purpose of sport. Taking as my starting point J.S. Russell’s treatment of this topic, I argue that consent is the more weighty, and in many cases the more fundamental, value and that when it conflicts with internalist considerations, it is consent that takes moral priority.     

Intentional Rules Violations—One More Time

A familiar move that philosophers of sport make in the debate on the doping-issue is to reject from the start the argument that doping comes down to cheating. The claim that doping is cheating is often rebutted with the argument that doping is only cheating when one accepts that the use of doping is unjustified in itself. In this paper I want to argue that putting aside the cheating-argument in this way comes, first, too easy, because essential complexities of what cheating is, are neglected. And, second, it comes too soon, because spelling the cheating argument out throws new light on the debate about matters of justifying the rules and criteria concerning doping. I will confine myself in this paper to the claim that it is in any case the institutional authorities that professional athletes cheat on. The relations with other parties that apparently can be claimed to be cheated upon also, such as other athletes in competition, are left out. The argument from cheating takes its starting point from a principle of fidelity, taken from Scanlon. By this principle the morally acceptable conduct of those taking part in a practice is grounded in the way reciprocal expectations are raised between parties to the practice. I apply this principle to the relation between athletes and institutional authorities in sport practices. This argument can take the cheating argument to a new level of seriousness, especially in the sense that the arguments treated here support a plea for democratization of the procedures and a larger role of the sportsmen and sportswomen themselves, or so I will defend.     

Sport as a (mere) hobby: in defense of ‘the gentle pursuit of a modest competence’

In this essay, I defend sport as a (mere) hobby in contrast to sport as a ‘mutual quest for excellence through challenge’. With the assistance of ideas found in the novel Don Quixote, I raise questions about the clarity, merit, and sufficiency of the quest-for-excellence apologetic. I employ arguments made by James and Dewey to support my alternate defense of sporting activity as a hobby, that is, as ‘the gentle pursuit of a modest competence’. Based on the work of Wu, my defense stands as both a philosophic argument and a cultural critique.     

In Praise of Partisanship

J.S. Russell, Stephen Mumford, and Randolph Feezell have criticized my view that zealous partisans of a particular team are superior to purists, who derive an esthetic pleasure from good play by any team. All three philosophers extol the virtues of purism and Russell defends a pluralistic view that rejects the very idea of an ideal type of fan. In response, I renounce the claim that partisans are superior to purists and instead propose a more modest defense of partisanship. Moderate partisan fans, who constrain their support by moral and esthetic criteria, exhibit admirable concern for their team’s wellbeing, have unique opportunities to display moral virtue, and are necessary for the welfare of competitive sport. Partisans’ choice of team is influenced by arbitrary factors but arbitrariness is built into the very nature of sport and applies equally to purists’ admiration of athletic excellence. It diminishes neither the value of athletic excellence nor the value of partisans’ devotion to their team.     

Playing to your opponent’s weakness – or strength

Playing to your opponent’s weakness is a strategy commonly adopted in head-to-head sports. I argue, however, that competitors in head-to-head sports should adopt the opposite strategy: playing to your opponent’s strength (PTS). To do so, I first distinguish two senses of victory and explain what constitutes a meaningful victory in head-to-head sports. I then examine the implications of mutualism as exhibited in Robert L. Simon’s view that sport is a mutual quest for excellence through challenge. Finally, I defend the notion that competitors in head-to-head sports should adopt PTS by stating and answering seven objections.     

Autonomous Authorization of Deception in Sport

Two recent articles in this journal – one by Morris, the other by Pfleegor & Rosenberg – have revived the philosophical discussion of the ethics of deception in sport which had largely laid dormant since the 1973 publication of Pearson’s ‘Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics’. Morris and Pfleegor & Rosenberg both share with Pearson the view that ethical deceptive sport acts are those that relate to sport-specific skills. However, whereas Pearson ultimately grounds this view in the agreement she takes to obtain amongst sport participants, both recent treatments overlook this fundamental aspect of her account and offer alternative justifications for that view. I argue, though, that in both cases the arguments offered are incomplete precisely because they require an appeal to the agreement amongst participants that lies at the foundation of Pearson’s account. On all three treatments, I argue, what ultimately determines an action’s ethical status is not its relation to sport-specific skills, but its conformity to, or violation of, that agreement. I conclude with a discussion of what this implies for future work on deception in sport.     

Three Standards of Athletic Superiority

The aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the inherent purpose of sports competitions. In ‘On Winning and Athletic Superiority’, Nicholas Dixon states that the central comparative purpose of an athletic contest is to determine which team or player is superior, or, synonymously, to provide an accurate measure of athletic superiority. Dixon identifies athletic skill as the standard of athletic superiority in competitive sport. However, I argue there are three separate standards of athletic superiority: the demonstration of athletic skill, the achievement of prelusory goal using lusory means, and achievement of superior formal result. This stance responds to Dixon’s argument that failed athletic contests are contests that have not fulfilled the central purpose of competitive sport, because they have been undermined by refereeing errors, cheating, gamesmanship or bad luck. I argue that a failed athletic contest occurs when any of the three standards of athletic superiority conflict.     

What would a deep ecological sport look like? The example of Arne Naess

Since the 1960s environmental problems have increasingly been on the agenda in Western countries. Global warming and climate change have increased concerns among scientists, politicians and the general population. While both elite sport and mass sport are part of the consumer culture that leads to ecological problems, sport philosophers, with few exceptions, have not discussed what an ecologically acceptable sport would look like. My goal in this article is to present a radical model of ecological sport based on Arne Naess’s version of deep ecology called ecosophy_T. After outlining the Naessian ecocentric view of biospheric egalitarianism I present the consequences for sport and physical activities. I also give examples from Arne Naess’s own practice of sport which was guided by the principle ‘Richness in ends, simplicity in means!’ I discuss whether Naessian deep ecological sport is what we will all end up with after the ecocatastrophe or whether it can be an inspiring ideal for many of us right now.     

Toward a shallow interpretivist model of sport

Deep ethical interpretivism has been the standard view of the nature of sport in the philosophy of sport for the past seventeen years or so. On this account excellence assumes the role of the foundational, ethical goal that justice assumes in Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist model of law. However, since excellence in sports is not an ethical value, and since it should not be regarded as an ultimate goal, the case for the traditional account fails. It should be replaced by the shallow interpretivist model that I begin to sketch out and defend here.     

On game definitions

Wittgenstein did not claim that the ordinary language concept ‘game’ cannot be defined: he claimed that there are multiple definitions that can be adopted for special purposes, but no single definition applicable to all games. I will defend this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position by showing its compatibility with a pragmatic argumentative view of definitions, and how this view accounts for the diversity of disagreeing game definitions in definitional disputes.     

Social Philosophy of Sport: A Critical Interpretation*

In this article I argue both that an understanding of sport’s general character as competitive play can help us to read Homer more insightfully and that this reading can boomerang back to us to further illuminate the sport as competitive play thesis. My overall method is that of (Rawlsian) reflective equilibrium. The three sections of Homer that I examine are the Phaiacian games in Book 8 of the ‘Odyssey’, the Patroclos games in Book 23 of the ‘Iliad’, and the Penelope games in Books 21–22 of the ‘Odyssey’.     

Moral thinking,sports rules and education1

The purpose of this study is to resolve ‘moral conflict’ in sport and to present a better approach with respect to right actions for sports participants. While acknowledging that there are many positive values or principles (e.g. Olympism) in sport, some ‘moral conflict’ in sport might still arise and therefore cannot be easily resolved. By introducing Hare's two levels of moral thinking (i.e. intuitive level and critical level), I first clarify the question ‘Why do moral conflicts appear?’ That moral conflicts may arise normally is because people or philosophers tend to think that moral principles ought to be simple and general. In the general situation, it would be fine to follow these kinds of principles when there is no conflicting situation. But in a particular context, there might be a problem. It would be impossible to resolve a conflicting problem if we do not think critically. Second, I suggest that ‘keep the rules’ can be seen as a prima facie principle or duty for sports participants. However, this prima facie principle may not be sufficient or appropriate to resolve the problem of conflict by using the intuitive thinking, since one might face a conflict between ‘keep the rules’ and ‘not to keep the rules’ and s/he cannot select in between. Thus, critical thinking is needed. Third, I try to differentiate critical thinking from intuitive thinking. Critical thinking aims not only to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive thinking, but also to resolve conflicts between them. So, if we are able to think critically, a prima facie duty sometimes can be overridden by other more important duties (sound and ethical) in a particular situation. However, as not all sports participants are capable enough to think critically, moral education regarding how to develop athletes' ‘critical thinking’ in sport is needed. It may be recommended that virtue ethics play an important role in sport not just through initiating participants into rule‐following but also in cultivating certain dispositions and educating their desires. As it is, what we also need is a good sports education system which can enlighten people toward a better understanding of sport and its values.     

[Transgender] young men: gendered subjectivities and the physically active body

In this paper, I discuss [transgender] young men's social, physical and embodied experiences of sport. These discussions draw from interview research with two young people who prefer to self-identify as ‘male’ and not as ‘trans men’, although they do make use of this term. Finn and Ed volunteered to take part in the research following my request for volunteers at a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) youth group. Their narratives provide valuable testimonies on transgender and transgender and sport: more specifically, their experiences of school sport, their embodied subjectivities, transitioning and sport participation. The focus on transgender and sport also highlights the taken-for-granted assumption that a coherent LGBT collective exists and that transgender is a fixed, definable and agreed-upon category. The paper, therefore, has two aims. First, it intends to privilege and document the views of two young people who identify with a group that is often marginalised. Their narratives raise significant questions in relation to transgender and sport participation in educational and recreational settings. Second, the paper seeks to expose the methodological and ontological complexities surrounding ‘LGBT’ and ‘transgender’ and place these debates within sport and educational studies.     

Sport,Aesthetic Experience,and Art as the Ideal Embodied Metaphor

Despite a prevalence of articles exploring links between sport and art in the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers in the new millennium pay relatively little explicit attention to issues related to aesthetics generally. After providing a synopsis of earlier debates over the questions ‘is sport art?’ and ‘are aesthetics implicit to sport?’, a pragmatically informed conception of aesthetic experience will be developed. Aesthetic experience, it will be argued, vitally informs sport ethics, game logic, and participant meaning. Finally, I will argue that embodying pragmatic conceptions of art as its ideal metaphor re-opens space to best realize the deep potential of sport as a meaningful human practice.     

Competition,cooperation, and an adversarial model of sport

In this paper, I defend a general theory of competition and contrast it with a corresponding general theory of cooperation. I then use this analysis to critique mutualism. Building on the work of Arthur Applbaum and Joseph Heath I develop an alternative adversarial model of competitive sport, one that helps explain and is partly justified by shallow interpretivism, and argue that this model helps shows that the claim that mutualism provides us with the most defensible ethical ideal of sport is false. By replacing that view with an understanding of sporting adversarial ethics we can appreciate that the ethics of sport are more complex than has been commonly recognized.     

Conventionalism defended: a reply to Moore

In a recent article in this Journal, Eric Moore criticized an earlier essay of mine published in this same Journal on two fronts. On the first, he criticized my criticisms of broad internalism for relying on abstract moral principles too far removed from the practice of sport to adjudicate normative conflicts in which disputants cannot agree on what is the purpose of sport. On the second front, he criticized my reliance on what he called Rorty’s “controversial” views of truth and rationality to back up my criticisms of broad internalism. I find both criticisms forceful but not persuasive. In my reply, therefore, I defend both use of Rorty’s and other similar historicist takes on rational justification and my criticisms of broad internalism principles-based approach to normative inquiry in sport.     

A dolphin only looks like a fish: Players’ behaviour analysis is not enough for game understanding in the light of the systems approach – a response to the reply by McGarry and Franks

Abstract

In this article I defend my previously published system approach to game playing in sports (Lebed, 2006). Founded on the main argument of mine about insufficiency of performance analysis only for games study, it is based on an inter-disciplinary comprehension of sporting game events from four different angles: the logical-philosophical, the behavioural (performance), the anthropological, and complexity angles. The paper consists of four parts, corresponding to the four angles. The first three parts offer deconstructive and reconstructive analysis. The three provide criticism of McGarry and Frank's arguments against my view of complex dynamical systems in sports. The logical analysis negates my opponents’ general view of a match (a process) as a dynamical system. The behaviour analysis refutes their claim about couple oscillator dynamics as a universal dynamically interpreted model of game playing. The anthropological panoramic vision of sporting games leads me to conclude that my opponents’ analysis of two exclusively interacting sides in a squash or soccer contest is too narrow and insufficient to explain the broad diversity of games. According to the, classification suggested in Lebed (2004), I offer seven possible models that can systematically reflect different groups of games. In the fourth part, the complexity angle is analysed from a constructive point of view. Here I take one of the above seven models and try to outline a ‘‘soccer-like’’ game perspective modelling founded on the view of play process as a conflict of two four-level self-regulating complex systems, where each one is additionally involved in its own loop of cybernetic regulation.     

Coaching whiteness: stories of ‘Pacifica exotica’ in Australian high school rugby

The intersection of sport and education is a potentially powerful site for the production of class and gender. This paper examines how the relationship between sport and education can also serve to (re)produce ideas about ‘race’. Drawing on research conducted during my time as a coach of the first XV rugby team at an elite private school in Australia, I consider how whiteness creates the ‘other’. In particular I highlight how, despite their absence, the Pacific Island ‘other’ is (re)produced through stories that coaches share during training. These stories revolve around the themes of the ‘natural’, fear and violence and commodity. As themes they resonate with a larger meta-narrative that informs dominant ‘white’ culture on Pacific Islanders in Australia. Such stories have the power to shape students’ subjectivities, both of themselves and Pacific Islanders. Deconstructing the white-stream narrative identifies sport settings in education as important pedagogical sites where ‘race’, class and gender are learned. As such, there is a need to utilise critical pedagogical approaches in the education of sports coaches.     

‘Being in your body’ and ‘being in the moment’: the dancing body-subject and inhabited transcendence

Sports studies is currently dominated by the intellectualist approach to understanding skill and expertise, meaning that questions about the phenomenological nature of skilled performance in sport have generally been overshadowed by the emphasis on the cognitive. By contrast, this article responds to calls for a phenomenology of sporting embodiment by opening up a philosophical exploration of the nature of athletic being-in-the-world. In particular, the paper explores the conceptualisation of immanence and transcendence in relation to the embodied practice of dance, engaging with Merleau-Ponty’s important insight that the body can be a source of transcendence. I also draw on data from in-depth qualitative interviews with professional contemporary dancers to explore dancers’ concepts of ‘being in your body’ and ‘being in the moment’, and to suggest that during the actual embodied practice of dance, dancers do not experience transcendence and immanence as they are conceptualised in philosophy. Rather, I argue, dancers experience a third mode of being that is somehow in-between these two binary terms. I have called this ‘inhabited transcendence’.     

If sport's the solution then what's the problem? The social significance of sport in the moral governing of ‘good’ and ‘healthy’ citizens in Sweden, 1922–1998

All over the westernised world, sport has been promoted as a ‘solution’ to many of the social ‘problems’ and challenges that face modern societies. This study draw on Foucault's concept of governmentality to examine the ways in which Swedish Government Official Reports on sport, from 1922 to 1998, define social problems and legitimate governing, and sport as a solution, in the name of benefiting Swedish society. The analysis shows that citizens' ‘good’ and ‘healthy’ behaviour and bodies are in focus of problematisation throughout the studied period. In relation to this, sport is seen as an important tool and solution. Parallel with increased critique of sport in contemporary times, a neo-liberal governmentality is embraced which in turn affect how ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ are thought of in individualistic and rational ways.