Moral Rules, Utilitarianism and Schizophrenic Moral Education

R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’ for their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian,‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very frequently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare's attempt to balance these two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a ‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis.     

道德原则的困境与当代康德式伦理学的辩护

从微观角度看,道德原则是对"我应当做什么"这一问题的回答,从宏观角度看,道德原则又是对人类的行为和生活方式提出的规范与期望,因此道德原则的普遍性与有效性不仅是康德伦理学需要说明的问题,同时也与我们能否在生活世界中共享一些行动原则从而实现相互理解并尽可能地减少冲突等现实问题密切相联。面对康德意义上传统的道德原则在现代社会语境中遭遇的一些理论与实践方面的困境,当代建构式的康德伦理学进行了一种积极的探索与辩护。     

On Moral Luck and Nonideal Moral Education

In contrast to the Kantian principle that we are morally accountable only for those actions over which we have control, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, and others have argued that luck plays a significant role in the moral life. Put briefly, moral luck is at play when we are appropriately praised or blamed for our moral actions despite the fact that at least some aspects of what we are being judged for lie beyond our control. In this essay, Ann Chinnery discusses the concept and various types of moral luck, and draws on two news stories from the summer of 2013 (one involving an incident in the United States and the other in the United Kingdom) in order to suggest that a nonideal approach to moral education could go some way toward mitigating the morally limiting effects of “constitutive bad luck.”     

Moral Intuitions,Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning1

In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model for moral development, proposed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, not only teaches us how we acquire intuitive moral judgements, it also shows the interconnectedness of intuitive thinking and deliberate reasoning. Analysing the expertise model in more detail, I show that it cannot do justice to the importance of reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are needed because we expect people to be able to argue for their standpoints. I conclude that moral education should not only aim at improving intuitive moral judgements, but also at acquiring reasoning skills.     

论网络社会的道德规范

网络社会已经是我们生活的一部分和生活的环境,新的网络生活世界、交往方式、关系结构,需要有相应的交往规则系统来框定社会交往范型,明确基本权利义务关系。新的网络社会空间中,人也应当有自己的精神家园,建设自己灵魂的居所。因此应当提供一个具有合理性与现实有效性的意义系统,这个意义系统就是网络社会的新型道德规范。     

Sustaining Hegemony: Educational Use of Photographs Representing Human Distress

The use of photography representing human distress in higher education warrants moral attention, owing to the imperative that we avoid objectifying the vulnerable communities who are often represented in those images. Assuming the fundamental Kantian precept that we should always treat others as ends and never merely as means, I extend this precept to include the photographic representation of human distress which involves vulnerable others. This I explore by drawing on the critical theory of Horkheimer and the critical pedagogy of Gottesman. The tendency to decontextualise and depoliticise the act of ‘using’ photographs freely available in the public domain serves to consolidate the status quo and sustain the existing hegemony that allows such use and guides our moral judgements. Derrida, I suggest towards the end of my paper, has some illuminating things to say about this.     

康德道德哲学中的实践理性

康德的道德哲学是个演绎的体系,完全从理性原则出发。也正是这种理性的法则完全排斥了经验的成分,因而强调它的纯粹性,其目的就是为了维护道德的纯洁性。但是,康德严肃主义的道德哲学也有其内在的矛盾性,即这种完全从自我的理性原则出发的道德实践在现实生活中必然遭遇到它的悖谬,因而可以说。康德的道德辩证法就是理性与经验的斗争法则。此外,康德为了使得这种纯粹的实践理性能够在现实中获得它的合理性。也同样允许具有合理倾向的实践经验的存在。但尽管如此,他的实践理性还是保持在原子式的个体之内。     

Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?

There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related 'fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork 's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy.     

德育工作的精髓是"无为而治"--中美学校德育的差异与思考

我国有专门的德育课程,有专设的德育机构,还有专管德育的各层次的负责人,但学生的道德状况仍然存在严重的问题,可谓“有为难治”;美国的学校没有“德育”概念,不承认有“德育”工作,可是学生的文明素质却比我们要好,可谓“无为而治”。由此而见,我们的德育必须做深入性的思考和根本性的改革。     

Education for Moral Integrity

This paper focuses on coherence and consistency as elements of moral integrity, arguing that several kinds of—mostly second‐order—virtues contribute to establishing coherence and consistency in a person's judgements and behaviour. The virtues relevant for integrity always accompany other, substantive virtues, and their associated values, principles and rules. In moral education we teach children all kinds of substantive virtues with integrity as our goal. Nevertheless, many adults do not attain moral integrity, although they are clearly not immoral. What precisely are they lacking? Education for moral integrity should focus on strengthening motivational self‐sufficiency, furthering critical and imaginative thinking and promoting moral unity.     

Wonder and Moral Education

Many authors have claimed a moral and educational significance for wonder. In this article Anders Schinkel assesses these claims in order to address the question whether we do indeed have reason to stimulate the sense of wonder and to provoke experiences of wonder in education with a view to its moral effects or importance. Are there moral effects of wonder — or does wonder have a moral significance — that give us a (further) reason to promote children's sense of wonder and to attempt to elicit the experience of wonder in children? And if so, will any experience of wonder do, from a moral perspective, or do only some experiences of wonder — in specific contexts, or with a specific object — have the desired effect? Schinkel argues that, although there is certainly a case to be made for wonder's moral (educational) importance, it needs to be made cautiously. Wonder coheres more easily with some emotions and attitudes than with others, but in the end its moral significance depends to a large extent on how we interpret or make sense of our wonder and what we wonder at. In moral education, therefore, the value of wonder depends on how it is framed and morally charged.     

The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory

From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research.     

论实践哲学中的意志自由与道德至善

在实践哲学领域中,特别是在康德的哲学思想中,其运用纯粹理性的方式对意志自由和至善做出了深刻的论述。而在近代以来,人们充分挖掘理性的同时,依然认识到追求至善是人的自身的目的所在。对道德至善与意志自由的关系进一步分析,得出意志自由是实现道德至善不可缺少的前提,并且实现道德至善又是意志自由的终极目标。     

大德育反思:一种基于德育政策视角下的实践建构

无所不包的大德育是我国的特色,并且得到了国家德育决策者的确认。从政策层面重新审视大德育,将道德教育作为整个德育的奠基平台,以其为核心推动大德育的协调发展,在某种程度上可以改变大德育的混乱状态,既为国家德育政策变革与完善提供思路,也为中小学德育实践的深入推进提供政策支撑与方向引领。     

中国传统伦理观的认识与反思

儒家关于家庭关系及其伦理规范的观念，是儒家人伦思想和道德原则的主要内容。中国传统伦理学认为孝与悌－－亲情，是处理家庭亲缘关系的道德规范；朋与友－－友情、夫与妇－－爱情，是处理社会关系的道德规范。它们是建设家庭、社会伦理道德的化资源。在挖掘这些资源的过程中，需要赋予它新的内涵。反思中国传统的家庭伦理观，在新形势下有必要进行一系列的道德教育，做到爱人以浓情、修已以正心。     

博采众长,探求高校德育新理念下的德育方法

近年来高校在德育实践中已基本形成了一致的德育新理念,即以人为本,促进人的全面发展。围绕这一理念,各高校都在积极探索,取得了许多各具特色的德育经验和方法,这是德育工作者可以利用的宝贵资源。本文认为,虽然各高校的实际情况有所不同,但是反映共同德育理念和一般德育规律的经验,还是值得互相借鉴。作为德育工作者,除了自己潜心研究德育方法以外,也要以开放的心态虚心学习,充分利用现有资源,博采众长,以便迅速有效地找到适合本校的德育方法。     

The Role of Feelings in Kant's Account of Moral Education

In line with familiar portrayals of Kant's ethics, interpreters of his philosophy of education focus essentially on its intellectual dimension: the notions of moral catechism, ethical gymnastics and ethical ascetics, to name but a few. By doing so, they usually emphasise Kant's negative stance towards the role of feelings in moral education. Yet there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: Kant writes that the inclinations to be honoured and loved are to be preserved as far as possible. This statement is not only at odds with Kant's general claim that education should not encourage feelings, but more importantly, it encourages a feeling that is in many ways paradigmatically un‐Kantian. How are we to understand the fact that of all feelings, the love of honour should be preserved? To answer this question, I begin by clarifying the reasons behind Kant's negative stance towards feelings in moral education. I then turn to his account of the feeling of love of honour. After distinguishing between its good and its bad forms, I consider two ways of making sense of the positive role Kant assigns to it. The first, modest reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour is morally useful because it has two functions: an epistemic one, and a motivational one. The second, more ambitious reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour enables the child to experience her inner worth as bearer of value.     

Education without Moral Worth? Kantian Moral Theory and the Obligation to Educate Others

This article examines the possibility of a Kantian justification of the intrinsic moral worth of education. The author critiques a recent attempt to secure such justification via Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends. He gives four reasons why such an account would deny any intrinsic moral worth to education. He concludes with a tentative justification of his own and a call for a more comprehensive engagement between Kant's moral theory and the philosophy of education for purposes of understanding what constitutes the moral core of education.     

Popper's Third World: Moral habits,moral habitat and their maintenance

If we accept Popper's idea that the human habitat is described in terms of three worlds, and that there are overlaps between these three worlds, our moral actions and values will also be subject to the same kinds of consideration as a repertoire of behaviours exhibited in a physical environment. We will develop moral habits in a moral habitat and our moral behaviours will also be dependent on the kind of moral habitat in which we find ourselves.

There are three main problems to which this analysis leads and on which we will focus in this paper. Firstly, there is the problem of the kind of moral environment—habitat—that we need to provide for human beings if they are to develop the kinds of moral values that we hold to be important. Secondly, there is the question of how we are to develop the kinds of moral habits themselves and thirdly, there is the question of how these moral habits and habitat are to be maintained. If we take Popper seriously then human beings have a crucial responsibility in the creation of a moral third world—that is, a habitat in which human beings can flourish. Schools have an important role as a moral habitat for the inculcation of good moral habits.     

The relevance of cosmopolitanism for moral education

In this article we defend a moral conception of cosmopolitanism and its relevance for moral education. Our moral conception of cosmopolitanism presumes that persons possess an inherent dignity in the Kantian sense and therefore they should be recognised as ends‐in‐themselves. We argue that cosmopolitan ideals can inspire moral educators to awaken and cultivate in their pupils an orientation and inclination to struggle against injustice. Moral cosmopolitanism, in other words, should more explicitly inform the work that moral educators do. Real‐world constraints on moral action and the need to prioritise one’s sometimes conflicting responsibilities will often qualify cosmopolitan justice as supererogatory. This fact does not absolve persons from aspiring to see themselves as having the moral obligation to help others in need, while recognising that their factual obligations are more modest in being bound by what they are actually able to do.