Critical Thinking,Autonomy and Practical Reason

This article points out an internal tension, or even conflict, in the conceptual foundations of Harvey Siegel's conception of critical thinking. Siegel justifies critical thinking, or critically rational autonomy, as an educational ideal first and foremost by an appeal to the Kantian principle of respect for persons. It is made explicit that this fundamental moral principle is ultimately grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomous practical reason as normatively and motivationally robust. Yet this Kantian conception openly conflicts with Siegel's own two‐component theory of critical thinking, which on close inspection turns out to be a version of the Humean conception of instrumental practical reason as normatively and motivationally powerless. It is concluded that Siegel cannot have it both ways: he cannot appeal both to means‐end and to robust rationality. Siegel's Kantian justification of the critical thinking educational ideal is, therefore, found wanting in terms of his own Humean premises.     

From Environmental Education to Ecopolitics. Affirming Changing Agendas for Teachers1

In this paper I examine Peirce's epistemological and ontological theories and indicate their relevance to educational practice. I argue that Peirces conception of Firsts, Seconds and Thirds entails a fundamental ontological realism. I further argue that Peirce does have a theory of truth, that it is a particular non‐traditional ‘correspondence’ theory, consistent with, and implicit in, an over‐arching position of pragmatic realism. Peirce's epistemological position is subject to misinterpretation when the ontological realism on which it rests is overlooked. Finally I suggest that such a re‐consideration of Peirce's pragmatic ontology and epistemology in an educational context is needed.     

What are the Bounds of Critical Rationality in Education?

Since Dilthey we have become used to thinking of reason as having a cultural and historical setting. If we take this insight seriously, then critical rationality or critical thinking can no longer be conceived of as context‐free skills. This paper takes up the line of thought that is elaborated by Christopher Winch in his ‘Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim’ and seeks to explicate it by drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of ‘language games’ and on the re‐evaluation of ‘thinking’ by Theodor Ballauff (a German philosopher of education who was influenced by Martin Heidegger). The overcoming of a solipsistic and idealistic conception of thinking raises questions regarding the pedagogical settings and aims, as well as the problems over the limits of critique in education. A comparison of Ballauff's and Winch's positions reinforces the sense of the significance of critique: although the role of critical rationality within education is ambiguous and precarious, the investigation of autonomy (as an educational goal) shows that critique cannot be limited in any straightforward way.     

Student views concerning evidence and the expert in reasoning a socio‐scientific issue and personal epistemology

This study investigated their views concerning evidence and expert opinion of 10th‐grade students, accessed by an open‐ended questionnaire in the context of a socio‐scientific issue: the cause of flood disasters, and personal epistemology identified by the Learning Environment Preference Questionnaire (LEP). Students' responses to the open‐ended questions showed that when thinking about the flood issue, most students rely heavily on direct and numerical data to draw their conclusions, while experts represented a source of conclusive information. The LEP scores indicated that, in terms of epistemological development, students were mostly at the stage of the ‘multiplicists’ in Perry's model. The statistical analysis suggested that view towards evidence and expert were associated with personal epistemology.     

Dewey as Virtue Epistemologist: Open‐Mindedness and the Training of Thought in Democracy and Education

In epistemology today, the intellectual virtues are receiving renewed attention. Contemporary normative virtue epistemology suggests that a key task of philosophy is not only to study the nature of knowledge and thought, but to promote good thinking. While not regarded as a standard thinker in the tradition of virtue epistemology, Dewey thought like this too. In fact, study of the virtues that make for good thinking plays a key role in Dewey's educational thought, most notably in Democracy and Education. In this paper, I reconstruct Dewey's work on ‘the training of thought’ in Democracy and Education as a form of virtue epistemology. I give particular attention to Dewey's thinking about the virtue of ‘open‐mindedness’ and highlight the touchpoints and differences between Dewey's conception of open‐mindedness and contemporary accounts.     

Critical Thinking as a Normative Practice in Life: A Wittgensteinian Groundwork

On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing‐things‐aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of the practical, and yet contends that a reasonable person lets rules of rationality compel her. These rules are not mere heuristics. I further examine Burbules' conception of communicative reason, and, among others, his interpretation of Wittgenstein's sign‐post example.     

Lockean Social Epistemology

Locke's reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. In particular Michael Welbourne, in his article ‘The Community of Knowledge’ (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge, claiming that he ‘could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge’. This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific ‘knowledge’ to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what we would call ‘testimonial knowledge’ in appropriate esteem. This can be shown by his careful distinction between testimony and mere received opinion. Furthermore, this distinction is dependent upon a knowledge community which enables hearers of testimony to access alternative accounts. In view of this, we can consider Locke's Conduct of the Understanding in a new light. Dedicated to the autodidact adult, The Conduct directs the learner to reason clearly and well. One goal is to render adult students capable of assessing testimony. The advice given is social in nature. The student must not limit his study to ‘one sort of men or one sort of books’. Otherwise, he faces the sort of cognitive isolation which would render him a mere receiver of opinion. The picture of Locke that emerges is not that of a dyed‐in‐the‐wool sceptic regarding testimonial knowledge, but of a philosopher who formed an embryonic social epistemology embedded within a programme of adult education.     

Figures of Disengagement: Charles Taylor,Scientific Parenting,and the Paradox of Late Modernity

In this essay Luc Van den Berge and Stefan Ramaekers take the idea(l) of “scientific parenting” as an example of ambiguities that are typical of our late‐modern condition. On the one hand, parenting seems like a natural thing to do, which makes “scientific parenting” sound like an oxymoron; on the other hand, a disengaged stance informed by the latest scientific findings is uncritically demanded of parents, as such an approach is conceived of as a panacea. Instead of taking sides in this discussion, the authors seek a way to make sense of it, drawing upon the work of Charles Taylor, who offers a striking account of our contingent modern condition as well as of our ontological human constitution. They focus particularly on two examples Taylor gives where the contingent self‐understanding does not coincide with our timeless human features. This opens a space for what might be considered paradoxes in our late‐modern Western culture. This essay thus confronts Taylor's philosophy with the new parenting discourse to reveal how our moral horizons have evolved. Following this approach, the authors both expand on Taylor's thinking about our late modernity and at the same time try to assess the new scientific parenting discourse.     

Dangerous Dualisms in Siegel's Theory of Critical Thinking: A Deweyan Pragmatist Responds

Harvey Siegel's conception of critical thinking is riddled with unnecessary and confusing dualisms. He rigidly separates 'critical skill' and 'critical spirit', the philosophical and the causal, 'is' and 'ought', and the moral and the epistemological. These dualisms are easily traced to his desire to defend an absolutist and decontextualised epistemology. To the Deweyan naturalist these dualisms are unnecessary. Appealing to the pragmatist notion of beliefs as embodied habits of action evincing emotion, I show how language, meanings and the mind, including the mind of the critical thinker, emerge from our biological being.     

Moral Rules, Utilitarianism and Schizophrenic Moral Education

R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare's attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis.     

Beyond Epistemological Deficits: Dynamic explanations of engineering students’ difficulties with mathematical sense-making

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students’ difficulties with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology. Students’ beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder the activation and integration of productive knowledge they have. Such explanations, however, risk falling into a ‘deficit trap’—substituting a concepts/skills deficit with an epistemological one. Our interview-based case study of a freshman engineering major, ‘Jim,’ explains his difficulty solving a physics problem (on hydrostatic pressure) in terms of his epistemology, but avoids a deficit trap by modeling the dynamics of his epistemological stabilities and shifts in terms of fine-grained cognitive elements that include the seeds of epistemological expertise. Specifically, during a problem-solving episode in the interview, Jim reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We show that Jim has all the mathematical skills and physics knowledge he would need to resolve the contradiction. We argue that his difficulty doing so stems in part from his epistemological views that (i) physics equations are much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and (ii) physics equations do not express meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. But Jim’s in-the-moment shift to a more sophisticated epistemological stance highlights the seeds of epistemological expertise that were present all along: he does see common sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so), and in some circumstances, this connection is both salient and valued.     

Critical Thinking, Epistemic Virtue, and the Significance of Inclusion: Reflections on Harvey Siegel's Theory of Rationality

Among proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. Siegel argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry. He maintains that epistemic virtues such as inclusion are neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that if we are to avoid falling prey to relativism, criteria are needed to distinguish which of these virtues are indeed rational. However, the author argues that at least some of Siegel's own rational criteria cannot pass the "necessary or sufficient" standard by which he measures epistemic virtues. Moreover, reliance upon criteria fails to settle conflict in cases of disagreement over what constitutes authoritative evidence. Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative rationality can help us to overcome this impasse, because it provides a nonrelativistic basis for justifying inclusion and giving it a place of priority in practical reasoning.     

Epistemology in Excess? A Response to Williams

Emma Williams’ ‘In Excess of Epistemology’ admirably endeavours to open the way to an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one I have defended ad nauseum in recent decades by developing, via the work of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger, ‘a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks’, one that ‘does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.’ In this response I hope to show that much of Williams’ alternative approach is compatible with my own; that, where incompatible, the alternative is problematic; and, finally, that there is a risk of talking past one another, talking at cross‐purposes, that all sides must work to overcome.     

A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking

This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action‐situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual's judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one's moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates viewing critical thinking as a form of judgement that is action‐oriented, spiritual, ethical and interpersonal.     

Critical thinking and the disciplines reconsidered

This paper argues that Moore's specifist defence of critical thinking as ‘diverse modes of thought in the disciplines’, which appeared in Higher Education Research & Development, 30(3), 2011, is flawed as it entrenches relativist attitudes toward the important skill of critical thinking. The paper outlines the critical thinking debate, distinguishes between ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘relativist’ approaches and locates Moore's account therein. It uses examples from one discipline-specific area, namely, the discipline of Literature, to show that the generalist approach to critical thinking does not ‘leave something out’ and outlines why teaching ‘generic’ critical thinking skills is central to tertiary education, teaching and learning, and employment opportunities for students. The paper also defends the assessment of critical thinking skills.     

What Makes a Person British? Children's conceptions of their national culture and identity

During the past decade, the cultural restorationist wing of the New Right has sought to impose its own anachronistic and sentimental conception of ‘British culture’ on schools and colleges. This conception, which is little more than a glib celebration of quintessential ‘Englishness’, characterises the national culture in largely monolithic and ethnically undifferen‐tiated terms. Concerned about the possible pernicious effects of educational policies inspired by such thinking, we present the findings of a recently completed ethnographic study of 8‐11 year‐olds’ conceptions of British national culture. Our paper considers the extent to which children's understanding of this complex form of collective identity may vary with age, and ethnicity. We conclude by exploring the implications of the findings for anti‐racist and multicultural education.     

Goldman and Siegel on the Epistemic Aims of Education

Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel's position intuitively more plausible than Goldman's, we also find Siegel's defence of it wanting. We suggest novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel's own arguments but look to us more promising.     

Bhaskar's Critical Realism and Educational Knowledge

As a critical realist Bhaskar is concerned with ‘emancipatory social practice’. For him the world cannot be changed rationally unless it is interpreted adequately and this interpretation has as its prerequisite the philosophical idea of the independent existence of the natural and the social world; he extends his ideas from the sciences directly into the social sciences. His organising theme is: the nature of, and the prospects for, human emancipation. This article is an attempt to give Bhaskar's ideas some exposure among those working in the sociology of education. It opens with a brief history of recent social epistemological thought in education, using critiques of Quine, Dewey and Popper as a backdrop to introducing Bhaskar. It concludes with an expository account of Bhaskar's conception of discovery, points to its strengths and relevance for education, and presents an interpretation of its stages.     

Organizational epistemology,education and social theory

Organizational learning or epistemology has emerged in order to manage the creation of knowledge and innovation within contemporary capitalism. Its insights are being applied also to the public sector. Much of the research in organizational learning has drawn upon the discipline of psychology, particularly constructivist theory. Two approaches in organizational epistemology are considered here: Nonaka’s theory of knowledge creation, and Engeström’s expansive learning theory. Notwithstanding the reference to ‘learning’, these approaches have so far had little application to schools, especially at the level of pedagogy. But there are indications that re‐culturing, ‘workforce re‐modelling’ and inter‐agency working are becoming more prominent within the public services in England. In these endeavours, government may come to regard organizational epistemology as an important new procedure in the management of change. Thus far, sociology has had two kinds of ‘relationship’ with organizational epistemology: first, social phenomenology and ethnomethodology have been of practical use; and, second, critical theory objects to the near‐absence of a consideration of power and ideology within the discourse of organizational epistemology.